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This master’s thesis examines German teachers’ initial experience of the first PISA (Programme for International 
Student Assessment) study. German pupils’ low PISA scores caused a public and political shock in German 
educational discussion at the beginning of the 2000s. As a case example, teachers in the largest union of educational 
workers in Germany, the Gewerkschaft Erziehung und Wissenschaft (GEW) are scrutinised using the GEW’s 
membership magazine, Erziehung und Wissenschaft (E&W) as research material. Examining teachers as a case 
group provides deepening insights into the extent to which PISA affected the educational self-understanding in 
Germany. 
 
The objective is to contribute to the understanding of how international comparative studies influence educational 
discourse in a national context. Educational researchers have criticised the acceptance of PISA as an indicator of 
success between school systems and the extent it affects educational policy, drawing attention to PISA’s institutional 
background as initiated by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). In the light of the 
criticism, the analysis focuses on the GEW actors’ perception of PISA as an institution. The research material is 
analysed from the perspective of history of ideas and policy analysis with an attempt to trace the experiences of the 
various actors within the GEW. Through Reinhard Koselleck’s concepts of space of experience and horizon of 
expectations, the actors’ conceptualisation of their past, present and future is elucidated. Carol Bacchi’s analytic tool 
for studying problem representations by probing them with questions guides the methodological approach.  
 
The analysis shows that the PISA results were seen to reveal the problems of German education and to indicate the 
successful educational policy of the high-ranking countries. The PISA discussion concentrated on arguing against 
certain structural and cultural aspects of German education that were perceived to be problematic. Although the 
research material illustrated some multiplicity of political opinion within the organisation, the GEW’s resistance to the 
tripartite German school system became a prominent message in the magazine. The high PISA scores in other 
countries thus functioned as arguments for comprehensive schooling. Additionally, teachers’ attitudes and values were 
depicted as the problems of German education compared to successful countries.   
 
These discourses portrayed Germany to be far behind in international educational development. Consequently, other 
countries were often viewed as a homogeneous group. German education was likewise treated as an entity, despite 
the federal structure of the German school system. Attention was, therefore, hardly paid to the contextual factors 
behind each country’s educational system. Rather, the ranking positions were seen to indicate the success or failure of 
the system.  
 
Based on the E&W material analysed in this thesis, the institutional background of PISA was not discussed within the 
GEW. It is noteworthy that although free trade and market-orientation were perceived to threaten public education, 
PISA and the OECD were not discussed in this context. Moreover, German educational tradition, known as Bildung, 
was not considered to be in conflict with the OECD’s conceptualisation of education, although this has caused criticism 
among many German educationists.  
 
There was a selective tendency of how arguments were framed with PISA and what was considered successful. The 
assumptions and silences conveyed a tone of absolute certainty regarding what ought to result from PISA; it was 
represented as scientific evidence contrasting the perceived ideological policymaking in Germany. Despite the rigid 
dichotomies in the arguments, the assertions surrounding PISA came to reflect the ambiguity of the argumentation that 
previous research has also pointed out in the PISA discourses. The assertions and beliefs concerning PISA were not 
eventually coherent, yet the contradictions were not discussed in the magazine. The analysis of the E&W material 
demonstrates a typical example of taking PISA as a given authority and using the assessment results to legitimise 
political arguments in national debates. The results support previous concerns regarding the need for further 
consideration of the political function and influence of large-scale educational assessments.  
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OECD:n toteuttama koululaisten osaamista mittaava PISA-tutkimus (Programme for International Student 
Assessment) aiheutti shokin saksalaisessa koulutuskeskustelussa joulukuussa 2001, kun Saksa sijoittui odotettua 
heikommin. Tässä pro gradu –työssä tarkastellaan saksalaisten opettajien ensitulkintoja tilanteesta keskittyen PISA-
keskusteluun Saksan suurimman opettajajärjestön GEW:in (Gewerkschaft Erziehung und Wissenschaft) 
jäsenlehdessä E&W:ssä (Erziehung und Wissenschaft). Tutkimusasetelma nojaa kasvatus- ja koulutustieteilijöiden 
huomioihin ylikansallisten toimijoiden lisääntyvästä koulutuspoliittisesta vaikutusvallasta. Aiemman kritiikin valossa 
tutkimusintressinä on opettajien suhtautuminen myös PISA:n institutionaaliseen taustaan. Syventymällä yksittäisen 
ryhmän PISA-keskusteluun tutkielma pyrkii lisäämään ymmärrystä laajamittaisten vertailevien tutkimusten 
vaikutuksista kansallisen tason koulutusdiskursseihin.  
 
Tutkimusmateriaalia analysoidaan aatehistorian ja politiikan analyysin näkökulmista. Teoreettisilta lähtökohdiltaan 
tutkielma nojaa Reinhard Koselleckin kokemustilan ja odotushorisontin käsitteisiin, joiden avulla GEW:n jäsenten 
PISA-tulkintoja eritellään historiallisten toimijoiden omassa ajassaan rakentamina käsityksinä menneestä ja 
tulevasta. Carol Bacchin työkalu yhteiskunnallisten ongelmanmäärittelyiden analysoimiseen puolestaan ohjaa 
avaamaan opettajien argumentaatioon sisältyviä taustaoletuksia ja aukkoja.  
 
GEW:n lehdessä PISA-tulosten nähtiin todistavan saksalaisen koulupolitiikan väitetyt ongelmakohdat. Huolimatta 
lehden paikoin moniäänisestä sisällöstä ja lukijakunnasta keskeiseksi viestiksi muodostui tulkinta saksalaisesta 
koulujärjestelmästä epätasa-arvoa tuottavana mekanismina, jota oli lähdettävä uudistamaan PISA-tulosten 
viitoittamalla tiellä. PISA-kirjoittelussa painottui GEW:in vastustus Saksan vallitsevaa hierarkkista 
rinnakkaiskoulujärjestelmää kohtaan: tärkeimpänä muiden maiden menestystekijänä esitettiin 
yhtenäiskoulujärjestelmä ja siihen liittyviksi oletetut kulttuuriset arvot sekä opettajien asenteet. Syntyi vaikutelma, 
että Saksa oli jäänyt jälkeen kansainvälisestä kehityksestä, jota muiden maiden uskottiin seuranneen. Näin ollen 
ongelmanmäärittelyistä välittyi sekä ulkomaiden esittäminen homogeenisenä massana että saksalaisen koulun 
kuvaaminen yhtenäisenä huolimatta Saksan osavaltioiden koulupoliittisesta itsehallinnosta.  
 
Merkittävää on lehden PISA-keskustelusta puuttuva kunkin maan ja koulutusjärjestelmän kontekstin punnitseminen. 
Toimijat tulkitsivat PISA:ssa sijoittumista varsin kritiikittömästi joko menestyneen tai epäonnistuneen 
koulutuspolitiikan indikaattorina. PISA:n merkitys argumenteille myös vaihteli, vaikka muiden maiden 
menestystekijöitä tarkasteltiin nimenomaan PISA:aan liittyvänä keskusteluna. Mielenkiintoista on se, että vaikka 
globalisaation ja markkinaperiaatteiden ulottuminen julkiseen koulujärjestelmään nähtiin uhkana, samassa 
yhteydessä ei keskusteltu PISA:n ja sen käsitteistön leviämisestä kansallisiin koulutusjärjestelmiin. Saksalaisen 
Bildung-tradition ja PISA:n edustaman koulutusymmärryksen yhteensopivuutta ei myöskään kyseenalaistettu.  PISA-
tutkimukseen suhtauduttiin siis ylhäältä annettuna auktoriteettina, johon viittaamalla perusteltiin väitteitä 
tieteellisyyden nimissä vastakohtana esimerkiksi poliitikkojen väitettyihin ideologisiin käsityksiin. Tulokset 
havainnollistavat, kuinka PISA:n kaltainen työkalu voidaan valjastaa poliittisen argumentoinnin apuvälineeksi 
vetoamalla tieteellisen tutkimuksen todistusvoimaan.  
 
GEW:in PISA-keskustelu vahvistaa aiemman tutkimuksen huomioita PISA:aan nojaavan koulutuspoliittisen 
argumentaation haastavuudesta. Toimijoiden argumentaatio oli osin epäjohdonmukaista. Toisaalta lehdessä oli 
esillä ristiriitaisia väitteitä siitä, miten PISA-tuloksia pitäisi hyödyntää konkreettisesti koulunkäynnin ja oppimisen 
parantamiseksi. Ristiriidoista ei kuitenkaan juuri keskusteltu. Samanaikaisesti useat koulutuspoliittiset 
ongelmanmäärittelyt päätyivät ehdottomiin vastakkainasetteluihin esittäessään, että PISA:sta voitaisiin tehdä joko 
oikeita tai vääriä johtopäätöksiä. Silti ei lopulta ollut selvää, mitä PISA:n perusteella oli toimijoiden mukaan 
mahdollista sanoa. Tämä ei kuitenkaan heikentänyt PISA:lle epäsuorasti myönnettyä valta-asemaa. Tulokset 
vahvistavat aiemman tutkimuksen osoittamaa tarvetta huomioida laajamittaisten osaamisvertailujen vaikutusta 
koulutusdiskursseihin ja uskomuksiin.  
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1 Introduction 
 
Since its first cycle of assessing the student achievement in 2000, the Programme for 
International Student Assessment (PISA) conducted by the Organisation of Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) has attracted exceptional attention throughout 
the educational world. Conducted every three years, PISA measures the competence of 
15-year-olds in mathematics, natural science and reading literacy.  
 
Germany in particular reacted intensively to the PISA results, in which it ranked notably 
below the OECD average in all three subjects out of the 32 countries that participated in 
2000. Additionally, Germany had one of the strongest correlations between 
socioeconomic background and achievement. The media coverage and public 
discussion of PISA in Germany extended that of any other participating country, so that 
German PISA reactions have been characterised as a “shock”.1 The media reported a 
“PISA fiasco” and an “educational catastrophe” and for example Der Spiegel asked on 
its cover, whether German pupils were “stupid”.2 The Standing Conference of Länder 
Ministers for Culture and Education in Germany (Kultusministerkonferenz, KMK) 
called an emergency meeting and announced a list of measures as a reaction to PISA.3 
Observers have stated that PISA did not only cause a discursive shift in Germany but 
also changed the way German educational politics were arranged.4 In this master’s 
thesis I examine the German PISA shock from the perspective of German teachers.  
 
                                                
1 Niemann, Dennis (2010) Deutschland – Im Zentrum des PISA-Sturms. In Knodel, Philipp, 
Martens, Kerstin, de Olano, Daniel & Popp, Marie (eds.) Das PISA-Echo: Internationale 
2 Sind deutsche Schüler doof? Magazine cover. Der Spiegel 50/2001, 10 December 2001. 
http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-20960854.html. Accessed 20 February 2018; Darnstädt, 
Thomas, Koch, Julia, Mohr, Joachim, Neumann, Conny, Wensierski, Peter (2001) PISA-Fiasko: 
Das Land der Dichter un Denker – abgehängt. Spiegel Online, 14 December 2001. 
http://www.spiegel.de/lebenundlernen/schule/pisa-fiasko-das-land-der-dichter-und-denker-
abgehaengt-a-172574.html. Accessed 20 February 2018.  
3 Kultusministerkonferenz (KMK) (2002) PISA 2000 – Zentrale Handlungsfelder. 
Zusammenfassende Darstellung der laufenden und geplanten Maßnahmen in den Ländern. 
Beschluss der 299. Kultusministerkonferenz vom 17./18.10.2002. 
http://www.kmk.org/fileadmin/Dateien/veroeffentlichungen_beschluesse/2002/2002_10_07-
Pisa-2000-Zentrale-Handlungsfelder.pdf. Accessed 30 March 2018; Niemann, 72. 
4 Ertl, Hubert (2006) Educational standards and the changing discourse on education: the 
reception and consequences of the PISA study in Germany. Oxford Review of Education, 32(5), 
619–634; Niemann, 59–60.  
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1.1 Research task 
 
Among the countless contributions to the German PISA reactions, this thesis focuses on 
the historical event of the German PISA shock with a case study of teachers’ 
perspective on PISA. Despite the cornucopia of literature on the German PISA case, 
teachers’ point of view on the issue has not attracted much inquiry in Germany. 
Teachers are the actors facing the reality and consequences of educational policymaking 
in their everyday professional life, yet from their position they have no direct influence 
on politics. Still, or perhaps consequently, research concerning the influence of large-
scale assessments in Germany has mainly concentrated on examining the effect on 
policy and media.5  
 
I have selected the largest teachers’ union in Germany, Gewerkschaft Erziehung und 
Wissenschaft (GEW) as the case group of educational workers. I will analyse their 
direct interpretations of PISA by looking at the PISA discussions and discourses in the 
membership magazine of the organisation, Erziehung und Wissenschaft (E&W) directly 
after the publication of the results in December 2001. Investigating the roles attributed 
to PISA within a small group provides insights into the extent of its ascendancy as a 
transnational policy instrument at national level debates. While analysing how the 
actors commented the PISA situation, this thesis presumes that they simultaneously 
interpreted and gave meanings to the whole institution of PISA.  
 
The OECD launched PISA for the very purpose of assisting governments and the public 
to monitor and improve their national school systems with comparable data on 
educational outcomes between participant countries. Unlike earlier large-scale studies, 
PISA was not designed to measure the mastery of curricular contents of each country; 
instead, it was intended to assess the ability of young people at the end of compulsory 
schooling age to apply what they had learnt in “real life situations”. The intention of 
such a large-scale assessment was therefore based on the argument that, PISA would 
                                                
5 E.g. Martens, Kerstin & Niemann, Dennis (2013) When Do Numbers Count? The Differential 
Impact of the PISA Rating and Ranking on Education Policy in Germany and the US. German 
Politics, 22(3), 314–332; Tillmann, Klaus-Jürgen, Dedering, Kathrin, Kneuper, Daniel, 
Kuhlmann, Christian & Nessel, Isa (2008) PISA als bildungspolitisches Ereignis: Fallstudien in 
vier Bundesländern. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften; Ringarp, Johanna (2016) 
PISA lends legitimacy: A study of education policy changes in Germany and Sweden after 
2000. European Educational Research Journal, 15(4) 447–461. 
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provide evidence on how well national educational systems prepared students to meet 
the needs of the 21st century economic realities.6 In times of a dominant knowledge 
economy discourse7, which promotes the belief in the linkage of educational 
achievement and economic growth, such an assertion is likely to receive acceptance and 
increase the interest in achievement assessments. However, Phillip Brown and Hugh 
Lauder among others have questioned the common assumptions that demand for 
technical skills would be increasing in the future and that higher skill levels would 
result in high returns.8  
 
Meanwhile, the significance that international organisations such as the OECD have 
gained in defining educational goals through large-scale assessments has drawn 
educational researchers and social scientists to scrutinise these new processes of global 
educational governance. The widespread acceptance of the PISA studies by 
governments and educationists worldwide has increased critical analyses on its impact 
on national policymaking and educational discourse.9 In 2014, academics from the field 
of education sent an open letter to the OECD’s PISA Director Andreas Schleicher, 
expressing concerns that PISA would have a negative influence on national educational 
systems and that it would narrow the understanding of education.10  
 
In the German public discussion other national models of education and international 
comparison played an essential role as well.11 Kerstin Martens and Dennis Niemann 
among others have explained the particular intensivity of the German response to PISA 
by stating that Germans were under the historical impression of being educationally 
                                                
6 OECD (2000) Measuring student knowledge and skills: The PISA 2000 Assessment of 
Reading, Mathematical and Scientific Literacy. Paris: OECD, 3–4, 7–8.  
7 See Bacchi, Carol (2009) Analysing Policy: What is the problem represented to be? French 
Forest, N.S.W.: Pearson, 232–242.  
8 Brown, Phillip & Lauder, Hugh (2012) Globalization, knowledge, and the myth of the magnet 
economy. In Livingstone, D. W. & Guile, David (eds.) The Knowledge Economy and Lifelong 
Learning. A Critical Reader. Rotterdam: Sense Publishers, 117–146.  
9 Sellar, Sam & Lingard, Bob (2014) The OECD and the expansion of PISA: new global modes 
of governance in education. British Educational Research Journal, 40(6), 917–936; Grek, 
Sotiria (2009) Governing by numbers: the PISA ‘effect’ in Europe. Journal of Education 
Policy, 24(1), 23–37; Auld, Euan & Morris, Paul (2016) PISA, policy and persuasion: 
translating complex conditions into education ‘best practice’. Comparative Education, 52(2), 
202–229.  
10 See the debate between the critics and Schleicher in Policy Futures in Education (2014), 
12(7).  
11 E.g. Ringarp.  
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superior and thereby taken aback because of the poor ranking.12 Germany has 
historically had a culturally specific self-perception of Bildung, which cannot be 
translated as mere ‘education’13; this aspect brought an additional starting tone to the 
German PISA discussion.14 Researchers have demonstrated that merely low national 
scores in PISA have not necessarily led to an intensive consideration of the assessment. 
Instead, local contextual factors can better explain the character of the national 
response.15  
 
Teachers’ discussion concerns a variety of societal flows; thus their contribution to the 
debate did not take place in a vacuum. Moreover, the PISA discussion fundamentally 
involved a research perspective, as the objective of PISA is directed at the aim of 
evidence-based policymaking; that is, the utilisation of scientific knowledge to inform 
policymakers.16 Bellmann has discussed the German PISA debate drawing attention to 
the power relations between researcher knowledge, political decisionmaking and 
educational theory. He claims that while there is an “alliance” between contemporary 
research and educational politics, the PISA discussion has shown that the relation 
between politics and research is not quite clear, as there is no consensus on what 
conclusions should in fact be drawn from the PISA results.17 Consequently, the German 
researcher discussion following the release of PISA 2000 results cannot be overlooked 
when attempting to understand teachers’ interpretations of the German PISA debate. 
The researcher discussion therefore plays an essential role in the analysis chapters, 
where the analysed GEW material is contrasted with contemporary researchers’ 
positions on PISA.  
 
                                                
12 Martens & Niemann, 315, 324; Gruber, 201–202.  
13 It is difficult to find one word to describe the connotations attached to Bildung. Cultivation 
and self-formation are just one aspects to mention. See e.g. Masschelein, Jan & Ricken, Norbert 
(2003) Do We (Still) Need the Concept of Bildung? Educational Philosophy and Theory, 35(2), 
139–154.  
14 See Horlacher, Rebekka (2011) Bildung. Bern: Haupt Verlag. 
15 Wiseman, Alexander (2013) Policy responses to PISA in comparative perspective. In Meyer, 
Heinz-Dieter & Benavot, Aaron (eds.) PISA, Power, and Policy: the emergence of global 
educational governance. Oxford: Symposium Books, 303–322; Martens & Niemann.  
16 Wiseman, Alexander W. (2010) The Uses of Evidence for Educational Policymaking: Global 
Contexts and International Trends. Review of Research in Education, 34(1), 1–24. 
17 Bellmann, Johannes (2007) Der Pragmatismus als Philosophie von PISA? Zeitschrift für 
Erziehungswissenschaft, 10(3), 421–437. 
5 
In order to understand German educational politics, certain characteristics of the system 
must be taken into account. Firstly, owing to the federal structure of the country, each of 
the 16 Bundesländer has relatively strong autonomy over its own school system. The 
ministers of education in each Bundesland exert power through KMK, the Standing 
Conference of Ministers of Education in Germany (Kultusministerkonferenz), whereas 
the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) has a more subordinate role.18 
Secondly, the German school system differs from most other Western systems due to its 
tripartite structure, where children are allocated at around the age of 11 to separate 
secondary schools. Gymnasium is the highest of three hierarchical school forms offering 
an academic track, whereas Realschule, an intermediate track, and Hauptschule as the 
lowest one prepare the youth for vocational education. Additionally, there exist special 
schools, Sonderschulen, for children with disabilities. Most Bundesländer also have 
Gesamtschulen alongside the selective schools; in these ‘comprehensive’ schools 
different school types are combined in a single school building, yet this does not mean 
that children would always be instructed in mixed-ability groups.19 The federal structure 
and the tracking element of the system are therefore essential aspects to pay attention to 
when analysing the research material.  
 
I will look back to the beginning of the German PISA discussion in order to trace the 
initial interpretations and experience of a group that was not under the pressure of 
implementing policies as the German politicians were. Nevertheless, the GEW as an 
active player in the German educational debates was intrinsically linked to the political 
context20. In fact, according to Klaus-Jürgen Tillmann et al., PISA provided arguments 
for teachers’ unions to criticise those in power.21 Given the attention to educational 
inequality that PISA caused in German education debates22, the viewpoint of the GEW 
is especially interesting because of the strong emphasis they give to social equality 
issues in education23. One of the questions of this thesis is therefore, how the social 
                                                
18 Ertl, 622; Niemann, 61.  
19 Niemann, 62; Ertl 620, 631; Pfahl, Lisa & Powell, Justin J.W. (2011) Legitimating school 
segregation. The special education profession and the discourse of learning disability in 
Germany. Disability & Society, 26(4), 449–462.  
20 Hartong, Sigrid (2011) Basiskompetenzen statt Bildung? Wie PISA die deutschen Schulen 
verändert hat. Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 208.  
21 Tillmann et al., 42–45.  
22 See e.g. Ertl.  
23 GEW (no date) Die GEW stellt sich vor. http://www.gew.de/ueber-uns. Accessed 24 January 
2018.  
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equality aspect relates to the market economy approach to education of the OECD.24 
Johannes Bellmann has suggested that, the OECD’s educational thinking, which he 
claims consists of both the human capital theory and social constructionism, is 
paradoxical and has misled the interpretations of the background of PISA.25 
Consequently, the extent to which the GEW teachers accepted PISA as an institution is 
the main interest of this thesis. By focusing on the early stage of the PISA discussion I 
attempt to trace the first impressions and reactions of the GEW members in order to 
better understand the roles that were attached to PISA in a single national context.  
 
In the following parts of chapter one I describe the approach of this thesis by presenting 
previous literature and the theoretical and methodological framework. Next, I present 
and discuss the research material. I conclude chapter one by presenting the outline of 
this work and the questions that I will apply to the GEW material. In chapters two, three 
and four the research material of the GEW magazine is analysed. The argumentation of 
the GEW material is put into perspective by reflecting it with the contemporary 
researcher discussion particularly in chapter four. Finally, I will discuss the findings in 
chapter five.  
 
1.2 Previous research 
 
This thesis does not concern what PISA does or its actual policy impact. This is already 
a subject of a remarkable amount of research, both in the German context and 
internationally.26 Instead, this thesis will address the discourses surrounding PISA that 
reproduce its ascendancy: how PISA was discussed and what kind of roles the selected 
actors attached to it in a national context. It is therefore necessary to examine the 
                                                
24 On the market economy approach of the OECD, see e.g. Bieber, Tonia & Martens, Kerstin 
(2011) The OECD PISA Study as a Soft Power in Education? Lessons from Switzerland and the 
US. European Journal of Education, 46(1), 101–116; Simola, Hannu, Rinne, Risto, Varjo, 
Janne & Kauko, Jaakko (2013) The paradox of the education race: how to win the ranking game 
by sailing to headwind. Journal of Education Policy, 28(5), 612–633. 
25 Bellmann 2007.  
26 E.g. Knodel, Philipp, Martens, Kerstin, de Olano, Daniel & Popp, Marie (2010, eds.) Das 
PISA-Echo: Internationale Reaktionen auf die Bildungsstudie. Frankfurt am Main: Campus 
Verlag; Breakspear, Simon (2012) The Policy Impact of PISA: An Exploration of the 
Normative Effects of International Benchmarking in School System Performance. OECD 
Education Working Papers, No. 71. Paris: OECD; Ringarp.  
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historical and transnational perspective on the influence of international agencies on 
national educational discourses.  
 
PISA in the international context 
 
At the turn of the 21st century, the influence of globalisation on national educational 
processes had already attracted attention among researchers, who remarked on the 
increasing standardisation of educational models and the growing role of supranational 
actors since World War II.27 Stephen J. Ball drew attention to the diffusion of ideas 
such as the ‘knowledge-based economy’ and the emergence of “magical solutions” to 
educational and societal ‘problems’, and suggested that the global developments were 
leading towards an increasing commodification of education.28  
 
Although governments have gazed into other national educational systems since the 
beginning of the building of nation-states, many researchers have stated that towards the 
end of the 20th century the influence of international actors on national educational 
politics has increased and the nature of comparison changed. Educational outcomes are 
in public and among politicians expected to produce economic success, and the belief in 
fast solutions for more effective and accountable educational systems has gained 
ground.29 António Nóvoa and Tali Yariv-Mashal remarked the growing popularity of 
comparative educational research and its use as a political tool “rather than a research 
method or an intellectual inquiry”.30 In other words, what was referred to as 
‘educational research’ seemed to have gained differential meanings. The need to make 
education scientific by collecting hard data has, according to critics, led to ignoring the 
                                                
27 Dale, Roger (2003) Globalization: A New World for Comparative Education? In Schriewer, 
Jürgen (ed.) Discourse Formation in Comparative Education. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 
2nd ed., 87–109.  
28 Ball, Stephen J. (1998) Big Policies/Small World: An Introduction to International 
Perspectives in Education Policy. Comparative Education, 34(2), 119–130.  
29 Rust, Val D. (2006) Foreign influences in educational reform. In Ertl, Hubert (ed.) Cross-
national attraction in education: accounts from England and Germany. Oxford: Symposium 
Books, 23–33; Kamens, David H. (2013) Globalization and the Emergence of an Audit Culture: 
PISA and the search for ’best practices’ and magic bullets. In Meyer, Heinz-Dieter & Benavot, 
Aaron (eds.) PISA, Power, and Policy: the emergence of global educational governance. 
Oxford: Symposium Books, 117–139.  
30 Nóvoa, António & Yariv-Mashal, Tali (2003) Comparative research in education: a mode of 
governance or a historical journey? Comparative Education, 39(4), 423.  
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contextual variance and complexities of educational phenomena – aspects that others in 
the field considered crucial.31  
 
Moreover, researchers have stated that the ostensibly context-free approach may easily 
lead to reiterating certain policy discourses, recently referring to efficiency, 
accountability and quality in education, by claiming them to be universal goals, even 
though they in fact would aim at national success in global competition.32 Roger Dale 
has commented that while national educational systems should be seen as products of a 
world culture, supranational forces affecting national educational systems ought to be 
also interpreted “through national institutions and traditions”33. In fact, Kerstin Martens, 
Klaus Wolf and Daniel Tröhler have drawn attention to the national interests behind the 
PISA organisation that trace back to the Cold War power structure.34 On the other hand, 
Hannu Simola et al. have pointed out how the “unbearable narrowness of a national 
view” may also lead to blindness when observing how transnational comparison affects 
the national and the local.35 These approaches have prominently guided my topic of 
research to scrutinising the complex relations between what is understood as national 
and international.  
 
One should therefore consider PISA as only one instrument in this larger context of 
globalisation of educational discourse. The wide-reaching acceptance of PISA since its 
launch in 1999 has reinforced the significance of the OECD within the educational 
world.36 This has prompted increasing critical analyses of the reception of PISA in 
                                                
31 Cowen, Robert (2014) Ways of knowing, outcomes and ‘comparative education’: be careful 
what you pray for. Comparative Education, 50(3), 282–301; Simola, Hannu, Rinne, Risto, 
Varjo, Janne & Kauko, Jaakko (2013) The paradox of the education race: how to win the 
ranking game by sailing to headwind. Journal of Education Policy, 28(5), 612–633.  
32 Simola, Hannu & Rinne, Risto (2011) Education Politics and Contigency. In Pereyra, Miguel 
A., Kotthoff, Hans-Georg & Cowen, Robert (eds.) PISA Under Examination: Changing 
Knowledge, Changing Tests, and Changing Schools. Rotterdam: Sense Publishers, 226; 
Kettunen, Pauli (2008) Globalisaatio ja  kansallinen me: kansallisen katseen historiallinen 
kritiikki. Tampere: Vastapaino. 
33 Dale 2003, 88–89.  
34 Martens, Kerstin & Wolf, Klaus D. (2006) Paradoxien der Neuen Staatsräson: Die 
Internationalisierung der Bildungspolitik in der EU und der OECD. Zeitschrift für 
Internationale Beziehungen, 13(2), 145–176; Tröhler, Daniel (2013) The OECD and Cold War 
Culture: thinking historically about PISA. In Meyer, Heinz-Dieter & Benavot, Aaron (eds.) 
PISA, Power, and Policy: the emergence of global educational governance. Oxford: 
Symposium Books, 141–161.  
35 Simola et al. 2013, 613; Kettunen, 2008.  
36 Sellar & Lingard 2014.  
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various national contexts.37 Many critical educational scientists question its 
performative influence and contribution to the ascendancy of standardisation and 
rankings.38  
 
A global pressure of certain politics has created an educational discourse that reinforces 
policy isomorphism and increasing convergence in educational systems.39 Although 
John W. Meyer and others have identified convergence of educational systems as a 
natural development,40 critics point out how international agencies promote certain 
policy themes. Besides standardisation and accountability, concepts such as 
decentralisation, school autonomy and privatisation increasingly appear in the 
vocabulary of educational policymaking across nations. What is often underlined within 
this discourse, is the goal of both equity and excellence: the comparativists are 
commonly driven by the ideal of decreasing educational inequality, although critical 
sociologists such as Nelly Stromquist have stated that in reality, the competitive liberal 
capitalist model seems to gain grounds.41 Jenny Ozga has suggested that the increasing 
emphasis on educational accountability has in fact led to a decline in political and 
professional accountability, whereas a neoliberal, technical understanding of 
accountability has taken root.42 Critical analyses of national PISA reception have also 
remarked that the actual OECD recommendations, for example improving equality 
issues, often do not appear in the national reforms: it is more the legitimacy of PISA-
inspired reforms that drives political forces. Thus, often the politicians seem only to 
                                                
37 Pereyra, Miguel A., Kotthoff, Hans-Georg & Cowen, Robert (2011, eds.) PISA Under 
Examination: Changing Knowledge, Changing Tests, and Changing Schools. Rotterdam: Sense 
Publishers; see also Ozga, Jenny (2012) Assessing PISA. European Educational Research 
Journal, 11(2), 166–171.  
38 Grek 2009; Meyer, Heinz-Dieter & Benavot, Aaron (2013, eds.) PISA, Power, and Policy: the 
emergence of global educational governance. Oxford: Symposium Books; Gorur, Radhika 
(2016) Seeing like PISA: A cautionary tale about the performativity of international 
assessments. European Educational Research Journal, 15(5), 598–616.  
39 Wiseman, Alexander W., Pilton, James & Lowe, J. Courtney (2010) International Educational 
Governance Models and National Policy Convergence. In Amos, S. Karin (ed.) International 
Educational Governance. International Perspectives on Education and Society, vol. 12. Bingley: 
Emerald Group Publishing Ltd, 3–18.  
40 Meyer, John W. & Ramirez, Francisco O. (2000) The World Institutionalization of Education. 
In Schriewer, Jürgen (ed.) Discourse Formation in Comparative Education. Frankfurt am Main: 
Peter Lang, 2nd ed., 111–132.  
41 Stromquist, Nelly P. (2005) Comparative and International Education: A Journey toward 
Equality and Equity. Harvard Educational Review, 75(1), 101–107; Bieber & Martens.  
42 Ozga, Jenny (2013) Accountability as a policy technology: accounting for education 
performance in Europe. International Review of Administrative Sciences, 79(2) 292–309.  
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make use of the ranking rather than actually take interest in the PISA data.43 My 
research setting also pays attention to how teachers responded to these issues.  
 
As mentioned before, these developments are tightly connected to the contemporary 
tendency to connect educational achievement with economic success.44 For the OECD, 
emphasising the capability of the PISA scores to predict national economic performance 
is a fundamental part of its logic and argumentation.45 However, David Berliner and 
Alexander Wiseman among others have criticised the increasing tendency of 
contemporary educational discourse to draw causal connections between assessment 
results and economic growth.46  
 
Wiseman et al. see the economisation of education as part of a more general 
transnational scientized discourse, a growing conviction since World War II that 
societal problems could be solved by rationalizing the social world.47 The appeal of the 
collection of data and comparisons is tightly connected to this kind of rationale, aiming 
at “evidence-based” policymaking and identifying “best practices”, which would result 
in desired educational outcomes.48 Simola has described the discourse praising the 
effectivity of educational reform as “wishful rationalism”, a truth discourse, which 
becomes self-evident and affects what is seen as essential concerning educational 
reform.49 Radhika Gorur has argued that in contemporary times of economic and 
political uncertainty, a narrative of crisis with “proven” solutions is likely to appear 
                                                
43 Sellar, Sam & Lingard, Bob (2013) Looking East: Shanghai, PISA 2009 and the 
reconstitution of reference societies in the global education policy field. Comparative 
Education, 49(4), 464–485; Choi, Álvaro & Jerrim, John (2016) The use (and misuse) of PISA 
in guiding policy reform: the case of Spain. Comparative Education, 52(2), 230–245.   
44 Sellar & Lingard 2013; Bieber & Martens. 
45 E.g. OECD (2010) The high cost of low educational performance. The long-run economic 
impact of improving PISA outcomes. Paris: OECD Publishing; see also Hanushek, Eric & 
Wößmann, Ludger (2010) The economics of international differences in educational 
achievement. CESinfo Working Paper, No. 3037.  
46 E.g. Berliner, David (2015) The Many Facets of PISA. Teachers College Record, 117(1), 1–
20; Wiseman 2010, 11.  
47 Wiseman, Alexander W., Damaschke-Deitrick, Lisa, Bruce, Elizabeth, Davidson, Petrina & 
Taylor, Calley Stevens (2014) Transnational scientized education discourse: A cross-national 
comparison. In Schmid, Josef, Amos, Karin, Schrader, Josef & Thiel, Ansgar (eds.) 
Internationalisierte Welten der Bildung und Bildungspolitik im globalen Vergleich. Baden-
Baden: Nomos, 121–146.  
48 Wiseman 2010.  
49 Simola, Hannu (1998) Firmly bolted into the air: Wishful rationalism as a discursive basis for 
educational reforms. Teachers College Record, 99(4), 731–757.  
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attractive.50 Simola et al. and Ozga have referred to the OECD as a leading force of a 
neoliberal movement, which reinforces “ideologies of technocratic rationality”.51 
Furthermore, it has been noted that reporting the evidence-based method does not 
always mean that it would be the actual method used for political decisions, it is rather 
the legitimacy that quantitative data enjoys that persuades governing agents to make all 
educational policy “evidence-based”.52  
 
Robert Cowen has referred to an “agency voice”, which promotes the message that 
through instruments provided by international organisations such as the OECD, correct 
solutions to educational ‘problems’ could be identified. Another problematic point 
according to Cowen is the “manifestly objective” tone of this kind of comparative 
research, when it presents certain policy reforms as global ‘imperatives’ or “universal 
remedies”. Despite the alleged objectivity, this kind of discourse is in fact increasingly 
political and connected to national and transnational politics.53 Euan Auld and Paul 
Morris have problematised the “crisis rhetoric” of the OECD and consultant agencies 
such as McKinsey as a “story of control”, which these agencies use to legitimate their 
approach to education as the “only reasonable position”.54  
 
Depoliticising the matter in fact makes it easier to offer policy recommendations as 
“neutral”, which reinforces the implicit power of single actors in international 
organisations.55 Researchers have referred to the OECD as a “soft power” in the 
educational world, in order to explain the ascendancy of an organisation, which in fact 
has no legal power over education.56 One could look at the alleged objectivity of the 
agency voice of the OECD and the evidence-based policy discourse through what 
Jürgen Habermas and Max Horkheimer stated about scientism, namely that it “silences 
an important debate about values, informed opinion, moral judgements and beliefs”57. 
Therefore, particularly the definition processes of these alleged ‘problems’ and 
                                                
50 Gorur.  
51 Simola et al. 2013, 613; Ozga 2013.  
52 Wiseman 2010.  
53 Cowen; Grek 2009.  
54 Auld & Morris; see also Gorur.  
55 Grek, Sotiria (2013) Expert moves: international comparative testing and the rise of 
expertocracy. Journal of Education Policy, 28(5), 695–709.  
56 Wiseman 2010, 17; Bieber & Martens.  
57 Habermas 1972, Horkheimer 1972, cited in Manion, Lawrence, Cohen, Louis, Morrison, 
Keith (2013) Research Methods in Education. Abingdon: Routledge, 15.  
12 
ostensibly neutral ‘best practices’ remain interesting for research.  
 
In consequence, instead of expecting that countries or actors within them react 
similarly, it is relevant to ask how interpretations are formed and how they function in 
national contexts. Previous accounts have pointed out that merely poor PISA results 
were not causing strong reactions at a national level58. Building on this, I focus on the 
processes in which the situation is defined problematic, attempting towards a better 
understanding of the mechanisms of political influence at the grassroots level. After all, 
reactions to PISA, although diverging in form, have shown a tendency of what Luís 
Miguel Carvalho has called “convergence towards the tool”, referring to the constitution 
of PISA as a taken-for-granted platform, where interests and meanings are reproduced. 
Carvalho notes that the “existence of PISA depends on the effective connection of 
interested (individual and collective) actors”.59 It is therefore not irrelevant to consider, 
who talks about PISA and how.  
 
PISA in the German context 
 
Previous research on the PISA reception in Germany has highlighted that PISA caused a 
tremendous shift in the educational discourse, which led to a fast establishment of a new 
culture of comparison and determined the discussion in educational politics long after 
the release of the results.60 Tillmann et al. have conducted an exhaustive analysis on the 
politics of the German PISA discussion from the politicians’ perspective and concluded 
that PISA served mostly as a form of legitimation for already existing political 
agendas.61 As stated before, finding such a function for PISA is not unusual in the 
critical educational scientists’ approaches to PISA.62  
 
                                                
58 Martens & Niemann; Wiseman 2013.   
59 Carvalho, Luís Miguel (2012) The Fabrications and Travels of a Knowledge-Policy 
Instrument. European Educational Research Journal, 11(2), 183–184.  
60 Ertl; Niemann; Martens & Niemann.   
61 Tillmann, Klaus-Jürgen, Dedering, Kathrin, Kneuper, Daniel, Kuhlmann, Christian & Nessel, 
Isa (2008) PISA als bildungspolitisches Ereignis: Fallstudien in vier Bundesländern. 
Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.  
62 See e.g. Takayama, K., Waldow, F., Sung, Y.-K. (2013) Finland has it all? Examining the 
media accentuation of Finnish education in Australia, Germany and South Korea. Research in 
Comparative and International Education, 8(3), 307–325; Grek 2009.   
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The impact of PISA in Germany on policy and media has thus been a subject to 
multiple analyses,63 but from rather different perspectives than this thesis. Johanna 
Ringarp has looked at the German case from the conceptual perspective of reference 
societies and legitimacy, but focusing on policy level and examining the main actor of 
German educational politics, the Standing Conference of the Ministers of Education in 
Germany (Kultusministerkonferenz, KMK)64. Many accounts on the German PISA case, 
despite discussing the impact of PISA on policy and discourses, tend to neglect the 
larger context of the PISA institution and the implicit political influence of the 
institution65. Others, such as Margarete Imhof’s study of German teachers’ reception of 
PISA, begin with the presumption that PISA ought to be used to improve teachers’ 
working methods66. Sotiria Grek, however, has pointed out the overarching acceptance 
of PISA in German political and public discourse among other countries; additionally, 
Martens and Niemann place the paradigm shift particularly in the context of global 
governance OECD and the promotion of PISA67. While these studies have mostly 
focused on policy and media, they provide a helpful framework for a case study of a 
specific group such as the GEW.  
 
This master’s thesis is an attempt to examine to what extent the “PISA effect”68 takes 
root at a level closer to the field of educational professionals. Thus, my research interest 
does not merely lie at how PISA results were interpreted and evaluated, but also at how 
the actors related to the institution itself and its background. Analysing how individuals 
and groups outside the initial policy making circle became engaged and made 
conclusions of the situation provides a different vantage point to the extent of the 
authority of PISA. Therefore, the interest of this thesis leans on not only the 
interpretations of PISA, but on how the actors by interpreting the PISA results also 
                                                
63 See Hopfenbeck, Therese N., Lenkeit, Jenny, El Masri, Yasmine, Cantrell, Kate, Ryan, 
Jeanne & Baird, Jo-Anne (2017) Lessons Learned from PISA: A Systematic Review of Peer-
Reviewed Articles on the Programme for International Student Assessment. Scandinavian 
Journal of Educational Research, 61(1), 13–14.  
64 Ringarp.  
65 E.g. Gruber; Ertl.  
66 Imhof, Margarete (2005) Zur Rezeption der Ergebnisse der PISA-Studie durch Lehrer und 
Lehrerinnen: Meinungen und Einstellungen. Unterrichtswissenschaft, 33(3), 255–271. It must 
be noted that although Imhof’s study could at a first glance seem relevant for my thesis as it also 
concerns German teachers’ perception, it derives from the field of pedagogical psychology and 
has therefore a very different research approach.  
67 Grek 2009; Martens & Niemann, 325.   
68 Grek 2009.  
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interpreted the institution itself. In regard to my research interest in the GEW agents’ 
experience, I have additionally examined the context in which they participated in the 
PISA debate, that is, the German researchers discussion, in order to place the GEW 
reactions in their contextual relationships. This is to show that different actors did not 
necessarily relate in a similar way to PISA, some might have questioned the institution 
more than others.  
 
Florian Waldow has touched upon the GEW’s reactions to other national models in the 
case of Finland as a reference society and thereby provided not only substantial but also 
methodological support for my approach. However, his research focus, time frame and 
sources differed from the research settings of this thesis.69 Jesco Kreft has examined the 
GEW positions on PISA as part of his study of German labour unions as actors in 
educational politics. According to Kreft, after the release of PISA a change had 
occurred in the GEW attitudes to international large-scale assessments. Whereas the 
GEW had still questioned the methodology and validity of earlier studies, in its position 
to PISA it increasingly accepted the orientation of large-scale studies and supported a 
thorough educational reform.70  
 
Sigrid Hartong has additionally noted, that the GEW’s criticism was not directed at the 
OECD or at PISA, but at the German implementation of the results. The GEW criticised 
mainly the mentality of exclusion, which according to the GEW prevailed in the 
conservative groups of the German society.71 Although the findings of Kreft and 
Hartong give an indication of the direction of what to expect from my research material, 
it must be noted that their time scopes and approaches differed from my research 
interest in the claims of the agents and evaluation of the institution. I will elucidate 
these aspects of the approach in the next subchapter.  
 
A perspective closer to my viewpoint can be found in Tillmann et al.’s extensive study, 
where they show how PISA results were utilised in political processes in four German 
                                                
69 Waldow, Florian (2010a) Der Traum von ”skandinavisch schlau werden”. Zeitschrift für 
Pädagogik, 56(4), 497–511. 
70 Kreft, Jesco (2006) Gewerkschaften und Spitzenverbände der Wirtschaft als 
bildungspolitische Akteure. Positionen, Strategien und Allianzen. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für 
Sozialwissenschaften, 167; Hartong, 208–209. 
71 Hartong, 210.  
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states. Their work has elucidated how the legitimacy of PISA functioned at a political 
level: what mattered was the public and political acceptance of PISA rather than any 
“empirically proven” results. For instance introducing national standards and all-day 
schooling were legitimated as consequences of PISA although they had been on the 
agenda already before the publication of the assessment.72  
 
However, Tillmann et al. did not link their findings to the larger transnational 
phenomenon of the impact of large-scale assessments on national educational policy 
and discourse. Waldow has criticised Tillmann et al. of this lack of connections to 
international comparative literature, calling the German case “a textbook example of the 
selective use of international in the national policy-making process”.73 This thesis builds 
on Waldow’s remarks on the Tillmann et al. study by choosing the approach from the 
presented international literature. Elsewhere, Dale has examined the education policy 
formation at the EU level and suggested, leaning on Cox (1996), that most work on the 
topic lacks a critical approach, falling to the category of “problem-solving theory”, 
which takes institutions and social power relations for granted74. My approach starts 
from a similar endeavour to look at the German case from a critical perspective giving 
particular attention to the position of the OECD and PISA as institutions in the teachers’ 
discourses. I will analyse a narrow selection of sources with a more thorough lense, 
which takes into account the extent of which national models and international 
influence are taken for granted. 
 
1.3 Theoretical and methodological framework  
 
I have defined as my research task to analyse how German teachers within the union 
GEW interpreted the PISA 2000 results. I will approach this task from two angles: the 
experience and expectations of the GEW and their way of constructing and representing 
problems.  
 
                                                
72 Tillmann et al.  
73 Waldow, Florian (2010b) What PISA did and did not do: Germany after the ”PISA-shock”. 
European Educational Research Journal, 8(3), 482. 
74 Dale, Roger (2009) Contexts, Constraints and Resources in the Development of European 
Education Space and European Education Policy. In Dale, Roger & Robertson, Susan (eds.) 
Globalisation & Europeanisation in Education. Oxford: Symposium Books, 24.  
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Space of experience and horizon of expectation 
 
Firstly, in accordance with the history of ideas, instead of focusing at the conditions 
itself, this thesis looks at how actors of the time experienced and defined the situation. 
The task is, as Markku Hyrkkänen puts it, to “conceive the conceiving of things”.75 In 
order to understand the problematisations of the past individuals, one can lean on what 
Reinhart Koselleck theorised as “the future of the past” (Vergangene Zukunft). With that 
he meant examining how people in the past conceived and made choices concerning 
their future.76 Consequently, the actors’ present experience is to some extent determined 
by their past, and, it is their past in their present experience that guides how they 
conceptualise the future: it guides the histories that they can imagine possible (mögliche 
Geschichten). Experience, as Koselleck formulates, has processed past occurrence; it 
can make the past present and thus bind together fulfilled or missed possibilities within 
one’s own behaviour. Koselleck defined the categories of “space of experience” and 
“horizon of expectation” as tools to better understand the complex connections of past, 
present and future in the action of past agents. With ‘horizon’ Koselleck demonstrates 
the difference of expectations compared to the already experienced — the horizon is a 
line visible in front of us, but in the end impossible to reach.77  
 
Koselleck suggests, that these categories are suitable for the thematisation of historical 
time because they in a sense embody past and future. One thing that history of ideas can 
teach is to refine the human ability of placing oneself into other people’s position78. The 
point of acknowledging these categories from Koselleck as the embodiment of historical 
time in this work is to stay receptive to how meanings are constructed in the research 
material: to what extent and ways the past has a role in the descriptions of the present, 
and how expectations of the future are shaped by what is experienced in the past, and on 
the other hand, how expectations may shape the present.79  
 
Furthermore, Koselleck’s concepts guide to being receptive of the fears, hopes, and 
desires, as well as the rational thinking and the curiousity inherent in the representations 
                                                
75 Hyrkkänen, Markku (2002) Aatehistorian mieli. Tampere: Vastapaino, 41–42.  
76 Koselleck, Reinhard (1989) Vergangene Zukunft. Zur Semantik geschichtlicher Zeiten. 
Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp; Hyrkkänen, 246.  
77 Koselleck, 350–357.  
78 Hyrkkänen, 247. 
79 See Koselleck, 353–359.  
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of problems, which are entangled in the present, the past and the future. Accordingly, 
Koselleck justified the purpose of these concepts in their ability to guide the focus on 
the “concrete units of action” within social or political movement.80 Precisely the 
concept of agency within the GEW connects to the core of my research focus — agency 
within the GEW actors as educational agents but also as political actors participating in 
the political landscape of German education.  
 
According to Koselleck, the connection between experience and expectation always 
also includes a prognosis. Applying this to the German PISA case, one can assume that 
the PISA debate included claims and assumptions of the future. In this regard, 
Koselleck drew attention to how this connection and the prognostic structure of it 
together make visible the possible alternative and changeable character of historical 
time (die Veränderbarkeit geschichtlicher Zeit).81 These categories thus indicate, at best 
put in German, the “Zeitlichkeit des Menschen und der Geschichte”82; they thus make 
more comprehensible the changeability and contingency of human action and thinking. 
That is why I consider them appropriate tools to examine ideas that easily fall into the 
category of taken-for-granted phenomena.  
 
Problem definitions and representations 
 
The second angle builds on the concepts of experience and expectation. Koselleck also 
notes that there is no history existing without it being constituted through the 
experiences and expectations of active human agents.83 This leads to the social 
constructionist approach of Malcolm Spector and John Kitsuse and later Carol Bacchi, 
who in approach to social problems deflected attention away from any ‘objective 
conditions’ to the representations and definitions of conditions.84 In order to trace the 
experience and expectations of the GEW commentators I will ask how they defined the 
situation, which nationwide was problematised as “shocking”. 
 
                                                
80 Koselleck, 350–359. 
81 Koselleck, 357–359.  
82 Koselleck, 354. 
83 Koselleck, 351.  
84 Bacchi, Carol (2009) Analysing Policy: What is the problem represented to be? French 
Forest, N.S.W.: Pearson; Spector, Malcolm & Kitsuse, John I. (1977) Constructing social 
problems. Menlo Park, California: Cummings Pub. Co. 
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In the previous subchapter I discussed the dominant educational discourse in which 
PISA acts as part of the current tendency of advocating evidence-based policymaking in 
Western industrialised societies. Bacchi’s application of challenging such a “paradigm 
of problem solving” provides methodological tools for opening or at least loosening the 
tight knot around taken-for-granted assumptions. There is a lack of consideration of this 
aspect in many accounts analysing the German PISA reactions.85 Therefore, I lean on 
Bacchi’s approach to shift from ‘problem solving’ to ‘problem questioning’. Spector 
and Kitsuse’s thorough work from 1977 elaborates the significance of scrutinising the 
definitions of problems instead of focusing on the ‘problematic’ conditions. With 
Bacchi’s WPR approach, short for “what is the problem represented to be”, one can take 
Spector and Kitsuse’s understanding further.86  
 
Spector and Kitsuse highlight the difference of examining how individuals react to a 
threatening condition from asking, how individuals construct reality by recognising a 
condition and defining it as threatening. Instead of conventionally thinking that 
“troublesome conditions” create dissatisfaction followed by institutional responses, 
Spector and Kitsuse state that “the establishment of an agency authorised to deal with 
certain conditions generates dissatisfactions among populations about conditions that 
previously were unseen or routinely accommodated”.87 The OECD, in its mandate of 
producing solutions to educational problems can be seen as such an agency.  
 
As Spector and Kitsuse point out: “Every experience of displeasure and dissatisfaction 
has its origins in the availability, if not promise, of remedies, cures, reforms, and 
solutions for such troubles.”88 In other words, the definition of something as a problem 
derives from a subjective discovery that it could be changed. In the PISA discourse of 
comparing national models, it is thus the “discovery” of potential success in some 
countries that drives the need to conduct such assessments. Accordingly, a few previous 
analyses on national PISA responses have mentioned that the PISA results as such did 
not cause a shock in itself but that they had to be defined as problematic, which 
                                                
85 E.g. Gruber; Ertl; Imhof; Leschinsky, Achim (2005) Vom Bildungsrat (nach) zu PISA. Eine 
zeitgeschichtliche Studie zur deutschen Bildungspolitik. Zeitschrift für Pädagogik, 51(6), 818–
839.  
86 Bacchi; Spector & Kitsuse.  
87 Spector & Kitsuse, 45, 84. 
88 Spector & Kitsuse, 84.  
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occurred, for instance, in Germany but to a lesser extent in the United States.89   
 
Spector and Kitsuse state, leaning on Blumer (1971): “Deprivation or exploitation or 
even starvation cannot account for how a specific group of people formulate their 
troubles or to whom they turn for redress”.90 Thus, if research focuses on the conditions 
and asks for causes for certain action, the attention is deflected from the process of how 
the actors argue and to whom they direct their arguments, and also what kind of 
assumptions are included in these claims. According to Spector and Kitsuse, all this 
ought to be the material and sources for the researcher. They thereby conceptualise 
problem definitions as claims-making activities. Following this, the researcher looks at 
how claims are expressed and how the agents justify their conduct. A further point from 
Spector and Kitsuse is that motives, values, and interests are not explaining the conduct 
to the researcher, but to the research objects themselves. The process of imputation, the 
perspective of the agents, is the subject matter and part of the data.91 
 
Bacchi’s approach has a more practical tone: it provides a list of questions to apply in 
the source analysis. Firstly, Bacchi starts with asking, what is the problem represented 
to be, and secondly, moves on scrutinising the assumptions that underpin this 
representation. Next, she draws attention to how the representation has come about. In 
this respect, Bacchi’s tool for analysing problematisations in fact grasps the issue in a 
way that complements the history of ideas approach presented above. She highlights the 
need to consider the historical background of problem representations or, as she 
borrows Michel Foucault’s concept, the genealogy of events. This aspect in particular 
treats the representations of inevitabilities by looking at the processes behind 
representations and by revealing implicit power relations. Fourth, Bacchi asks what is 
left unproblematic in the representation of a ‘problem’. Such silences can be identified 
by analysing the assumptions surrounding the problem and by asking, where they might 
distort or misrepresent certain issues. To analyse silences means to examine the 
conditions in which certain problem representations gain dominance while others are 
silenced. Genealogies also contribute to the understanding of silences, since they 
elucidate the problem representations, which have not become dominant.  
                                                
89 Martens & Niemann; Ringarp.  
90 Spector & Kitsuse, 84. Italics added.  
91 Spector & Kitsuse, 72, 95–96.  
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The fifth question enquires into the effects that follow from the representation of the 
problem. Bacchi remarks that effects here are understood differently from a standard 
policy approach, which evaluates measurable ‘outcomes’. Rather, the WPR approach 
identifies more subtle effects: for example discursive effects and subjectification effects. 
In the former category the researcher examines how assumptions and silences 
surrounding the problem representation have an impact on what is considered necessary 
for political action and how they may thereby limit the possibilities to think differently. 
As for subjectification effects, the analysis asks how discourses shape and constitute 
different social roles. Analysing PISA discussion, one might encounter subject positions 
such as pupils and teachers, or politicians and statistic experts. Finally, Bacchi asks how 
and where the representation is produced and how it may ‘travel’.92  
 
In my analysis I will above all focus on the presumptions and silences within the 
research material: what is said and what is left unsaid. Altogether Bacchi’s tool supports 
conceiving problematisation as a framing mechanism, in which some issues are 
emphasised while some are left out. This is how these narratives direct our attention and 
“limit awareness”.93 In other words, representations of problems entail power. Here I 
lean on Foucault’s understanding of power as productive technique and mechanism, as 
relations between actors94. Foucault stated that to govern means to “structure the 
possible field of action of others”.95 Accordingly, Bacchi points out Foucault’s 
definition of discourse as an “asset, the object of political struggle”96. Such action does 
not have to be conscious in order to have power. My approach presupposes that 
disseminating definitions and conceptualisations of phenomena such as PISA may 
affect the actors at the grass root level of educational workers in a similar pattern as 
political governance influences people in society. Reproduction of certain discourses 
does not have to be conscious, but its effect depends on how actively and widely they 
are used97.  
                                                
92 Bacchi, 1–16, 43, 58, 61, 224.  
93 Bacchi, 262–264.  
94 Masschelein & Ricken, 143–144. 
95 Foucault, Michel (1982) The Subject and Power. In Dreyfus, Hubert & Rabinow, Paul (eds.) 
Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and hermeneutics. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 
220–221.  
96 Bacchi, 45.  
97 See Carvalho.  
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Problematising discourses or scrutinising power relations does not, however, aim at 
demonising or depreceating them. As Foucault suggested, all discourses are dangerous, 
but it is not quite the same as bad98. In other words, the aim of drawing attention to the 
ascendancy of PISA and the discourses that have come to surround it is not the same as 
suggesting that one should not conduct research on educational issues or aim at basing 
political decisions on evidence. The point is merely to set influential discourses under 
critical scrutiny99.  
 
Nevertheless, it is not insignificant, which interests and subjective assumptions lie 
behind a research task. Whereas Spector and Kitsuse specifically underline that one 
should refrain from giving attention to whether the claims that the research objects 
make are true or false because it is not the subject matter, Bacchi states that her 
approach has an “explicitly normative agenda”. In fact, by identifying what is left 
unproblematic in a representation the researcher takes a stand on which aspects could 
have been taken into account.100  
 
The line between staying ‘objective’ and having normative agendas is thus rather thin, 
an issue of eternal confrontation for a researcher. Particularly historians, however, work 
by drawing inferences as Jorma Kalela has stated. One is thereby constrained to accept 
the challenge of simultaneously making assumptions and refraining from inferring too 
much. Towards the end of the 20th century historians have increasingly agreed with E. 
H. Carr that recognising one’s preconceptions is a better way to control their influence 
on the research results than trying to set aside the fact that the researcher is inevitably 
connected to his or her society.101 In educational research it is also acknowledged that 
the researcher must acknowledge his or her subjectivity; if the researcher would claim 
to be completely external to his or her research objects, he or she would have chosen the 
positivistic approach, that is, expecting that social phenomena could be researched with 
                                                
98 Foucault 1983, cited in Popkewitz, Thomas S. (2000) National Imaginaries, the Indigenous 
Foreigner, and Power: Comparative Educational Research. In Schriewer, Jürgen (ed.) Discourse 
Formation in Comparative Education. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2nd ed., 294.  
99 See Hopfenbeck et al., 15.  
100 Spector & Kitsuse, 77–78; Bacchi, 44, 68.  
101 See Kalela, Jorma (2000) Historiantutkimus ja historia. Helsinki: Gaudeamus, 57–58, 73–95, 
170–171, 232–235; Hyrkkänen, 252.  
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similar expectations and tools as natural phenomena.102 In the end, Bacchi’s approach 
does not intend to offer any particular program for change, but merely ways to detach 
oneself from dominant discourses and to open up different reflections on them.  
 
To summarise the viewpoints of my approach, two aspects ought to be highlighted. 
Firstly, all the aspects presented concentrate on scrutinising the how instead of the why, 
thus the focus is at the process of argumentation and the active construction of 
meanings. Secondly, the approaches of experience and expectation interlock with 
problem representations since they both acknowledge the alternative character of 
history; both call for the need to grasp that things could have been different and that 
definitions of problems are contingent and path dependent.103 This is the reason why it 
is important to scrutinise representations of “truths” and “inevitabilities” — to loosen 
the knot around the claims of the “only possible options”.  
 
1.4 Research material  
 
The Gewerkschaft Erziehung und Wissenschaft (the German Education Union), GEW, 
is the largest teachers’ union in Germany, representing a wide spectrum of educational 
workers from kindergartens and general education to higher education, adult education 
and research. Founded in 1948, the GEW represented 264 684 educational workers in 
2002.104 The organisation is not only attending to the interests of its members and their 
working conditions, but also campaigning for educational reforms.105  
 
Although the GEW states that it is not a committed to any political party, it has been 
characterised as belonging rather to the left side.106 Compared to other teachers’ 
                                                
102 See e.g. Manion, Lawrence, Cohen, Louis, Morrison, Keith (2013) Research Methods in 
Education. Abingdon: Routledge, 7, 15. 
103 Hyrkkänen, 246; Bacchi, 44; Spector & Kitsuse, 75–76; Koselleck 357–359.  
104 Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (no date) DGB-Mitgliederzahlen 2000–2009. 
http://www.dgb.de/uber-uns/dgb-heute/mitgliederzahlen/2000-2009. Accessed 8 January 2018; 
Kopitzsch, Wolfgang (2017) Die Gründung der Arbeitsgemeinschaft deutscher Lehrerverbände 
(AGDL) 1945 bis 1949 und die Entstehung der GEW (ADLLV). In Dowe, Dieter, Fuchs, 
Eckhardt, Mätzing, Heike Christina & Sammler, Steffen (eds.) Georg Eckert: Grenzgänger 
zwischen Wissenschaft und Politik. Göttingen: V&R unipress, 62.  
105 GEW (no date) The German Education union. http://www.gew.de/ueber-uns/the-german-
education-union. Accessed 8 January 2018.  
106 Waldow 2010a, 500–501.  
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organisations in German, the GEW is more active on the field of school politics.107 
Among its political goals, the GEW particularly advocates the postponing of tracking 
pupils to different school forms and pleads a comprehensive school system. Other most 
important teachers’ associations in Germany include the Deutscher Lehrerverband (DL) 
and the Verband Bildung und Erziehung (VBE). Whereas the VBE concentrates on 
primary education, the DL is an umbrella organisation of several unions targeted at 
different German secondary school forms. In contrast to the GEW, the DL supports the 
retention of the three-tier school structure in Germany.108  
 
In this thesis I examine the discussions about PISA 2000 in the GEW membership 
magazine E&W (Erziehung und Wissenschaft). I have chosen to examine the 
membership magazine to trace the experience of the contemporaries as originally as it is 
possible in a work of this kind. Using interviews as sources, for instance, might lead to 
different results than analysing content on material written at the time.  
 
However, there are certain issues to take into account when using a trade union 
magazine as research material. The magazine contains multiple voices: members of the 
executive board, researchers, journalists, politicians and representatives of all the 
sections the GEW represents: from kindergarten to vocational education, from all 
secondary school forms to university teachers. Thus, the authors are not merely 
teachers. Consequently, the spectrum of commentators is rather wide and may provide a 
combination of conflicting standpoints. Although I have named this master’s thesis and 
the analysing chapters as “teachers’ discussion”, it is evident that the GEW’s teachers 
do not represent all the teachers in Germany. As a result, this analysis can provide only 
a limited view to the field workers’ perceptions on PISA. Moreover, the teachers and 
educationists in the GEW had a connection to politics through the trade union interests.  
 
Another point to remark upon is that the texts published in the magazine with full 
names of the authors do not, according to the E&W, necessarily represent the stance of 
the magazine or the organisation. Although one therefore cannot draw conclusions of 
the opinion of the entire organisation, I do not consider it insignificant or purely 
                                                
107 Hartong, 208.  
108 Overesch, Anne (2007) Wie die Schulpolitik ihre Probleme (nicht) löst. Münster: Waxmann, 
236. 
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coincidental what kind of statements a magazine prints for its members. Since the GEW 
states as its aim to inform its members of educational politics and professional issues109, 
the discussions are therefore to a certain degree interpreted as a result of purposeful 
action.  
 
In order to understand the character of the research material one should keep in mind 
that the discussions in the magazine do not entirely consist of teachers’ perspectives and 
opinions but also of information and perspectives directed towards teachers. In other 
words, I do not regard the organisation merely as an arena for teachers’ perspectives and 
positions, but also as having a purpose in guiding teachers’ opinions from the 
perspective of the organisation. It is especially relevant for my research approach to 
acknowledge the aspect that the magazine may affect the interpretation of teachers, 
especially in the case of PISA. This does not, however, implicate that all or even the 
majority of the members would automatically share the official GEW statements. After 
all, this thesis does not attempt to find answers to the question of teachers’ opinions, nor 
does it expect to find a unified viewpoint of GEW-minded teachers to PISA. Rather, the 
intention is to perceive the understanding of PISA within the E&W discussion and draw 
a picture of it accordingly.  
 
According to my research task I look at the initial reactions to PISA 2000, starting with 
the publication of the PISA results on 4th December 2001. In this thesis I begin to 
analyse the E&W material from the December 2001 issue, which already treated the 
published PISA results. In Germany, apart from the international PISA comparison, an 
additional study PISA-E (PISA-Erweiterung) was conducted in order to compare the 
results of the states with each other. The release of the results of the PISA-E in June 
2002 played an integral role in the national PISA debate, especially since they were 
published three months before the federal elections in September 2002 and thereby 
became a campaign issue.110  
 
In order to take these contextual events into account, I have decided to cover the E&W 
material until the September 2002 issue, and end the analysis at the election debate. 
                                                
109 GEW (no date) Leistungen im Überblick. http://www.gew.de/ueber-uns. Accessed 8 January 
2018.  
110 Tillmann et al., 19.  
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Additionally, I have read the E&W material before and after the research period of 
December 2001 to September 2002 in order to better identify the changes and 
continuations that the release of the PISA results may have affected. I have included all 
the E&W texts and articles during the research period, which mention PISA and/or the 
OECD. Additionally, articles that concern comparisons of the German education system 
to foreign systems have been considered also in those cases where PISA was not 
explicitly mentioned.  
 
The analysis of the E&W material contains direct citations from the magazine, which I 
have translated into English. The original versions can be found in the footnotes. 
Occasionally I have added italics to the citations in order to highlight aspects I regard as 
significant. In some occasions German terms are included in the text if considered 
relevant. Particularly the concept Bildung has such specific connotations in the German 
language that when deemed expedient, I have used the German instead of the English 
term ‘education’, in order to avoid misunderstandings and underline the attached 
meanings that I have considered essential for the research task.111  
 
1.5 Analysis and outline 
 
In this introduction chapter I have presented as my research task to trace German 
teachers’ perspective on PISA 2000 and to place their reactions into a larger 
international context. The thesis focuses on the tension between international and 
national by exploring how the GEW related to internationalisation and globalisation of 
education on the one hand and, how they identified with the traditional and structural 
aspects of German education on the other hand.  
 
In the following I present my research questions. With research questions I refer here to 
the questions with which I approach the E&W material. In other words, the questions 
posed to the research objects are the tools that contribute to solving the research task. 
These questions help me to analyse the GEW’s PISA discussion from the viewpoints 
presented in the previous sections.  
                                                
111 For more specific information about the historical background of the concept of Bildung, see 
Horlacher, Rebekka (2011) Bildung. Bern: Haupt Verlag. 
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Firstly, my approach concerns the experience and expectation of the GEW agents, and 
therefore I start with asking, (1) how the German PISA results and those of other 
countries were represented and interpreted in the magazine. This question 
predominantly guides chapters two and three. In order to further trace the 
representations of problems, I additionally ask the following questions: (2) what was 
represented as problematic and what was regarded as successful concerning PISA? (3) 
What kinds of consequences or solutions were suggested? (4) What kinds of 
assumptions were surrounding the representations? (5) What was silenced or left 
unproblematic? By applying these questions to the research material, I attempt to 
eventually discover (6) what kinds of roles were attached to PISA in the problem 
representations. The aforementioned questions further aim at revealing (7) how PISA 
was framed as an institution and how its background was evaluated.  
 
The analysis of the E&W material is conducted gradually in the following three 
chapters, which build on each other. Chapter two will examine the discussion of the 
German results, whereas chapter three concentrates on comparisons to other countries 
by examining how success in PISA was defined and evaluated and what kind of 
conclusions were drawn in relation to the perceived German situation. Chapter four is 
based on the findings of the previous chapters and takes the analysis further by 
scrutinising the function that was attached to PISA in the discourses. With chapter five I 
discuss the findings and present my conclusion.  
 
While PISA was discussed in the E&W magazine, the assessment was also a topic of 
great public interest in the German society and among educationists. Apart from 
analysing the E&W material I will take into account academic viewpoints to PISA in 
Germany in order to contextualise the GEW’s discourses.  
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2 Teachers’ discussion of the German PISA 
results 
 
I begin this chapter by looking at the initial experiences in the E&W after the release of 
the PISA results. The explanations and claims concerning the perceived situation will be 
analysed in further subchapters. In the public PISA discussion, German newspapers had 
reported a “failure” of German schools and a defeat that German pupils and teachers 
suffered112. The reactions in the E&W aligned with the nationwide PISA shock, and the 
matter was approached in a serious manner. The chair of the GEW executive board at 
the time, Eva-Maria Stange, commented the PISA results in December right after the 
publication and stated that German schools “played in the third league” in international 
comparison. To PISA she referred as “undeniable facts on the table”.113 The editorial 
continued the tone of national shame by referring to the “miserable certificate” 
Germany had received from PISA. No signs of questioning the “embarrassingly poor 
ranking” of Germany were visible in the initial reactions. It was stated that through 
PISA the efficacy and culture of German schools were put under question.114  
 
The concept of Germany playing in another league and the references to national shame 
remained in the following E&W issues115. The first reactions in December 2001 
signalled a conviction that the whole country lay behind compared to other countries, it 
was thus presupposed that all schools failed. Max Loewe, one of the E&W editors, 
attributed the results to the incapability of the German school system to compensate the 
“learning disadvantages” (Lernnachteile) related to socioeconomic background. He 
characterised the large German group of weak performing pupils:  
 
According to PISA these pupils lack elementary skills. They can indeed 
technically read but they do have problems to draw conclusions out of what they 
                                                
112 E.g. Spiewak, Martin (2001) Die Schule brännt. Die Zeit 50/2001, 6 December 2001. 
http://www.zeit.de/2001/50/Die_Schule_braennt. Accessed 20 February 2018. 
113 “Im internationalen Vergleich spielten ‘Deutschlands Schulen in der dritten Liga’. Dafür 
lägen nun nicht zu leugnende Fakten auf dem Tisch.” Befund. E&W 12/2001, 8.  
114 Editorial. E&W 12/2001, 3; Kahl, Reinhard (2001b) Depressive Zirkel gibt es genug. E&W 
12/2001, 2. 
115 Kaffeesatzleserei. E&W 6/2002, 4; Demmer, Marianne (2002b) Warten auf PISA-E. E&W 
6/2002, 5; Scheich, Henning (2002) Motor für Lernprozesse. E&W 6/2002, 12.  
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read; they are hardly capable of functioning in an adult or working life.116 
 
Loewe therefore immediately accepted, that the PISA tests could determine the extent to 
which these pupils were going to be capable citizens. An educational journalist 
Reinhard Kahl similarly pointed out how “our” good pupils were “only internationally 
average” and the weak ones were “indeed at a Third World level”.117 Kahl’s Third 
World reference along with the third league statements and Loewe’s working life 
conclusions put uncritical trust in the PISA study and its capability of evaluating 
Germany’s school system and success as a country. Although only implicitly, these 
responses also hinted that German economic strength was threatened. Moreover, this 
argumentation pattern raises the question of what was meant with the “Third World 
level”, as in the 2000 results the only participating non-OECD countries included 
Brazil, the Russian Federation, Liechtenstein and Latvia118.  
 
Despite calling for a positive reformation attitude, Kahl gave a rather defeatist 
diagnosis: “PISA shows, the German Sonderweg in Bildung has failed”.119 This and 
other references to the German “Sonderweg” in the PISA context reinforced the 
common interpretation of the situation in the magazine: Germany was represented to 
fundamentally differ from other educational systems based on PISA results.120 The 
historical weight of the Sonderweg concept intensified the implied severity of the issue. 
Notable was though, that Kahl presented similar arguments based on OECD data 
already before PISA121, and thereby his PISA reception seemed to base on his existing 
opinions of the German education.  
 
These reactions showed how the E&W discussion steadfastly accepted that PISA 
indicated system performance. Following the overall public discussion of PISA in 
                                                
116 “Diesen Schülern fehlen laut Pisa-Befund elementare Kenntnisse. Sie können zwar technisch 
lesen, haben aber Probleme, daraus Schlüsse zu ziehen und sind kaum berufs- oder 
lebensfähig.” Loewe, Max (2001) Ergebnis – Am Geld allein liegt’s nicht. E&W 12/2001, 6–7. 
117 Kahl 2001b. 
118 OECD (2001) Knowledge and skills for life. Paris: OECD Publications, 15. 
119 Kahl 2001b. 
120 Hebenstreit-Müller, Sabine & Müller, Burkhard (2002) Deutscher Sonderweg – Warum 
Kitas Bildungseinrichtungen werden müssen. E&W 4/2002, 12; Der erste und der zweite Blick - 
Eine erste Analyse der Ergebnisse. E&W 7–8/2002, 11–12.  
121 Kahl, Reinhard (2001a) Weak Germany. E&W 7–8/2001, 22.  
29 
Germany122, the E&W discussion called for search for causes and answers 
(Ursachenforschung) as the essential task “after the first act of PISA drama”. Stange 
called for a “merciless” investigation without taboos123, which already indicated that she 
expected similar political battles as in previous German school debates.124 A special 
“PISA details” series from February until April showed how the magazine attempted to 
trace correlations within the PISA data in order to explain and understand the results 
with the help of researchers.125 This might have been not least in order to widen 
teachers’ understanding of PISA.  
 
The following sections examine explanations given to the national PISA results in the 
E&W. Two rough categories could be distinguished: while some arguments saw the 
German system level accounting for the PISA results, others highlighted the impact of 
German cultural values and attitudes. Naturally, these categories overlapped in practice 
even within single articles. Therefore, the outline does not represent any absolute 
classifications in the E&W material but is merely a tool in the attempt to identify 
different levels of argumentation.  
 
2.1 Selective system 
 
From the very first reported reactions to PISA in the E&W it was clear which stand the 
GEW took: the causes were “not only due to school praxis” but also the school system 
had to be scrutinised.126 Later in June 2002, the message was clearer in the “school 
expert” of the GEW board, Marianne Demmer’s argumentation: the system and its 
boundaries prevented “peak performance” (Spitzenleistungen).127  
 
                                                
122 See Tillmann et al., 44–45.  
123 Befund. E&W, 12/2001, 8.  
124 Welzel, Steffen (2002a) Erfolgreiche Länder haben integrierte Systeme. E&W 1/2002, 24–
25; Befund. E&W, 12/2001, 8.  
125 Welzel, Steffen (2002b) Lernbedingungen von Jugendlichen. E&W 2/2002, 23; Ballauf, 
Helga (2002a) Vom Umgang mit Obstgärten, Kindbettfieber und Baumdiagrammen. E&W 
2/2002, 26; van Ackeren, Isabell (2002a) PISA-Details 2, Familiäre Lebensverhältnisse und 
Schülerleistungen. E&W 3/2002, 23–25; van Ackeren, Isabell (2002b) PISA-Details 3, 
Institutionelle Bedingungen schulischen Lernens – PISA-Ergebnisse und Empfehlungen. E&W 
4/2002, 23–26; van Ackeren, Isabell (2002c) Institutionelle Bedingungen schulischen Lernens 
(Teil 2). E&W 5/2002, 19–21.  
126 Befund. E&W, 12/2001, 8.  
127 Demmer, Marianne (2002c) Ja zur Heterogenität! E&W 6/2002, 16. 
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From the initial reactions onwards, the PISA discussion in the E&W in various ways 
argued that the PISA results had finally proven the failure of the German three-tier 
school structure.128 As the reception of the results throughout the E&W did not question 
the claim that PISA had in a tenable way measured system performance, the 
argumentation focused on identifying the defaults of the German system:  
 
The transfer to the Sonderschule is a typical part of the German school system. 
The strategy of the German education system was and is to form learning groups 
as homogeneous as possible. Identificating who should or is allowed to learn in 
which school form receives much more attention than individual support.129  
 
In the search of explanations for PISA the E&W turned continuously to the expertise of 
researchers. While the GEW authors appeared rather unanimous in their argumentation 
that PISA results had proven the failure of German three-tier school structure, the 
interviews of PISA experts entailed a diverging pattern: the question of causal 
connections between early tracking and achievement was treated cautiously. 
Nonetheless, it seemed that by asking leading questions, the interviewers attempted to 
find expert proof for the GEW interpretation.130 This seemed to put the interviewees in a 
position, where they had to refrain from making causal inferences, but the eventual 
message depended significantly on their views. One researcher often cited in the E&W, 
Klaus Klemm, for instance started with the cautious pattern but finally argued rather 
straightforwardly that the reason would lie in the tracking system:  
 
[PISA] gives strong hints that it is precisely the early sorting [...] owing to the 
fact that students with low learning levels perform particularly poorly. Pushing 
adolescents into a less stimulating learning environment, this is what the PISA 
authors work out clearly, slows down their development potential.131 
                                                
128 Kahl 2001b; Welzel, Steffen (2001b) Analyse – Preis der frühen Auslese. E&W 12/2001, 
10–12.  
129 “Die Überweisung an die Sonderschule ist ein typischer Teil des deutschen Schulwesens. Die 
Strategie des deutschen Bildungssystems war und ist, möglichst homogene Lerngruppen zu 
bilden. Der Identifizierung, wer in welcher Schulform lernen soll bzw. darf, wird viel mehr 
Aufmerksamkeit gewidmet als der individuellen Förderung.” Schnell, Irmtraud & Kehl, Ulla 
(2002) Der selektive Blick: Sonderschule – Die Schule für sozial benachteiligte Kinder. E&W 
4/2002, 25–26.  
130 Welzel, Steffen 2002a; Welzel, Steffen 2001b.  
131 “[PISA] gibt starke Hinweise darauf, dass es gerade dem frühen Sortieren [.] zu verdanken 
ist, dass lernschwache Schülerinnen und Schüler besonders schlechte Leistungen erbringen. Das 
Abschieben von Heranwachsenden in ein anregungsärmeres Lernmilieu, dies arbeiten die PISA-
Autoren deutlich heraus, bremst deren Entwicklungspotential.” Welzel, Steffen 2001b, 11.  
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Klemm’s formulation showed how in the end it was difficult to distinguish claims of 
causal effects from the more statistically adequate ones. Nevertheless, PISA experts 
could be cited to claim that the poor and meagre learning conditions in Hauptschulen, in 
the lowest track of the three-tier system, accounted for the low scores.  
 
Overall the PISA reactions in the E&W focused on the “shocking” conditions of the 
weakest performing pupils in Germany. The result according to which there was a 
relatively large group of German pupils scoring low in the PISA tests was used in the 
magazine as an argument against the prevailing three-tier system. However, especially 
in the initial reactions there was also a tendency to argue against the advocates of the 
German school system by calling attention to the moderate scores of the highest 
achieving German pupils. Kahl argued that the PISA results had proven the 
“anachronistic” three-tier structure could not be defended anymore:  
 
The main argument for early selection was to satisfy the more gifted part of the 
population by higher school forms. It is over. The Gymnasium does not meet its 
own requirements of elite education.132 
 
Klemm likewise directed his statement against the advocates of the current school 
system:  
 
The friends of tracked school structures have to be told: The reward for this 
price does not ensue. The separate instruction of pupils with higher performance 
in Gymnasium does not catapult this group into the international top field.133 
 
The common pattern of argumentation followed what was presented as the opponents’ 
idea that early tracking and homogeneous learning groups should lead to higher results, 
yet PISA was said to belie this.134 An opposing argument was published from a minister 
                                                
132 “Das Hauptargument für die frühe Selektion hieß, dem begabteren Teil der Bevölkerung 
durch höheren Schulen gerecht werden. Es ist dahin. Das Gymnasium wird in seinem eigenen 
Anspruch Elitebildung nicht gerecht.” Kahl 2001b.  
133 “Die Freunde gegliederter Schulstrukturen müssen sich sagen lassen: Der Lohn für diesen 
Preis stellt sich nicht ein. Die getrennte Unterrichtung der leistungsstärkeren Schüler und 
Schülerinnen in Gymnasien katapultiert diese Gruppe durchaus nicht in das internationale 
Spitzenfeld.” Welzel, Steffen 2001b, 11.   
134 Loewe, 6–7; Demmer, Marianne (2001) Bittere Wahrheiten. E&W 12/2001, 9; Kahl 2001b; 
Endres Gerhard L. (2002) Übertriebene Hektik ist nicht förderlich. E&W 2/2002, 17–19. 
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of the conservative party CDU/CSU, Hans Zehetmair, who stated in an interview that 
according to PISA Germany could keep up with the international level when it came to 
high performance.135 This indicated how different the interpretations of PISA in fact 
could be. Additionally, it seemed that these PISA discourses argued more with PISA 
using it as an argument rather than actually explained or dealt with the results.  
 
Klemm paid particular attention to the gap of 37 PISA score points between “our” 
strongest performers and those of Australia, the front-runner of the highest performers 
as Klemm phrased. The discourse focusing on the “international forefront” 
(Internationale Spitze) appeared several times and without further discussion of the 
possible contextual or contingent factors behind these “peak positions” 
(Spitzenpositionen) or “peak values” (Spitzenwerte).136 Giving high value to the ranking 
on top was compatible with the initial reactions discussed before, which framed the 
German PISA results as national shame. In fact, the discourse was also turned upside 
down by declaring that Germany was the Spitze only in terms of social selection.137 It 
seemed that being on the “top” was a goal in itself. The fixation on “peak values” on the 
one hand implied unconditional reliance on the PISA measures as indicators of 
“reality”.  
 
Paying attention to the PISA values in educational expenses between countries was one 
of the explanation categories framed with “consequences from the PISA disaster”.138 
Comparisons of educational investments focused on the lower values in Germany 
compared to other countries regarding primary education.139 Whereas Ulrich Thöne 
from the GEW remained steadfast in his opinion, the correlation between German low 
investments and low average scores was not “a pure coincidence”, the PISA Director 
Andreas Schleicher and researcher Klemm were more cautious in their argumentation. 
For Thöne the “standardised criteria” of the OECD data was enough legitimation to 
                                                
135 Endres. 
136 E.g. Demmer 2002c, 16; Welzel, Steffen 2001b, 11.  
137 Welzel, Steffen 2001b, 11.  
138 Ehmann, Christoph (2002) Wer hat, dem wird gegeben. E&W 3/2002, 6; Welzel, Steffen 
2001b, 12; van Ackeren 2002c; Schleicher, Andreas (2002) Schlüssel für die Zukunft. E&W 
3/2002, 2.  
139 Haas-Rietschel, Helga (2002a) Mehr Geld für die Grundschulen. E&W 3/2002, 18; 
Schleicher; Welzel, Steffen 2001b, 12.  
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draw further conclusions.140 Although Schleicher and Klemm, too, argued by comparing 
GDP percentages spent for education between Finland and Germany, they again 
avoided direct causal inferences. They defined PISA’s role rather vaguely to be a reason 
to “think about the distribution of educational investments” and emphasised that not 
only money played a role but also “quality of results”. With this Schleicher referred to 
Finland, Korea, Sweden and the UK outperforming Germany despite their lower 
educational expenses.141  
 
It seemed that PISA could simultaneously indicate two slightly diverging conclusions: 
less investments in German early education were framed as a partial explanation to the 
results, while at the same time PISA provided justification that not money alone led to 
success, proven by the high results of countries with less investment. When experts 
argued with PISA data in the E&W, they often presented comparisons of German PISA 
values to the OECD average ones as a basis of presented deficits in the German 
system.142 However, it remained ambiguous what kind of inferences one should have 
drawn based on these proposals to ponder the educational expenses. In fact, it seemed 
that the main point was merely to underline the devastating gap between Germany and 
other countries.  
 
In fact, Schleicher’s commentary with numerous statistical comparisons and details is 
likely to have left a slightly ambiguous impression, particularly considering teachers as 
the audience of the magazine. There was a contrast between two types of 
argumentation: the technical expert voices and the E&W attempts to elucidate the PISA 
findings with technical expertise on the one hand143, and the rather political 
argumentation of non-technician authors on the other hand. Still, explaining PISA 
results with financial resources received in total a minor role in the magazine from the 
initial reactions onwards144. Criticism based on financial deficits was later linked to the 
                                                
140 Thöne, Ulrich (2002a) Suche in der falschen Richtung. E&W 3/2002, 10.   
141 Schleicher; Welzel, Steffen 2002a, 23. 
142 E.g. van Ackeren 2002c; Schleicher.  
143 See the PISA Details series: Welzel, Steffen 2002b, 23; Ballauf 2002a, 26; van Ackeren 
2002a; van Ackeren 2002b; van Ackeren 2002c. 
144 Loewe.  
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GEW campaign statement, according to which persisting values in the society and 
politics prevented the appropriate resources for education145.  
 
Among the initial reactions in the E&W it seemed natural to expect the causes to lie in 
didactic practices. Some comments showed a straightforward conviction that according 
to PISA “something goes wrong” in German classrooms.146 Helga Ballauf, one of the 
E&W editors, seemed convinced of the KMK politicians’ conclusion that most of the 
“achievement deficit” in German schools could be improved with “pedagogical-
didactic” ways.147  
 
In this case the beliefs obtained a concrete form in the PISA researcher Jürgen 
Baumert’s interview, where he argued that the PISA results could be traced back to the 
common style of teaching in Germany, the concept of “fragend-entwickelnde 
Unterricht”. He defined this teaching method as “choreography” of a teacher aiming 
towards more and more simple questions, which eventually would become trivialised 
and lead to a convergent but simultaneously meandering style of teaching. Baumert 
defined this “structure” of German teaching as exhaustive and counterproductive and 
claimed it to be the reason why Germans failed to cope with heterogeneity in the 
classroom in an appropriate and individual way. Baumert pointed out, international 
comparison to “successful integrated systems” had shown that better lesson concepts 
were possible.148  
 
Seemingly the “school expert” of the GEW board, Marianne Demmer, had in a later 
issue accepted this researcher explanation of German school problems as part of her 
argumentation:  
 
It must become clear that the teacher-centered questioning-developing teaching 
style tailored to (allegedly) homogenous learning groups is more prone to 
interference, more exhausting and more threatened by failures than 
                                                
145 Rettet die Bildung. E&W 5/2002, 5. 
146 Befund. E&W, 12/2001, 8; Kahl, Reinhard (2002a) LAU, sehr lau. E&W 2/2002, 21; 
Ballauf, Helga (2002c) Kompetenz in der Sprachförderung. E&W 6/2002, 28.  
147 Ballauf 2002a, 26.  
148 Welzel, Steffen 2002a. 
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individualised learning oriented towards the pupils’ independence.149 
 
Contrasting the German fragend-entwickelnde concept to an “individual” teaching style 
in other countries – without specifying which countries were compared – was one of the 
examples in the E&W, which expected the reality to differ remarkably in classrooms 
outside Germany. In general, the assertion that German classrooms lacked attention to 
individual differences prevailed in various forms of argumentation. Another example of 
similar explanations claimed that teachers’ belief of standing in front of a homogeneous 
class led to them practising the teacher-centred teaching style, which again was claimed 
to level down pupils’ individual potential and eventually reduce achievement.150 
Remarkable was, however, that compared to usual cautious argumentation from PISA 
experts, in this case Baumert’s support for the representation of problem was 
straightforward.  
 
2.2 Selective culture 
 
The perception that the problem lied at the teacher culture continued in various forms. 
The journalist Kahl described PISA as “a mirror, [which] shows our ugly, smart-alecky 
traits that often tend to embarrass others.”151 While reforming the school structure was 
the main argument between the lines of the PISA discussion, there was a wide 
conviction that the problem of selective structural elements was reflected in many 
teachers’ work and attitudes as well. Kahl’s reference to PISA as a mirror made clear 
his implication that PISA was indicating the truth. Teachers were claimed to focus on 
the “purity of the school institution” rather than on the future of the pupils.152  
 
The peculiar cross of our school system is that if a pupil is in a bad state, 
teachers in higher school forms tell him, "you do not fit in here, go away". [...] 
German teachers have virtually an obsession of having the wrong pupils. They 
                                                
149 “Es muss deutlich werden, dass der auf (vermeintlich) homogene Lerngruppen 
zugeschnittene lehrerzentrierte fragend-entwickelnde Unterrichtsstil störanfälliger, 
anstrengender und stärker von Scheitern bedroht ist als ein auf Eigentätigkeit der Schüler 
orientiertes individualisiertes Lernen.” Demmer, Marianne (2002a) Riss durchs Lehrerzimmer. 
E&W 3/2002, 22.  
150 Diehl, Ute (2002b) Vom Nutzen der Unterschiede. E&W 6/2002, 9. 
151 “PISA ist ein Spiegel, [und] zeigt unsere hässlichen, besserwisserischen, häufig zur 
Demütigung anderer neigenden Züge.” Kahl 2001b.   
152 Schnell & Kehl.  
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are quick with contempt. This leads to a fatal atmosphere. Pupils interpret it like 
this: you are not welcome here.153  
 
Some consider the (supposedly) homogenous learning group and the necessary 
selection as the basic requirement for successful working. [...] Pupils who are 
'not conforming' or are 'too stupid' are then 'themselves to blame' and have to 
'bear the consequences'.154 
 
The arguments above were tied up with the accusation, the “system logic” led German 
teachers to delegate their problems further, that is, to lower school forms instead of 
taking responsibility. Teachers were seen to shift the responsibility to the pupils.155 
Additionally, other critics defined the German strict and “outmoded” grading system to 
be the German problem: teachers’ compartmentalised way of thinking was said to kill 
children’s motivation and creativity.156  
 
On the other hand, attention was also given to the PISA result according to which there 
was a deficit in German teachers’ diagnostic competence.157 This was one of the 
measures of the KMK as a response to PISA as well: to increase diagnosis of 
weaknesses and strengths158. Partially it was contradictory to the GEW viewpoint, 
according to which teachers were already excessively compartmentalising pupils.  
 
Explaining low achievement with a perceived culture of disregard did not otherwise 
seem to be something the authors would have drawn from the PISA data, rather, it 
seemed to derive from already existing opinions. Demmer, however, tried to link her 
argumentation to the PISA results:  
 
                                                
153 “Das besondere Kreuz unseres Schulsystems ist doch: Wenn ein Schüler schlecht steht, 
sagen ihm die Lehrer auf der höheren Schule, “hier bist du falsch, geh ab”. [...] Deutsche Lehrer 
haben geradezu eine Obsession, die falschen Schüler zu haben. Sie sind fix mit Verachtung. Das 
führt zu einer fatalen Grundstimmung. Schüler interpretieren sie so: Willkommen bist du nicht.” 
Kahl 2001b.  
154 “Die einen halten die (vermeintlich) homogene Lerngruppe und die dazu notwendige 
Selektion für die Grundvoraussetzung erfolgreichen Arbeitens. [...] Schüler, die ‘nicht spuren’ 
oder ‘zu dumm’ sind, sind danach ‘selbst Schuld’ und müssen die ‘Konsequenzen tragen’.” 
Demmer 2002a, 21. 
155 Kahl 2001b; Demmer 2002a, 21.  
156 Wilhelm, Arnold (2002) Überbleibsel. E&W 5/2002, 34; Winter, Felix (2002) Chance für 
Schüler und Schule. E&W 2/2002, 22, 27.  
157 Welzel, Steffen 2001b, 12; van Ackeren 2002c. 
158 KMK 2002, 7–8, 13–14.  
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The pronounced selection mechanisms in Germany exert on teachers no 
'compulsion to care'. This is reflected, for example, in the PISA result, according 
to which pupils especially in the German Gymnasium find the support of their 
teachers very low. Only four countries have lower scores than Germany.159 
 
Reliance on PISA score points was a straightforward legitimation of Demmer’s 
argumentation: it drew one particular value and linked it to the overall interpretation of 
selective attitudes as the explanatory factor. This does not yet allow one to infer, to what 
extent Demmer actually believed that these PISA variables defined the German 
educational reality, and to what extent it was a matter of framing a single PISA finding 
to fit and legitimate an already existing statement.  
 
The fact that teachers were subjects of public criticism in the PISA debate was taken 
into account in the E&W160; on the other hand as I have shown in this subchapter, the 
E&W argumentation partially participated in this criticism. However, it is interesting to 
what extent a magazine for teachers can set accusations directly at their audience. Apart 
from the GEW and researcher voices standing behind the assertion that outmoded 
teacher methods or teachers’ attitudes were a major reason behind the PISA results, a 
few readers of the E&W criticised their colleagues for incompetence as well.161 In 
contrast, several commentators defended teachers by drawing attention to the poor 
socioeconomic and structural conditions in the society in total. They criticised the hasty 
way of politicians or the GEW suggesting curricula changes, teachers’ teamwork and 
teacher training reforms or asking teachers to develop support concepts in the situation, 
where teachers were already overloaded with their everyday work challenges.162 
Thereby it seemed that the E&W treated this tense topic – considering its audience – 
from rather diverse angles.  
 
                                                
159 “Die stark ausgeprägten Selektionsmechanismen in Deutschland üben auf die Lehrer keinen 
’Zwang zum Kümmern’ aus. Dies schlägt sich dann zum Beispiel in dem PISA-Ergebnis nieder, 
wonach Schülerinnen und Schüler vor allem deutschen Gymnasien die Unterstützung durch ihre 
Lehrer als sehr niedrig empfinden. Nur vier Länder haben noch niedrige Werte als 
Deutschland.” Demmer 2002a, 21–22. 
160 Alexander, Uta (2002) Weg vom Ruch des Laberfachs. E&W 1/2002, 6.  
161 Büttner, Manfred (2002) Geschichte. E&W 2/2002, 40; Thomsen, Helga (2002) 
Selbstreflexion. E&W 4/2002, 40. 
162 Eickhoff, Georg (2002) Kurve. E&W 2/2002, 40; Roever, Sabine (2002) Wer? E&W 2/2002, 
42; Donath, Marion (2002) Engpässe. E&W 4/2002, 40; Senkspiel, Jörg (2002) Verärgert. 
E&W 6/2002, 33. 
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The cultural values of selection and irresponsibility were not merely seen to be inherent 
in teachers’ attitudes but to prevail in the whole society as a continuous force. The 
GEW campaign “Save the Bildung” (Rettet die Bildung) in spring 2002 declared to 
reject what they perceived as the existing societal persistence on selection instead of 
support.163 Demmer seemed to suggest, educational reality in societies could consist of 
either the idea of early selection or individual support. She saw this inherent concept 
battle in German school politics deriving from the fronts of the previous school debate 
in the 1960s and 1970s.164 Demmer made a clear contrast between Germany and other 
countries: she claimed that through the fact that Germany had not implemented a 
thorough educational reform in contrast to “many other European countries”, the 
German education had ended up to be a “mishmash of both philosophies”.165 With this 
she seemed to imply, all these other countries would have explicitly decided to base 
their system on the sole idea of individual support. Thus again, a fundamental gap 
between the German reality and other countries was represented without commenting 
the possible contextual factors behind other countries’ situations.  
 
What Kahl in his initial reaction to PISA in December 2001 had declared as 
“pedagogical destruction force of our system”166, Demmer defined later in June as the 
German “homogeneity paradigm”.167 The PISA details series in the E&W commented 
this “common German complaint” about inconvenient achievement variation in 
secondary schools by pointing out the PISA finding, which stated that German students’ 
performance within a school was much more homogeneous than in other countries.168 
On the other hand, several adversaries of the three-tier system made use of the PISA 
finding, according to which there was overlap in the achievement between German 
school forms. They thus claimed that PISA had shown the allocation of pupils to 
hierarchical tracks did not accord with the actual skills of pupils.169  
 
As part of the same argumentative goal PISA therefore provided arguments to show 
                                                
163 Rettet die Bildung. E&W 5/2002, 5.  
164 Demmer 2002b. 
165 Ibid.  
166 ”der pädagogischen Destruktivkraft unseres Systems”. Kahl 2001b.   
167 Demmer 2002c, 15–16.  
168 van Ackeren 2002b. 
169 Fend, Helmut (2002) Alle fördern – von allen viel verlangen. E&W 6/2002, 2; Klemm, 
Klaus (2002) System verstärkt soziale Selektion. E&W 5/2002, 22; Demmer 2002c, 17. 
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both that German classrooms were more homogeneous than others and that the 
homogeneity still was not what the structure claimed to be. Arguing that the three-tier 
system was not in reality functioning in the meritocratic way it claimed resembled the 
1970s critical theorists’ argumentation against the functionalist understanding of 
schooling.170 Demmer stated that tracking had not led to the desired homogeneity by 
referring to “all empirical studies”:  
 
The common notion that the highest performers are in Gymnasium, the "middle 
ones" in Realschule, and the weakest performers in Hauptschule, turns out on 
closer inspection to be pure fiction.171 
 
This is one of the contexts where it became clear how PISA and empirical studies were 
seen as representing facts opposed to ‘fiction’ or common imagination. According to 
this belief, with PISA one could manage to disprove the represented opposing opinion. 
Interestingly, Ute Diehl showed in her argumentation for integrated learning groups 
how the critics themselves may reproduce the exact presumption Demmer criticised:  
 
The school systems in Finland and Sweden have shown through the PISA study 
that good to very good learning outcomes are not linked to homogeneous 
learning groups, as is common in the tripartite school system. They may come 
about just because strong, middle and weak pupils are taught together in one 
group.172 
 
Despite her critical take on the German tracking system Diehl seemed to unconsciously 
define heterogeneity as collecting these three groups into one classroom, assuming that 
groups of pupils consisted of either strong, middle or weak performers. Even though 
their opinions on the tracking element converge, Diehl appeared to reproduce this 
national belief that Demmer criticized in the same E&W issue. Detaching oneself from 
one’s own national context and from the embedded presumptions might thus be more 
                                                
170 Sadovnik, Alan R. (2016) Theory and Method in the Sociology of Education. In Sadovnik, 
Alan R. & Coughlan, Ryan W. (eds.) Sociology of Education. A Critical Reader. New York: 
Routledge, 3rd ed., 6.  
171 “Die landläufige Vorstellung, in Gymnasien seien die leistungsfähigsten, in Realschulen die 
“mittleren” und in Hauptschulen die leistungsschwächeren Schüler anzutreffen, erweist sich bei 
näherem Hinsehen als pure Fiktion.” Demmer 2002c, 17.  
172 “Die Schulsysteme in Finnland und Schweden haben durch die PISA-Studie bewiesen, dass 
gute bis sehr gute Lernergebnisse nicht geknüpft sind an homogene Lerngruppen, wie sie im 
dreigliedrigen Schulsystem üblich sind. Sie kommen vielleicht gerade zustande, weil starke, 
mittlere und schwache Schüler gemeinsam in einer Gruppe unterrichtet werden.” Diehl 2002b, 
6–7. Italics added.   
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difficult than expected.  
 
Already the initial PISA reactions in the E&W gave a myriad of suggestions for 
consequences of PISA and solutions for solving the perceived problems in Germany.173 
The fact that the first issue after PISA under the heading “consequence” published a 
lengthy and meandering article from a school development professor Hans-Günther 
Rolff indicated the experienced urgency to turn PISA “feedback” 
(Datenrückmeldungen) into practical administrative and didactic changes. Rolff 
provided explicit recommendations of curricula changes and teachers’ teamwork hours 
as part of his plea for “coordinated quality initiative” in order to raise achievement.174 
The existence of an empirical school development perspective in the early reactions was 
a significant statement even though the focus later turned into discussing the tense 
topics of the national education politics. Seemingly the GEW had the need to give an 
active impression by contributing with fast solutions. This was, as Tillmann et al. have 
written, the public expectation in Germany despite the limitations of the PISA study to 
provide explicit policy recommendations.175 
 
In this subchapter I have demonstrated how explaining PISA results in the E&W led to 
arguments, in which PISA legitimised pre-existing opinions and criticisms of the 
German system; in various ways the problem was represented to derive from the three-
tier school system and its advocates in the society, as well as ignorant attitudes and 
practices among teachers. Despite including cautious expert statements against causal 
inferences about integrated systems and success, this was the message expressed 
throughout the E&W material from various angles. How expert opinions and PISA data 
analyses were treated in the magazine showed how ambiguous and sometimes 
contradictory the information was that justified the arguments. As in the nationwide 
public PISA discourses, in the E&W the demand for explanations was likewise 
visible176. In spite of the declared attempts to search for answers, the argumentation 
with PISA seemed to base on already existing convictions.  
 
                                                
173 E.g. Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung (2001) Schulen in Deutschland – Empfehlung. E&W 12/2001, 
31; Befund. E&W 12/2001, 8–9.  
174 Rolff, Hans-Günther (2001) Konsequenz. E&W 12/2001, 13–14, 16. 
175 Tillmann et al., 44–45.  
176 See Tillmann et al., 44–45.  
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Therefore analysing how other countries’ success in PISA was evaluated and interpreted 
elucidates more precisely how PISA was discussed, which leads us further into 
understanding the role of PISA in the GEW discourses.  
 
3 Teachers’ discussion of successful countries 
in PISA 
 
In the previous chapter I showed how the reactions to PISA results in the E&W 
followed the public German interpretations of the situation: PISA was seen to reveal the 
German “Bildungsmisere”, which in the GEW perception was understood as deficits of 
the German educational system particularly in terms of selectivity at both system and 
cultural level. Following an attitude that resembled the perpetual interest of national 
policymakers to borrow foreign models177, the E&W sought for solutions to the 
represented educational problems by examining other countries’ educational systems.178 
This attitude was manifested in GEW-organised excursions to certain countries in 
spring 2002:  
 
PISA raised the question, what do the others do better? For example 
Scandinavian countries like Finland or Sweden. In search of answers a group of 
the GEW executive board travelled at the end of January with journalists and 
[...] scientists [...] to the land of Pippi Longstocking.179 
 
Interestingly, Sweden was the first country to be presented in a reportage after the 
publication of PISA results, even though it was not among the PISA “top performers” 
such as Finland and England180, which were the following two countries presented in 
their own articles. The travel destinations reflected, which countries received particular 
                                                
177 Rust, Val D. (2006) Foreign influences in educational reform. In Ertl, Hubert (ed.) Cross-
national attraction in education: accounts from England and Germany. Oxford: Symposium 
Books, 23–26.  
178 Welzel, Steffen 2002b, 23; van Ackeren 2002a, 23.  
179 “PISA ließ bei uns die Frage aufkommen, was machen die andern besser? Zum Beispiel 
skandinavische Länder wie Finnland oder Schweden. Auf der Suche nach Antworten reiste 
Ende Januar eine Gruppe des GEW-Hauptvorstands zusammen mit Journalisten und [...] 
Wissenschaftlern [...] ins Land von Pippi Langstrumpf.” Haas-Rietschel, Helga (2002b) Pippi 
Langstrumpf lebt. E&W 3/2002, 28.  
180 In this case, the E&W wrote about the ”English school system” and not that of the United 
Kingdom.  
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attention in the magazine: Finland and Sweden were the most mentioned reference 
countries in comparisons throughout the E&W material.181 The United Kingdom, 
however, also received attention partially due to what was represented as supportive 
early education principles.182  
 
In the following sections, I will continue by examining how the success in PISA was 
interpreted in the travel reports and in the overall PISA discussion in the magazine.  
 
3.1 Reform capacity as a success factor 
 
In the E&W material discussing successful countries in PISA context the most 
emphasised feature was the lack of or postponement of tracking in other systems.183 As 
a contrast to the “toxic” German atmosphere of selection, Kahl stated that in the 
“winner” countries, Japan, Finland or Canada, the German “Selektionswahn” did not 
exist, in Sweden it was according to Kahl “forbidden by law”.184 The acceptance of the 
PISA concept of “competence” was implied for instance by stating that “integrated 
school systems” had partially more than double the amount of young people in the 
highest competence level as Germany.185 This statement was justified by a reference to 
the PISA results but without specifying which countries were meant.  
 
The three country reports focused on explaining the success with the “learning together” 
of all children in a comprehensive system. Each case, although written by different 
authors with different perspectives186 argued that educational reform towards a more 
inclusive or integrated school system had caused the success.187 A social democrat 
politician Hartmut Holzapfel reported from Finland: 
 
                                                
181 E.g. Haas-Rietschel 2002a; Thöne 2002a; Klemm; Fend; Diehl 2002b, 6–7. 
182 Hebenstreit-Müller & Müller, 12. 
183 Welzel, Steffen 2001b, 12; Welzel, Steffen 2002a; Fend; Schnell & Kehl, 26.  
184 Kahl 2001b. 
185 Demmer 2001; Loewe.  
186 The Sweden article was written by an E&W editor, the Finnish one by a SPD politician and 
the England one by educational researchers.  
187 Haas-Rietschel 2002b; Ratzki, Anne & Schumann, Brigitte (2002) Ausbruch aus dem 
Teufelskreis? England setzt auf Leistungssteigerung – für alle. E&W 4/2002, 27–29; Holzapfel, 
Hartmut (2002) Koalition der Vernunft. Warum in finnischen Schulen vieles anders ist. E&W 
5/2002, 23–25. 
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Today, Finland is harvesting: with the results of the PISA study. In Germany 
one may still often declare, it would not be the time for a structural debate — it 
is striking, however, how clearly those countries are in the lead, which have 
managed the transition to comprehensive school or traditionally knew no other 
school form.188 
 
Holzapfel further implied how the solution to reform the Finnish education thirty years 
earlier from a selective system into a comprehensive one had been the “right one”, 
which Finnish teachers and politicians could now contentedly state.189 In a similar way, 
PISA ranking framed the beginning of the England report:  
 
Many years England held the midfield position in international studies. At PISA, 
it surprisingly appears in the top group. It even comes third among the European 
countries. Apparently, an ambitious reform programme, with which the New 
Labour has been modernising its schools since the 1990s, is taking effect.190 
 
In the case of England the authors Anne Ratzki and Brigitte Schumann thus emphasised 
the perceived connection between reform and success similarly as in the travel reports 
of the Nordic welfare state regimes in Finland and Sweden. The explanation for 
England’s success in the conducted PISA tests in 2000, however, was explicitly 
deduced from the New Labour politics implemented in the late 1990s. Without 
considering the aspects of the English system before 1997 when the New Labour 
government was elected,191 the authors highlighted how the English school structure 
was a comprehensive one, a “Gesamtschulsystem” with only five percent of private 
schools, and how it followed the principle of equal opportunity.192 What was further left 
without notion was the fact that the New Labour policies still represented relatively 
recent changes in 2002. As differences between Scandinavian and Anglo-Saxon models 
                                                
188 “Heute fährt Finnland die Ernte ein: mit den Ergebnissen der PISA-Studie. Da mag man in 
Deutschland noch so oft erklären, es sei nicht die Zeit für eine Strukturdebatte – auffallend ist 
dennoch, wie klar die Länder in Führung liegen, die den Umbau zur Gesamtschule geschafft 
haben oder traditionell keine andere Schulform kannten.” Holzapfel, 23. 
189 Holzapfel, 25.  
190 “Viele Jahre hielt sich England bei internationalen Untersuchungen im Mittelfeld. Bei PISA 
taucht es überraschend in der Spitzengruppe auf. Unter den europäischen Ländern liegt es sogar 
an dritter Stelle. Offenbar greift ein ehrgeiziges Reformprogramm, mit dem New Labour seit 
den 90er-Jahren seine Schulen modernisiert.” Ratzki & Schumann, 27.  
191 Concerning the selective and market-oriented features of the English school system in the 
1990s, see e.g. West, Anne & Pennell, Hazel (2000) Publishing School Examination Results in 
England: incentives and consequences. Educational Studies, 26(4), 423–436.  
192 Ratzki & Schumann, 27.  
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were not discussed further, it seemed that the authors either did not in fact consider 
England having equality issues or simply ignored such aspects in attempt to reinforce 
their argumentation about deficits of German education. Eventually it seemed that PISA 
results were the trigger to treat England in the first place. The atmosphere of the mutual 
understanding of social democracy between the German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder 
and the British New Labour from 1999 might have had an effect on the background.193 
Significant was how the PISA success in both Finland and England reports was directly 
stated to derive from the implemented reform, thus implying that PISA had proven the 
successful outcome of the reform.  
 
The assertion that educational reform leads to successful PISA results, and that it is 
possible to discover the features, which make a “good school” is, as mentioned before, a 
fundamental part of the OECD and educational effectiveness research logic.194 In the 
E&W, this discourse appeared in a guest commentary by the OECD’s PISA director 
Schleicher, who asserted that a “right mixture” of features made a “good school”.195 
Schleicher declared that the “deficits” in German education system did not imply that 
the system would have become worse than those of other nations. Instead, he claimed 
that the OECD indicators had shown how Germany had lacked the “dynamics” with 
which many other countries had reformed their system.196 Schleicher’s discourse 
accorded with the E&W’s attempts to find “answers” in the magazine. Furthermore, his 
remarks nurtured the arguments in the magazine about the continuous lack of 
educational reform in Germany since the 1960s school debate.197 Achim Leschinsky, a 
German historian of education, made similar diagnoses of the German educational 
politics later in 2005, when he tried to trace the causes behind what he called the 
educational “misery”, accusing German education of a continuous lack of reform.198 
Leschinsky’s problem representation resembled that of many E&W articles, which 
                                                
193 See e.g. White, Michael (1999) Blair and Schröder share a vision. The Guardian, 9 June 
1999. http://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/jun/09/eu.politics. Accessed 24 February 2018.  
194 E.g. OECD (2003) Literacy skills for the world of tomorrow. Paris: OECD Publishing, 24, 
223; see also Reynolds, David, Sammons, Pam, De Fraine, Bieke, Van Damme, Jan, Townsend, 
Tony, Teddlie, Charles & Stringfield, Sam (2014) Educational effectiveness research (EER): a 
state-of-the-art review. School Effectiveness and School Improvement, 25(2), 197. 
195 Schleicher.  
196 Ibid.  
197 Demmer 2002b; Klemm.   
198 Leschinsky, Achim (2005) Vom Bildungsrat (nach) zu PISA. Eine zeitgeschichtliche Studie 
zur deutschen Bildungspolitik. Zeitschrift für Pädagogik, 51(6), 818–839. 
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assumed that continuous educational reform was a desired and normal policy in 
successful countries.  
 
Further reliance on the OECD voice appeared for instance in Kahl’s arguments for 
changing the macro structure of the education system:  
 
Here the PISA result is quite clear. 'Schools score better in international 
comparison, the more autonomous they are,' says Andreas Schleicher of the 
OECD. The well-placed Scandinavian countries have decentralized their 
traditional centralized systems. All the money goes to the individual schools in 
Finland and Sweden, including teachers' salaries. The center sets goals in these 
countries and controls the results. Feedback is part of autonomy. Dialogue is the 
most important thing. [...] In order to find its own [goal], [the school] has to 
enter into dialogue with itself.199 
 
Kahl had therefore accepted Schleicher’s message of “autonomous schools” and 
decentralisation reforms as explaining success. The subtle way how OECD arguments 
were embedded in comparisons to other countries could be seen for instance in Ratzki 
and Schumann’s remark how English schools had for a long time been “a lot more 
autonomous” than German schools, although the authors did not mention the OECD in 
this context.200 Autonomy could be framed in various ways: while Klemm emphasised 
pedagogical autonomy following his perception of the Swedish system, for Kahl 
autonomy denoted teachers’ and schools’ responsibility over the pupils; thereby, this 
definition corresponded with his understanding of the deviance in German schools.201  
 
Besides autonomy, the OECD discourse highlighted accountability through 
standardised evaluation measures as a success factor of the leading countries in PISA202. 
In the PISA details article series, which attempted to explain the data for the readers, it 
was underlined how top PISA performers already knew national standardised tests and 
                                                
199 “Hier ist das PISA-Ergebnis ganz eindeutig. ‘Schulen schneiden im internationalen 
Vergleich umso besser ab, je autonomer sie sind’, sagt Andreas Schleicher von der OECD. Die 
gut platzierten skandinavischen Länder haben ihre traditionell zentralistischen Systeme 
dezentralisiert. An die einzelnen Schulen in Finnland und Schweden geht das ganze Geld, auch 
das für Lehrergehälter. Die Zentrale gibt in diesen Ländern Ziele vor und kontrolliert die 
Ergebnisse. Zur Autonomie gehört Rückmeldung. Dialog ist das allerwichtigste. [...] Um ihren 
eigenen [Ziel] zu finden, muss sie [die Schule] mit sich selbst in Dialog treten.” Kahl 2001b. 
200 Ratzki & Schumann, 28.  
201 Haas-Rietschel, Helga (2002c) Abschied von alten Bildern. E&W 3/2002, 31; Kahl 2001b. 
202 See Bieber & Martens.  
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had implemented them for a long time.203 Attitudes to steering and standardised tests 
received equivalent acceptance elsewhere in the E&W, as a researcher Helmut Fend 
characterised the difference between Germany and countries with a non-tracking school 
structure: 
 
Countries with comprehensive schools and good performance results have done 
both: optimal individual support combined with a non-school-based standard 
assurance via entrance examinations in vocational schools or Gymnasium upper 
classes, for example, or through cross-school examinations.204 
 
Fend saw the resistance to external achievement control not only within schools but also 
in the KMK.205 In fact, the time of PISA 2000 was the period when attitudes to 
standardisation seemed to have gradually changed in Germany, characterised as the 
empirical turn.206 The KMK had, however, a couple of years earlier in the Konstanzer 
Beschluss declared that Germany would shift from input to output steering by 
increasing external evaluation in order to assure quality.207 Apparently this shift had not 
yet changed how the research community observed the issue so that Fend still had the 
need to express the lack of achievement standards as a national deficit along with his 
favourable attitude towards PISA. However, Fend’s contemporary experience of 
fighting against strong resistance to school efficiency research appeared in the 
educational journalist Kahl’s argumentation on behalf of PISA as well.208 This suggests 
that at the time PISA might have received a positive connotation as a “saviour” also 
because of this perception of German structural suspicion to external evaluation.  
 
When England’s success was analysed, the strong control of school results with tests 
                                                
203 van Ackeren 2002c, 20.  
204 “Länder mit Gesamtschulen und guten Leistungsergebnissen haben beides getan: eine 
optimale individuelle Unterstützung kombiniert mit einer schulexternen Standardsicherung über 
Aufnahmeprüfungen in berufliche oder gymnasiale Oberstufen etwa oder über 
schulübergreifende Prüfungen.” Fend. 
205 Ibid. 
206 Lundahl, Christian & Waldow, Florian (2009) Standardisation and ‘quick languages’: the 
shape‐shifting of standardised measurement of pupil achievement in Sweden and Germany. 
Comparative Education, 45(3), 365–385.  
207 Kultusministerkonferenz (KMK) (1997) Grundsätzliche Überlegungen zu 
Leistungsvergleichen innerhalb der Bundesrepublik Deutschland – Konstanzer Beschluss. 
http://www.kmk.org/fileadmin/Dateien/veroeffentlichungen_beschluesse/1997/1997_10_24-
Konstanzer-Beschluss.pdf. Accessed 7.11.2017.  
208 Kahl 2002a, 21. 
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and willingness to raise achievement was likewise highlighted.209 Whereas the Finland 
report highlighted the lack of central testing as part of Finnish success factors, Fend in 
contrast put Great Britain and Finland under the same category of countries, which 
unlike Germany based their success on implementing external achievement control.210 
This further reinforced the impression that these countries were part of an ongoing 
development of progress.  
 
Highlighting the modernity of successful countries was thus a significant part of the 
representations. The E&W editor Haas-Rietschel was astonished of the lack of 
traditional classroom elements in the Swedish school called Futurum, which they had 
visited.211 Her emphasis on the school name implied the admiration for these 
“advanced” didactic principles:  
 
In the 'school of the future' there are no classes, no timetable, no school bell that 
annoys every 45 minutes, no blackboard, no teacher's desk, no arranged rows of 
seats.212 
 
Even the architecture of the school was said to be part of the pedagogical programme 
and to contribute to transparency and to “a new understanding” of teachers’ work.213 In 
the England report, underlining the high amount of technical equipment and computers 
in a similar way reinforced the picture of “modern” conditions not only in terms of 
reformed structure.214  
 
3.2 Principles of inclusion and responsibility as success 
factors 
 
In the Finland article, classroom-related factors were less emphasised than in the 
Sweden report. Instead, the Finnish “philosophy” of including every child at the system 
                                                
209 Ratzki & Schumann, 28. 
210 Holzapfel, 24; Fend.  
211 Haas-Rietschel 2002b. 
212 “Es gibt in der ‘Schule der Zukunft’ keine Klassen, keinen Studenplan, keine Schulglocke, 
die im 45-Minuten-Takt nervt, keine Tafel, keinen Lehrerpult, keine angeordneten Sitzreihen.” 
Haas-Rietschel 2002b, 30. 
213 Haas-Rietschel 2002b, 28, 30. 
214 Ratzki & Schumann. 
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level was highlighted. England was represented similarly as the forerunner of inclusion, 
which was said to be the “state goal” in the country. Ratzki and Schumann concentrated 
on pointing out the exemplary financial resources, which were used to encourage 
schools to accept “difficult” pupils.215  They further described the English system: 
 
In England, schools are responsible for the learning progress of their pupils. [...] 
The performance of individual schools and the results of particular school 
subjects are published in so-called league tables (ranking lists).216 
 
Responsibility therefore became the primary reference in the England report. It is 
interesting how responsibility was intertwined with the issue of testing culture and 
publishing ranking lists of school achievement. On the one hand, the authors briefly 
mentioned that the “rigorous” test system was associated with increased mental 
problems among pupils. Furthermore, the authors wrote that schools were tempted to 
form more homogeneous groups by giving easier tests to weaker pupils in order to raise 
the overall achievement of the school. This sort of “responsibility” over achievement 
did not, on the other hand, seem to affect at all what Ratzki and Schumann represented 
as genuine responsibility over the pupils’ individual needs.217 Thus, even though such 
adverse features of the English monitoring culture were in some extent acknowledged, 
they were not commented any further in the England article or elsewhere in the E&W. 
This gave an impression that the acknowledgement of the Anglo-Saxon testing culture 
did not play a role in the overall argumentation, which concentrated on glorifying the 
New Labour educational politics as a “creative mixture of reform, consequent 
integration und differentiation”.218  
 
However, if compared to the other country reports, there was a clear contradiction in the 
attitudes towards the ranking culture. Whereas in the England report responsibility 
equalled with pushing and pressuring by public ranking lists, in the cases of Finland and 
Sweden quite the opposite arguments were made. Holzapfel emphasised how Finland 
                                                
215 Ratzki & Schumann; Holzapfel.  
216 “In England sind die Schulen für den Lernfortschritt ihrer Schülerinnen und Schüler 
verantwortlich. [...] In so genannten League tables (Ranking-Listen) werden die Leistungen der 
einzelnen Schulen und die Ergebnissen einzelner Fächer veröffentlicht.” Ratzki & Schumann, 
29. Italics added.  
217 Ratzki & Schumann.  
218 Ibid.  
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had no central testing and that if there should be comparative tests, results would never 
be public or used to put pressure on schools.219 Haas-Rietschel underlined that in 
Sweden it “will not be attempted with a 'culture of strain' to teach the little ones the 
multiplication tables as early as possible”.220 These kind of arguments critically implied 
that Germany was suffering from an excessive achievement orientation. This could be 
also seen as a critique towards the KMK, which in 1997 had called for a ‘culture of 
strain’ (Kultur der Anstrengung) after Germany had brought mediocre results from a 
previous international large-scale assessment, TIMSS.221 These comparisons to Sweden 
and Finland were clearly inspired by the national disputes.  
 
Although elsewhere in the magazine it seemed that the E&W rather advocated the 
message, more supportive atmosphere at schools would lead to higher achievement, 
besides the England report there were other calls for more demanding culture. A 
conservative Bavarian minister of science Hans Zehetmair who, rather contrastingly to 
the usual E&W PISA argumentation, explained the PISA results by stating that 
discipline and achievement had not been valued enough in Germany.222 Even within the 
E&W there seemed to be a contradiction between these understandings of which 
emphasis, support or “pushing” would lead to higher results.  
 
It seemed that the England report in the end attempted to underline that the culture of 
standardised tests could, nevertheless, be combined with the ideal of support and 
integration, thus the elements that were the principal values of the GEW.223 Thereby it 
became obvious how the England representation was, although in a different way than 
the Sweden and Finland accounts, tightly tied to the German context:  
 
All these efforts [in England] never aim at selection, but always at inclusion, 
integrating all children and adolescents. There are some indications that in 
                                                
219 Holzapfel, 24. 
220 “…wird nicht mit einer ‘Kultur der Anstrengung’ versucht, den Kleinen möglichst früh das 
Einmaleins beizubringen”. Haas-Rietschel 2002b.  
221 TIMSS, short for Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study, was conducted by 
the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA) in 1995; 
Kultusministerkonferenz (KMK) (1997) Eine Kultur der Anstrengung entwickeln. Anhörung 
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Germany we are about to adopt forms of accountability from England, 
centralized examinations and tests, external evaluation, but without the 
integrative context. In the German selective school system, in contrast, these 
instruments only lead to increased selection.224 
 
The citation above indicated that the threats of standardisation movement were also 
scrutinised critically. This rather diverged from Fend, who earlier represented the 
standardised steering merely in a positive light. Interestingly enough, despite these signs 
of critical attitudes, the OECD or PISA assessments were not linked to harmful effects 
of monitoring at all in my research period in the E&W nor in the England article. In 
England the standardisation culture was not in the end framed as threatening because of 
the alleged thorough principle of inclusion.  
 
It seemed that for Ratzki and Schumann the PISA results in England represented an 
encouraging impulse especially because there was something familiar in the English 
system: in the strict culture of differentiating elements more consistencies could be 
connected to their own national context. Perhaps that is why a sign of hope was 
attributed to England and the social democrat New Labour in particular, since they were 
seen to indicate that a significant break in old structures of continuation was possible. 
Therefore, the authors could have seen England as providing new arguments to reform 
the German system at least partially in the situation, where the political Spielraum was 
experienced rather narrow concerning the three-tier structure.  
 
However, what was completely silenced in the case of England was the capability of the 
PISA results to indicate the reality in this extent. PISA received the role of an indicator 
of the state of things without further questions. Apparently, the argumentation was 
based on the perceived German problems, that is, teachers’ and schools’ irresponsible 
and ignoring attitudes regarding pupils and their achievement. The representation of 
England was crystallised in the principle of inclusion by stating that “no school, no 
                                                
224 “Alle diese Bemühungen [in England] zielen nie auf Selektion, sondern immer auf Inclusion, 
Einbeziehung aller Kinder und Jugendlicher. Manches deutet darauf hin, dass wir in 
Deutschland dabei sind, Formen der Rechenschaftslegung von England zu übernehmen, zentrale 
Prüfungen und Tests, externe Evaluation, aber ohne den integrativen Kontext. Im deutschen 
selektiven Schulsystem führen diese Instrumente im Gegenteil nur zu noch mehr Selektion.” 
Ratzki & Schumann, 29. Italics added.  
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teacher can justify poor performance by having the wrong pupils”.225 Ratzki and 
Schumann underlined the English principle of “pushing breaks the circle” merely in the 
light of responsibility over pupils’ achievement226. It was the conspicuous emphasis on 
this aspect that seemed to lead to silencing other issues.  
 
The definition of success was thereby remarkably affected by the representation of 
national problems. The national “lenses” guided the depiction of Finland in Holzapfel’s 
article in a similar way: the importance given to the inclusion principle seemed to derive 
from the need to underline the contrast to the represented German conditions, where the 
fear that a child is “in a ‘wrong’ school” was presented to be the prevailing 
philosophy.227 This represented deficit of the German system thereby resembled the 
same “homogeneity paradigm” discussed in the previous chapter.  
 
What was remarkable here was how it seemed that the national gaze was able to shift 
attention away from the unintended effects of the ranking culture in England. After all, 
Ratzki and Schumann did briefly mention effects such as pupils’ mental problems and 
the pressure schools had to raise their ranking position. In fact, researchers have found 
evidence that the increased performance measuring has led to schools behaving 
strategically. For example, schools have targeted resources on certain pupils at the cost 
of other pupils, and in some cases selected out pupils from disadvantaged backgrounds. 
Another criticism is that the pressure leads to “teaching to the test” which might narrow 
down the curricula.228 The fact that Ratzki and Schumann acknowledged these issues 
but then left them untouched suggests a selective way of examining the country 
comparisons. As Bacchi points out, leaving certain issues unproblematic may limit the 
discussion of the topic.229 
 
                                                
225 “Keine Schule, kein Lehrer kann schlechte Leistungen damit begründen, die falschen 
Schülerinnen und Schüler zu haben.” Ratzki & Schumann, 28.  
226 Ratzki & Schumann, 29. 
227 “der Angst davor, dass ein Kind auf der ‘falschen’ Schule sei”. Holzapfel, 25.  
228 West & Pennell 2000; West, Anne (2010) High stakes testing, accountability, incentives and 
consequences in English schools. Policy & Politics, 38(1), 23–39; Leckie, George & Goldstein, 
Harvey (2017) The evolution of school league tables in England 1992–2016: ’Contextual value-
added’, ’expected progress’ and ’progress 8’. British Educational Research Journal, 43(2), 
193–212.  
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3.3 The gap between Germany and the successful countries 
 
The national view seemed in general to be the filter through which other countries were 
perceived. In the Finland report this became obvious in the way Holzapfel rather 
haphazardly noted:  
 
Of course, there is no culture of grade retention. Nothing seems as absurd in 
Helsinki as the German conviction, that grade retention would be a pedagogical 
measure. Germany is famously the absolute world champion of grade 
retention.230 
 
The PISA results had also revealed that grade retention was particularly common in 
Germany. As this was one of the aspects of the German system that the GEW argued 
against leaning on the PISA results231, Holzapfel’s comparison gave again the 
impression that attention was given to features, which were experienced to be the most 
severe deficits in the authors’ national context. Besides describing the structural features 
of the foreign system, Holzapfel’s comparison thus focused on the polemic issues from 
the German context, and highlighted the distance between the national situation and the 
“successful” countries.  
 
In the Swedish case the experience of the German deficits alike seemed to have an 
effect on how it was argued about the success factors in the foreign country. Haas-
Rietschel suggested that Swedish teachers had an extraordinary enthusiasm for change:  
 
Swedish educators keep saing goodbye to their old concepts over and over again 
and are ready to design new pictures about learning and teaching.232 
 
Haas-Rietschel’s Sweden representation now attributed to teachers a similar reform 
capacity that earlier had been ascribed to all three foreign systems. The journalist Kahl 
drew a corresponding contrast between the values and attitudes in Sweden and 
                                                
230 “Selbstverständlich gibt es auch kein Sitzenbleiben. Nichts erscheint einem in Helsinki so 
absurd wie die deutsche Überzeugung, beim Sitzenbleiben handele es sich um eine 
pädagogische Massnahme. Deutschland ist bekanntlich beim Sitzenbleiben absoluter 
Weltmeister.” Holzapfel, 24. 
231 See e.g. Demmer 2002a. 
232 “…dass sich schwedische Pädagogen immer wieder von ihren alten Konzepten 
verabschieden, und bereit sind, neue Bilder über Lernen und Lehren zu entwerfen.” Haas-
Rietschel 2002c.  
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Germany: 
 
In which German schools was the motto "Love and Consequences", which was 
heard at the Bäckhagens Skola in Stockholm?233 
 
This argument, again, began with interpreting other countries in contrast to the 
perceived German problems. The comparison was based on a deep conviction, that 
German schools would fundamentally differ from other countries not only in their 
educational models but also in their deeper mentality and values.  
 
Haas-Rietschel stated that the school introduced in the Sweden report would give back 
the belief in the general concept of schooling.234 At the same time, however, she 
mentioned how the school in question was a specific project school, following 
pedagogy that ten percent of Swedish schools had started to apply.235 Therefore, it 
seemed that whereas German schools were treated as an imagined collective entity 
based on the PISA scores, the understanding of success abroad could be based on single 
examples without much notice to contextual factors or the overall picture.  
 
At the same time, however, it was more complex than that. Paying attention to the fact 
that the model Swedish school represented ten percent of Swedish schools did not seem 
to prevent Haas-Rietschel from giving the impression that Swedish education in total 
represented this ideal as a contrast to the German culture. Representations stating that 
successful countries believed “in the willingness of people to learn”236 or that the 
Swedes had “understood that learning is a highly individual and personal matter”237 
generalised their claims across the whole Swedish educational society. While references 
to single schools thus gave the impression that conclusions were drawn from a rather 
narrow basis, the simultaneous broad generalisations reinforced the insistent image of 
Sweden as a model example. Sweden had in fact been called a “Musterland” in the 
                                                
233 “An welchen deutschen Schulen lautete das Motto schon “Love and Consequences”, das sich 
an der Bäckhagens Skola in Stockholm hörte?” Kahl 2001b. 
234 Haas-Rietschel 2002b, 30. 
235 Ibid. 
236 Kahl 2001b. 
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E&W editorial already in the November issue in 2001 before the PISA results had been 
published.238  
 
In the E&W Sweden was altogether treated as the mythical “Bildungswunderland” 
where the E&W editorial expected the “secret of learning” to be discovered239. By 
representing Swedish education as following a “Pippi Longstocking principle” Haas-
Rietschel drew a mythical picture of pedagogy that encouraged the child to individual 
fantasy, obstinacy and willingness to experiment. The wilfulness of the “Pippi 
principle” seemed to function for the author not only as a model for child upbringing, 
but also as an encouragement to resist the prevailing traditional conservative boundaries 
of German school structure. The fact that the main reference of the Sweden report was a 
headstrong fairy tale character – the picture of Pippi illustrated three articles discussing 
Swedish education and educational politics – gives an idea to what extent PISA data 
played a role in the overall argumentation.240 Still, the glance at Sweden was initially 
justified with “results”, as the editorial of the issue introduced the Sweden report:  
 
Traveling educates. In any way the [...] GEW trip to Sweden has convinced even 
the most persistent doubters: school without selection is possible and — as the 
results reveal — also better.241 
 
It was not, however, specified, to which results they referred. Even though rankings and 
“peak positions” in PISA seemingly justified for the E&W authors the treatment of 
Finland and England in particular, Swedish PISA scores were only relatively good and 
not among the highest ranked countries242. Nevertheless, for instance the researcher 
Klemm did not refrain from referring to Swedish “peak values” (Spitzenwerte)243. The 
image of the Swedish peak position could have derived from earlier large-scale 
assessment, TIMSS results, which Kahl mentioned when discussing Sweden244. If this 
were the case, it would be peculiar that the more moderate results from the PISA study 
                                                
238 Editorial. E&W 11/2001, 3.  
239 Haas-Rietschel 2002b, 28–29; Editorial. E&W 3/2002, 3.  
240 Haas-Rietschel 2002b; Haas-Rietschel 2002c. 
241 “Reisen bildet. Jedenfalls hat die [...] GEW-Reise mit Bildungsjournalisten nach Schweden 
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Ergebnisse offenbaren — auch besser.” Editorial. E&W 3/2002, 3.   
242 OECD (2001) Knowledge and skills for life. Paris: OECD Publications, 53, 79, 88.  
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55 
received no remarks. It would not have quite fitted into the existing picture of Sweden. 
Evidently there was no need to justify the superiority of Swedish education or further 
examine the Swedish PISA results, since the conceptualisation of Swedish superiority 
was on a sufficiently steady basis. The image of Sweden in the E&W could be 
explained with the longer tendency in Germany to conceive Sweden as an educational 
model and more generally, as a societal model especially on the part of social 
democrats245.  
 
Waldow has observed that the German focus turned from Sweden to Finland after the 
PISA study,246 but apparently this shift had not yet occurred within the E&W during the 
research period of this thesis. This shows how PISA rankings at this point only in a 
selective way determined the “reference societies”247 of the GEW, and Sweden could 
retain its position as the familiar point of reference. Confirming what Waldow has 
stated earlier about the selective reference to international models at a national level, 
references to successful countries in the E&W thus signalled how the definitions of 
being on the top could vary between the PISA ranking lists and earlier connotations248.  
 
In this case, the representation of Sweden was based on already existing convictions. 
Consequently, these comparisons made within the PISA discussion had very little to do 
with drawing conclusions with PISA data or even with PISA rankings in the case of 
Sweden. Based on this, seeking for answers from abroad was not framed explicitly as a 
consequence of PISA. Instead, PISA seemed to have the role of stimulating the search 
for solutions in the first place. The inconsistency on the matter was only that it seemed 
to justify some arguments better than others.  
 
Other articles in the E&W did not always specifically mention PISA either when they 
referred to “success” or “evidence” of integrated systems working “intelligently” with 
heterogeneous groups.249 A sufficient reference to other countries’ success could be an 
unnamed “study”, as in Felix Winter’s travel report, where he recommended a 
                                                
245 See Waldow 2010a, 497–498. 
246 Waldow 2010a, 497–498.  
247 See Sellar & Lingard 2013; Schriewer, Jürgen & Martinez, Carlos (2004) Constructions of 
Internationality in Education, In Steiner-Khamsi, Gita (ed.) The Global Politics of Educational 
Borrowing and Lending. New York: Teachers College Press, 29–53.  
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“successful” portfolio method used in a few US schools as a remedy to the German 
strict grading system and to challenges with heterogeneous groups of pupils. Winter 
invoked the “lessons” Germany had received from PISA in his pleading to implement 
the portfolio method instead of normal exams. However, the concept of “evidence” in 
Winter’s argumentation had nothing to do with PISA data, although the report was 
framed as part of the first “practical conclusions” from PISA.250 This example showed 
again, how non-specific argumentation in the E&W could be framed as a “consequence 
of PISA”.  
 
The way of suggesting that Germany radically differed from the successful countries 
also reached the representation of the political landscape between countries. After a 
discussion with different parties and stakeholders of Swedish education, Karl-Heinz 
Heinemann, a journalist who also participated in the GEW trip to Sweden, perceived the 
Swedish politics as follows:  
 
No one of our discussion partners seriously disputes that much is being done for 
education in this country. There is no ideological sharpness that characterises 
the topic in our country. It is a good thing that there is a school for all, and it is 
also good that everyone here could achieve his goal...251 
 
He was thereby convinced that there was a profound difference between Swedish and 
German political cultures. Through this Sweden reference, Heinemann represented his 
own national context as a hopeless battle against political adversaries, who were 
opposing the values of education and equality. Holzapfel’s characterisation of Finnish 
culture of school politics had similar tones:  
 
It is a coalition of reason. No professional association demands for more 
instruction time for their subject, no minister of education calls for more 
obligatory presence hours for teachers.252 
 
                                                
250 Winter, 22, 27.  
251 “Von unseren Diskussionspartnern bestreitet niemand ernsthaft, dass in diesem Land viel für 
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so, dass es eine Schule für alle gebe, und es sei auch gut, dass jeder hier sein Ziel erreichen 
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Holzapfel’s Finland report accounted the Finnish success for “the coalition of reason”, 
as the whole article was headed. Heinemann’s and Holzapfel’s representations had 
something in common: they contrasted “reason” in successful countries with 
“ideological” when referring to the German debate in educational politics. 
Consequently, they gave a very context-free representation of foreign educational 
systems and silenced the possibility of any conflicts occurring in those countries. Since 
PISA was represented as the voice of “truth”, there seemed to be no need to question the 
existing interpretations of other countries’ political contexts, as PISA had already stated 
the “success”.  
 
These citations were examples of a common argumentation style in the E&W, which 
implied that ideological conflicts did not exist in successful countries. Further examples 
of such a representation were remarks on how the successful countries were dealing 
with heterogeneous ability groups in an “intelligent” way. This statement seemed to 
gain strength from assertions provided by OECD experts.253  
 
The perceived problem in Germany, the fixation on homogeneous learning groups, was 
again represented as the distinctive element of the German political and societal 
landscape. This was visible for instance in pleas stating that the question of 
heterogeneous learning should be discussed completely in a “non-ideological” way.254 
In the E&W, ideological was thereby used to describe the political opposition.255 This 
accords with Bellmann’s observations of the German “protagonists” of educational 
reforms, who tended to contrast their arguments as “pragmatic” against the 
“ideological” reform discussion in the 1960s and 1970s. The negativity of anything 
‘ideological’ was clear, only Bellmann has pointed out that pragmatic did not always 
have positive connotations in German discourse.256 Therefore it seemed that PISA had 
contributed to this conceptual shift.  
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3.4 Solutions according to the international development 
 
Besides the lack of tracking, several explanations for success highlighted that most 
other countries had “all-day schooling” (Ganztagsschule) unlike Germany. The aspect 
of all-day schools being the common form of school in Sweden was also not forgotten 
in the Sweden travel report.257 The researcher Klemm drew a picture of the reality of 
different school systems within Europe:  
 
That is the way it is. In the group of EU countries [...] Greece, Austria and 
Germany offer the half-day school, Italy and Portugal lead half-day and all-day 
schools side by side and all other EU countries have all-day schools as regular 
schools.258  
 
The way of talking about all-day schools in the E&W implied an assumption that 
outside Germany schools would be divided to either half-day or all-day schools, without 
considering possible variations in the understanding and background of this concept in 
other countries. Implying that everywhere else all-day schooling was normality 
reinforced the overall representation of Germany lying behind internationally. Already 
in the initial reactions of the E&W December issue it was stated that the “PISA authors” 
had advised Germany to “catch up with the common international standard” of all-day 
schooling, so that Germany could raise its average achievement scores.259 Thereby the 
OECD was given a legitimating role in the argument that Germany ought to act fast in 
this matter.  
 
In the nationwide PISA discourse, increasing all-day schooling had a significant role as 
one of the main consequences of PISA, as it had been set by the Länder Ministers of 
Education in the KMK right after the publication of the results as part of the political 
measures to implement260. It was framed in public as the solution to narrow the 
achievement gap based on socioeconomic differences in Germany.261 However, 
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Tillmann et al. have managed to show that Ganztagsschule had been partially on the 
agenda already before PISA discussion. Tillmann et al. have additionally argued that 
Ganztagsschule was accepted by the public and politicians not because of empirically 
proven value of it but rather due to the public conception according to which 
Ganztagsschule was a proper way to respond to the PISA results. The fact that the 
concept of Ganztagsschule had convinced the public was more important than any 
empirical evidence of it. Tillmann et al. conclude that the pressure that politicians had to 
act fast played a significant role in the process of legitimating the concept.262  
 
In the E&W, the perception of Ganztagsschulen as an appropriate reaction to PISA 
followed a similar pattern. Heinemann even called Ganztagsschulen the “charm” 
(Zauberformel) that would solve all problems, the low PISA-results among other things. 
Although the research material indicated that the E&W authors had also acknowledged 
the national “consensus” that had developed itself around all-day schooling, they still 
seemed to have the need to argue further for it.263 Heinemann claimed that all-day 
schooling would lead to a “new quality” of schooling and drew legitimation from 
Sweden:  
 
It is confirmed by the Swedish experiences, which Agneta Anderlund from the 
Swedish Lärarvörbundet reported: The entire school work has changed: now the 
teachers have fixed attendance time of 35 hours per week at school. And they 
have learned to accompany each student [...] individually in their 
development.264 
 
With the quote above Heinemann gave the impression, Sweden had recently gone 
through an equal reform transforming schools into “all-day schools”.265 He implied that 
a system level change to an all-day concept would change teachers’ working methods 
towards the concept of individual support. Apparently Heinemann expected a natural 
chain of development, where Germany would now follow Sweden. In the Finland 
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report, Holzapfel also tried in his argumentation for a comprehensive school system to 
draw parallels in the historical development of both countries by pointing out that 
Finland had had a similar selective system until the 1970s. He stated that where Finland 
had succeeded, Germany had “failed”.266 Thus, Holzapfel implied that both countries 
would have been in a similar course of development, where in the end there would exist 
winners and losers.  
 
The educational journalist Kahl drew similar conclusions of how other countries such as 
Canada or Scandinavians had “taken the risk to remove the fear out of the system and 
invest in trust…”267 With this Kahl implied that other countries would have suffered 
from similar problems as the systematic “fear” that Kahl perceived to be embedded in 
the German system. Assuming that other countries conceived the problems similarly as 
the E&W commentators was a common pattern in the magazine. Demmer, for instance, 
claimed that teachers throughout the world saw heterogeneous teaching groups as the 
biggest problem of their work.268 
 
If these patterns of argumentation are analysed in the light of Koselleck’s understanding 
of temporality between the experience and expectation, one can discern the tension 
between the experienced history of education and the expectations of desired outcomes. 
In the previous subchapter I showed how the German tradition and national experience 
was represented to intrinsically differ from successful countries. Conversely, it was now 
implied that all countries including Germany had undergone an equivalent phase in their 
educational history with similar challenges. Through this representation it was 
seemingly further underlined that the German course of history had taken a false turn.  
 
Common for these representations was the need to depict a historical development of 
certain events and assume that these had determined outcomes. For Holzapfel, Kahl and 
Heinemann among others this seemed to be an attempt to make things appear possible: 
the conditions could be or could have been something else. Leaning on Spector and 
Kitsuse’s theory, the availability of remedies in other contexts as the basis of problem 
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constructions generated dissatisfaction and simultaneously hopes for these actors.269 
The OECD’s arguments for the goals of PISA in a similar manner increased the appeal 
of comparison by asserting that PISA shows what is possible in education270. For the 
E&W commentators above, the perceived possibilities revealed by PISA thus shaped 
the expectations. In this way, international comparison had the function of widening the 
horizon of potential futures. There seemed to be a need to illustrate continuities: the 
commentators attempted to reduce the gap between present and past experience and the 
horizon of expectations.  
 
In the Finland report Holzapfel expected that since the Finnish PISA scores in reading 
literacy were high, the Finns had previously put particular weight on language 
competence in their system. Heinemann noted in another article how the Swedes had 
not given attention to PISA until it was stated that Swedish PISA scores were low in the 
area of “discipline”, after which the Swedes then realised that “something must be 
done” in that sector.271 These assumptions strengthened the impression that rational 
determined planning would contribute to high PISA results. What is more striking, this 
implied the expectation that each country would and should make political decisions 
according to the PISA rankings.  
 
Thus, it became increasingly clear that successful education systems in the E&W were 
mostly interpreted through a taken-for-granted attitude to PISA. Within the academic 
discussion of comparative education, critical educational researchers such as Simola et 
al. have demanded that contingency and possible historical coincidences behind the 
development of education systems should be taken into account when comparing 
systems272. Based on my research material it seems that such awareness was hardly 
present in the PISA discussions of the E&W at the time.  
 
Sellar and Lingard have observed an interesting pattern in the international reactions to 
PISA: even countries leading the rankings have had the need to make changes according 
to the PISA data. This demonstrates the ascendancy that PISA has in defining the 
                                                
269 See Spector & Kitsuse, 84.  
270 OECD (2004) What makes school systems perform? Seeing school systems through the 
prism of PISA. Paris: OECD Publishing, 3.  
271 Holzapfel, 24–25; Heinemann 2002a.  
272 Simola et al., 612–614. 
62 
“educational race”.273 Heinemann’s reportage in the E&W of the Swedish system 
provided an example of such a tendency, when he underlined that even a “successful” 
country such as Sweden was improving its system according to the PISA guidance. This 
reinforced the impression that the E&W discussions offered in this subchapter: it was 
expected that PISA should guide all education systems, including those already 
perceived as successful. In other words, PISA was given the power of defining, which 
education policies were required. This indicated an experience of urgency created by the 
PISA results. The E&W’s discussion showed signs of crisis rhetoric similar to what 
critical researchers such as Gorur, Auld and Morris have observed in the argumentation 
surrounding PISA274.  
 
3.5 The peculiar search for causalities 
 
While it has become clear that the discussion in the E&W focused on searching for 
causes for “success”, with which the magazine commonly referred to PISA as a 
yardstick, it did not seem to be a unified pattern of argumentation. Simultaneously there 
existed rather conflicting patterns of argumentation in the attempts to examine the PISA 
results: the GEW-minded arguments tended to draw direct conclusions that PISA had 
proved the flaws of the three-tier system, while statistical experts and researchers stayed 
cautious of such claims. In June, the GEW’s Demmer argued directly that “perhaps the 
Finns are successful exactly because they teach all children together.”275 There was thus 
a tendency to keep on referring to causal effects even half a year after the publication of 
the results, despite the fact that the complexities of PISA data had been acknowledged 
as well.  
 
In contrast, where researchers and PISA experts were interviewed or PISA data was 
analysed in the E&W,276 the researchers continuously stated how PISA could not 
provide evidence of school structure having a causal effect on achievement. Researchers 
such as Klaus-Jürgen Tillmann and Klaus Klemm started with remarking that PISA 
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could not provide causal inferences but moved directly after that to statements that 
PISA, nevertheless, indicated that German early tracking would differ from all top PISA 
performers in their comprehensive systems.277 Tillmann pointed out:  
 
... we are the country that is the earliest to track pupils within the structured 
school system - and we are far behind with our performance. Especially 
concerning the poor achievement results, we have a particularly sharp social 
selection with our Hauptschule. All this indicates that there is also a school 
system effect. Incidentally, the OECD sees the same way.278 
 
Indeed, the most often cited OECD voice in E&W, the PISA director Schleicher, 
followed a similar pattern of argumentation, such as in the following interview: 
 
[Welzel:] So are integrated systems more performance-capable? [Schleicher:] 
Even though causal relationships are difficult to determine here, there is a 
tendency for integrative school systems [...] to show better overall performance. 
[...] Decisions should therefore not be set and institutionalized too early.279 
 
Despite his straightforward arguments beginning with “PISA shows that…”, 
Schleicher’s diplomatic style concentrated on pointing out correlations of rather vague 
thematic points such as school climate and school autonomy.280 In contrast to 
Schleicher’s argumentation, which clearly accorded with the GEW-minded political 
opinions about early tracking as seen in the above quotation, the other interviewed PISA 
expert, the German PISA coordinator Jürgen Baumert had a different tone. He refrained 
from giving in to the E&W editor Welzel’s leading questions about the linkage of 
success and integrated structure. Baumert seemed to insist that the early tracking of the 
German system was an existing feature, an “unlucky matter”, with which one must learn 
to cope with by developing new didactic concepts. Moreover, Baumert’s rhetoric was 
more complex and technical, whereas Schleicher’s arguments appeared more 
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generalising and thus appealing. Baumert stated that among countries tracking early 
there were both those with good and those with weaker PISA results.281 He did not 
specify, which countries had those good results. Interestingly enough, the GEW-minded 
researcher Klaus Klemm had denied exactly this argument in the previous issue: for 
Klemm, PISA finally belied this mantra-like certainty.282 Again it was thus visible, how 
much the interpretations of the PISA results could differ. Still, it was rather peculiar that 
Baumert’s direct statement did not seem to weaken the GEW’s insistence on the ability 
of PISA to prove their resistance to the three-tier system throughout the magazine. In 
other words, Baumert’s expertise or the statement itself was not put under question but 
was completely silenced.  
 
The fact that the interview of Schleicher and Baumert was headed “Successful 
Countries have Integrated Systems” despite both interviewees denying causal 
connections was criticised by a reader, who accused the E&W of incompetence and 
intentional contorting the opinion of the interviewees.283 The existence of the GEW’s 
political line concerning the structure question in the E&W provoked other readers to 
criticise the active school politics of the GEW as well284. The indignation of the reader 
demonstrated the complexity of statistical expertise colliding with political opinions: in 
a way the experts’ statements and PISA results gave a reason both to name the interview 
as it was named, and also to draw critical attention to the contradiction. Paying attention 
to the “integrated” school system model of top PISA performers did not yet claim that 
the model itself would lead to success. This demonstrates the way that PISA could 
function in contradictory arguments.  
 
On the other hand, one could distinguish a political objective in many of the E&W 
articles, since arguing for the goal of comprehensive system was visible across the 
E&W material. Separating correlation and causality may thus become equivocal in 
debates where technical and political argumentation mingles. This showed how the 
OECD expertise seemed to provide legitimation both for those arguing for the abolition 
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of the tracking structure and for those denying the effect of school structure and early 
tracking.  
 
The complex nature of translating PISA data into practice became even more obvious in 
the attempts of the E&W to provide detailed analysis of the findings in their series of 
“PISA-Details” in four issues with the help of school development researcher Isabell 
van Ackeren.285 The series was introduced as follows: 
 
The PISA results are one thing, their explanation and the search for causes the 
other. On the 532 pages of the national study there are a number of detailed 
findings and correlations that are relevant to the understanding of PISA 
outcomes, their international positioning and the search for solutions to 
problems.286 
 
This attempt certainly showed that the E&W endeavoured to not merely examine the 
rankings in order to understand the PISA results. Still, the extent to which this interest 
in data and the attempt to explain the 532 pages actually changed anything in how the 
league tables affected the initial PISA reactions and the usage of PISA in the GEW 
argumentation leaves one to doubt. It is unlikely that these details would have 
contributed to teachers’ understanding of the PISA results. For instance, detailed 
comparisons of the PISA results, which measured the impact of homework, instruction 
time or external tutoring on achievement in different countries seemed to merely end in 
vague conclusions such as the following:  
 
Despite all the reservations regarding the data situation, the presented results 
may still possibly indicate an effect on the learning outcome by the factor 
'time'.287 
 
Although the objective of analysing the PISA data with an expert probably was to 
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increase transparency about the PISA results to a non-technician audience of 
educational workers, this kind of analyses have been likely to leave the readers rather 
confused exactly as in the case of the OECD experts’ causality arguments. Accordingly, 
the PISA Details articles emphasised how PISA would not transmit causal relations but 
mere hypotheses.288 Moreover, van Ackeren’s article reminded the readers of the fact 
that the OECD and the national report did not recommend changing the structure of the 
tracking systems, exactly as Baumert had implied in his interview.289 The complexities 
of statistical expertise combined with the layman urgency to “find answers” within the 
GEW thereby led to a peculiar combination of arguments side by side.  
 
To a certain extent, the inclusion of conflicting arguments in the E&W gave an 
impression that the discussion within the GEW included multiple aspects despite the 
otherwise rather one-sided argumentation on the tracking issue. In other words, the 
magazine highlighted the “scientific” approach on the matter and let contradictory 
stances coexist. However, there seemed to be no discussion between these two opposing 
stands or comments on the contrasting expert opinions, although PISA expertise was at 
the same time framed to buttress the arguments of the GEW. The existence of scientific, 
more cautious arguments did not lessen the more simplified GEW argumentation. In 
other words, the contradictory elements of the discussion were completely ignored.  
 
However, the tendency of making causal inferences with PISA caused criticism outside 
the E&W discussion among educational researchers. Johannes Bellmann and another 
German educationist, Ewald Terhart, warned of the hasty policy conclusions drawn 
from the PISA data. According to Terhart, it was not at all possible to infer the causes 
for the PISA results from the data.290 Bellmann has pointed out the same ambiguous 
tendency in Schleicher and Baumert’s argumentation, that was visible in the E&W 
material: even they as experts do not seem to agree on what can be suggested based on 
PISA. In the E&W sources, the research voices tended to deny causality but in the next 
sentence, as Bellmann has stated, provided policy recommendations stating “PISA, 
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however, does show…”291 In the magazine this pattern was framed to strengthen the 
plausibility of certain political arguments, such as comprehensive schooling and 
appealing governments to reform education. The given prominence to statistical 
expertise eventually functioned as a rhetorical device, regardless of whether the authors 
and interviewees consciously intended to do so.  
 
The fact that the PISA analysis in the magazine naturally attempted to lean on expertise 
and researchers in its urgency to discover causes for PISA results made visible the 
inescapable conflict between opposing political camps. Secondly, the combination of 
contradicting arguments illustrated the complexity of the dialogue between research 
knowledge and political matters. Lundahl and Waldow have drawn attention to the fact 
that psychometric studies are characterised by methodological complexities, which 
require a great amount of prior knowledge that most educational actors do not have. 
They, however, point out that it is not the psychometric science as such creating a 
“quick language” (Lundahl 2008) within educational discourse.292 The material 
analysed here suggests that the dialogue between psychometric research and political 
struggles indeed suffers from serious flaws.  
 
There were no signs of change in this pattern even later in 2002. After the German 
national supplement tests, the PISA-E results, were published in summer 2002 the GEW 
utilised the causality statement as part of their article, where they went through “claims” 
against “facts” about PISA studies.  
 
Neither the international nor the national PISA study allow for causal inferences 
from the school system to student performance. The assertion that the German 
Sonderweg of early performance selection has proved to be superior to 
integrated systems is refuted by PISA.293  
 
Thus, the causality argument was in a peculiar way turned upside down and used 
against the political opposition. In contrast, the stance of the GEW was now presented 
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to be on the side of the experts, who had refrained from making causal claims.  
 
3.6 The effects of the national PISA-E results on the teacher 
discussion 
 
As mentioned before, the German educational system is fundamentally affected by the 
fact that the country is divided into 16 Bundesländer, who have strong autonomy 
especially considering their school politics.294 The publication of the additional national 
PISA-E results in summer 2002 enabled comparing Länder with each other. This 
caused an intensive discussion in the E&W as it had done at the public level due to the 
federal elections in September 2002.295  
 
The difficulty in the PISA-E results for the GEW was to respond to the “irritating” 
result: the most conservative and selective state of Bavaria scored highest of all Länder, 
whereas Bremen scored the lowest, although educational expenses per pupil were the 
highest in Bremen. Immediately, the E&W accepted the German PISA expert Jürgen 
Baumert’s characterisation of the results: according to him, Bavarian results located 
Bavaria as “the so-called Bremen of Canada”. Canada had been one of the high 
performers in the international PISA tests but had variation between provinces. 
Baumert’s statement therefore implied that Bavarian high results were comparable with 
the lowest scoring Canadian provinces. In the E&W framing of PISA-E, Baumert’s 
words transformed into highlighting that in the “OECD comparison” Bavaria was “only 
the ‘Bremen’ of Canada” and thus “not Spitze”296. It seemed that with small phrasings 
the representation of the Bavarian scores received a slightly depreciating tone, although 
the statistics presented in the head article could have provided quite different 
conclusions: apparently the E&W at least did not merely look at PISA score points, 
since the presented average scores between Bavaria and Sweden were relatively near 
each other.297 This is interesting particularly because the PISA scores of the 
international comparison, as we have seen so far, had not been called under question.  
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Additionally, Baumert had stated that one should not search for role models within 
Germany but instead in Scandinavian or Anglo-Saxon countries.298 Baumert’s diagnosis 
seemed to fit the earlier GEW representation of Germany playing in another league 
compared to other industrial countries. Apparently the argumentation in the magazine 
could still rely on Baumert’s expertise despite his earlier refutation of German tracking 
system explaining the results. After all, his recommendation of gazing at international 
role models agreed with the GEW discourse.  
 
Although the educational journalist Kahl kept searching for didactic or system 
explanations for PISA-E by referring to Bavarian authoritative teaching style and 
connecting this to what according to him German schools needed, “autonomy” and 
individualism,299 in the overall argumentation of the E&W the PISA-E caused an 
argumentative shift. The analyses of the PISA-E results written by the E&W editors 
concluded that better socioeconomic conditions in the high-scoring Länder, Bavaria and 
Baden-Württemberg, explained the differences between German states, not pedagogical 
variance or educational policies.300 Although socioeconomic factors behind PISA 
results had not been completely ignored beforehand in the E&W301, the reliance on the 
explanatory power of pedagogical methods, school structure and implemented policies 
had been the focus of searching for “answers” as we have seen in chapters two and 
three. The turn from looking at educational policies to external factors occurred, 
interestingly enough, when the variance at the national level had to be explained. 
Otherwise the focus of the PISA discourse seemed to be directed at the prevailing 
election context:  
 
The campaigners are trying to draw superficial conclusions from those results, 
which first catch one's eye, in order to substantiate what they are always 
saying.302 
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Demmer reported that some conservatives had pleaded for commendation for their party 
politics due to the high PISA-E results in conservative governed states such as 
Bavaria303, which seemed to prompt the GEW authors to concentrate on criticising the 
national politics. At the same time, however, Kahl did not try to hide the fact that the 
results were not what the GEW had wished for304. The GEW statement declared:  
 
Instead of party political instrumentalisation of PISA data, thorough analyses 
are needed in order to elucidate correlations so that they can be effective in 
practice.305 
 
The irritation at the conservative election campaigning seemed to have increased the 
need to underline rationalised statements and dampen the Bavarian results. As shown in 
the quote above, it seemed that the on-going political battle strengthened the GEW 
experience that in Germany PISA was used politically. Moreover, this seemed to 
reinforce the self-perception, according to which the GEW stance was not based on 
political ideologies, but on facts. Despite accusing politicians and the conservative party 
of using PISA in politics, the GEW seemingly did not conceive its own PISA framing 
as anything political.  
 
However, the change in the earlier pattern of explaining PISA results did not reach the 
comparative gaze at the international level in the source material of this thesis: what 
was lacking was similar depth in scrutinising international results as had been 
conducted in the Bavarian case. Yet, it might have been impossible to have such 
detailed viewpoint to foreign countries in order to evaluate their background factors. 
Still, there were no signs of reconsidering the interpretations of other countries’ success. 
It seemed that the final diagnosis had been already made. Rather peculiar was that Kahl 
had added the US to his list of “happy” countries, whose communal school culture he 
linked not only to cognitive but also economic success.306 The GEW also declared that 
Germany could substantially only improve by orientating to “international development 
                                                
303 Demmer, Marianne (2002d) Der Bildungszwerg. E&W 7–8/2002, 13.  
304 Kahl 2002b.   
305 “Statt parteipolitischer Instrumentalisierung der Pisa-Daten werden vertiefende Analysen 
gebraucht mit dem Ziel, Zusammenhänge so aufzuklären, dass sie für die Praxis wirksam 
werden können.” Der erste und der zweite Blick - Eine erste Analyse der Ergebnisse. E&W 7–
8/2002, 11. Italics added.  
306 Kahl 2002b; Skandinavische Lektionen. E&W 7–8/2002, 5.  
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in Finland, Canada and Sweden”.307 References to other countries thereby continued the 
earlier pattern of drawing a distinction between Germany and successful school culture 
in Scandinavia and North America.  
 
3.7 Summary of the represented PISA results and conclusions 
 
In chapter three I have examined various meanings that were attributed to success in 
PISA in the E&W. Altogether the analysed discourses show the taken-for-grantedness 
of PISA as an indicator of success on the one hand. On the other hand, selective 
tendencies could be discerned: when it came to Finland and England, PISA rankings 
had inspired the examination of the systems, whereas in the case of Sweden the PISA 
results were silenced, and the presentation of the case was based on earlier convictions 
of successful Swedish education. Although PISA thus had a different connection to 
each case, all the travel reports were framed as part of the search for causes and 
solutions for the PISA results.  
 
Common for all representations was, however, that reforming the educational system 
was seen in a positive light. Sweden represented a country with a continuous capacity to 
reform, whereas England was an example showing that radical change is possible. The 
Finnish case was a more peculiar one and included elements from both categories, 
although, in the end the Finnish success was mostly explained by single systemic 
features. Furthermore, there seemed to be a tendency of simply linking Finland to the 
existing positive connotations of “Scandinavian” education. However, no other 
Scandinavian countries were mentioned.  
 
As these reference countries were examined, the comparative eye concentrated on 
issues that were represented problematic in the German context. Nonetheless, it is 
understandable that comparison occurring in a national context does perceive other 
countries through its national framework, as it defines a problem in a national context 
and searches for solutions to it. Comparison may provide perspective to one’s own 
context and help reconsider features that would not otherwise stand out in one’s own 
context. However, the comparison might lead to hasty inferences, if the external 
                                                
307 Der erste und der zweite Blick - Eine erste Analyse der Ergebnisse. E&W 7–8/2002, 11.  
72 
situations are not investigated in these cases with the same critical eye for the 
underlying factors as is acknowledged to exist in one’s own context. The scrutiny of the 
PISA-E results compared to earlier PISA discussion in the E&W elucidated how 
differently success and failure were interpreted at the international level than within the 
national borders.  
 
This analysis has demonstrated so far how the national “lenses” can guide the features 
that attract attention in foreign contexts, and that these selected features are then further 
interpreted through one’s own contextual background. Bacchi has pointed out how 
examining cross-cultural comparisons can show that particular problem representations 
may be traced back to certain institutional and cultural contexts. In the E&W this 
became visible for example in the usage of the concept Ganztagsschule and 
Gesamtschule: it seemed that other countries’ systems were discussed by referring to 
these German terms without considering that the concepts were linked to German 
particular institutional history and thus might not be congruent to describe foreign 
institutions. In the light of Bacchi’s theory, the E&W material also demonstrated how 
the belief in fast solutions may silence the historical and contextual path dependencies 
and contingencies in each national case. Moreover, representing conclusions as the 
“rational” ones or “truths” limits the possibility of discussing the matter further.308 
 
When it comes to consequences drawn from PISA, the viewpoints in the E&W in one 
way or another concluded, that German education needed a mental shift. This was 
argued to be not least due to the perceived harmful attitudes and practices of teachers, 
but also concerning the school structure level and the existing political values.309 
Comparisons to “successful” countries had the function of demonstrating, how the 
change would begin “in the minds” (in den Köpfen) of teachers.310 Later in autumn 2002 
the call for a “paradigm shift” was justified by the “international proof” which was 
believed to substantiate that integration and individual learning support led to success. 
“International proof” became a common reference to PISA, even though the word PISA 
did not always have to be mentioned anymore.311 
                                                
308 Bacchi, 12–14.   
309 Kahl 2001b; Demmer 2002c, 15–16.  
310 Haas-Rietschel 2002b, 28, 30; Haas-Rietschel 2002c; Diehl, Ute (2002a) Netzwerk für 
Kinder. E&W 5/2002, 6–7.  
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Increasing individual support and “heterogeneity” in schooling, according to the 
representations of foreign examples was the most common message throughout the 
analysed material. The need of the GEW to keep promoting its views can be interpreted 
as an attempt to contribute to the mental shift among its members. The E&W material 
indicated that GEW still seemingly experienced strong societal resistance to its values 
and goals.  
 
Aspects that were more compatible to the politicians’ viewpoints had to do with all-day 
schooling and early education. These issues were among the publically accepted 
responses to PISA according to Tillmann et al.312 In the GEW statements the emphasis 
on early education was visible in the longer goal of turning kindergartens into 
educational institutions after the model of other countries.313 The state of kindergartens 
and the lack of all-day schooling were among the aspects in which Germany was 
represented to have fallen behind in a pattern of development, which other countries 
were claimed to have taken long ago.  
 
In chapters two and three I have scrutinised the reactions and representations of German 
and foreign PISA results in the E&W and analysed their relations to one another. The 
following chapter rests on these findings and further treats the meanings that were 
attached to PISA in the E&W discussions.  
 
4 The framing of PISA and framing with PISA in 
teachers’ discussion 
 
By spring 2002, there was a tendency of starting almost every article in the E&W with a 
reference to PISA. Whether the article had to do with kindergarten, vocational 
education or university tuition fees, it seemed that PISA could offer a reference to any 
topic, although PISA had merely measured limited aspects of the achievement of 15-
year-olds. In all cases it was not clear if the PISA reference in the lead text had come 
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from the authors themselves or from the E&W editors.314 Besides the most common 
“PISA has shown that…” discourse that we have seen existed through the E&W 
discussion, other recognisable patterns continued to appear.  
 
In any case, the trip to Sweden, which had been planned long before the PISA 
results were published, has convinced even the most stubborn doubters…315 
 
The emphasis on having planned trips to Sweden or discussed issues PISA brought to 
the table already “long before PISA”,316 included a hint of pride that the actors 
themselves had been aware of the represented problems and sought solutions before the 
nationwide PISA shock. This again implied the authority given to PISA, and 
additionally gave the impression that the nationwide discussion had prompted the need 
to underline that PISA dealt with undeniable facts. Another question, which cannot be 
answered here, is whether the role of PISA was merely part of political argumentation 
or implied an actual belief in the reality that the PISA results formulated. A further 
pattern of argumentation, which at first glance gave a more moderate tone to the 
impression of giving all the credit to PISA, was the tendency to state that “not only, but 
also due to PISA…” areas of perceived problems such as early education could be 
finally reformed.317 It was implied that PISA had changed the political wind and finally 
research experts were heard even among politicians318. Thus, PISA was not represented 
to have been the first to discover deficits. However, given that PISA was represented to 
mirror the reality, this discourse eventually strengthened the message that PISA proved 
exactly what the GEW had been advocated for a long time.  
 
As the GEW had concluded till May, the causes for the poor PISA performance of 
Germany were perceived to lie at the values in the system and within politics: 
competition and selection were said to prevail instead of integration and support. 
                                                
314 E.g. Peters, Carsten (2002) Vergessene Aspekte – Plädoyer gegen Strafgebühren. E&W 
4/2002, 22; Herdt, Ursula (2002) Kellerkinder brauchen besondere Förderung. E&W 3/2002, 
25; Ballauf, Helga (2002b) Lernoasen für Kleine und Große. E&W 5/2002, 13.  
315 “Jedenfalls hat die längst vor der Veröffentlichung der PISA-Ergebnisse geplante GEW-
Reise mit Bildungsjournalisten nach Schweden selbst hartknäckige Zweifler überzeugt…” 
Editorial. E&W 3/2002, 3. Italics added.  
316 Editorial. E&W 3/2002, 3; Boehlkau, Tilman (2002) Mehr Zeit zum Lernen. E&W 3/2002, 
34.  
317 Chefsache. E&W 1/2002, 4; Welzel, Steffen (2001a) Zu Besuch im Rosengarden – 
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318 Kahl 2002a, 21.  
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PISA’s role had been to provide arguments for a transition from the past to new a 
direction of educational politics “with a future”.319  
 
The following sections will go deeper into the roles that were attached to PISA and 
analyse them in relation to some aspects of the national political context of that time, 
which, as I attempt to show, seemed to reinforce the meaning that was attached to PISA. 
Therefore, the matter did not only concern the way that PISA was framed, but also how 
PISA framed the issues that were considered urgent in German educational politics.  
 
4.1 The goal of a high performing, internationally competitive 
education system  
 
By late spring 2002, the GEW had initiated a campaign “Save the Bildung” (Rettet die 
Bildung), which polemically left only two possible alternatives for the actual situation 
to proceed: “Either the right and appropriate steps are taken according to the actual 
findings… or Bildung in Germany descends even deeper into international 
mediocrity.”320 With actual findings they again seemed to refer to PISA without 
explicitly mentioning it. The references to “right consequences” and “international 
mediocrity” indicated the taken-for-granted reception of PISA and the scale the OECD 
provided. Here one could argue that the GEW campaign was essentially linked to a 
political battle of the time; hence, it should not too hastily be interpreted as indicating 
factual trust in the OECD’s worldview. Whichever the case, especially considering the 
E&W’s function of informing teachers and influencing their opinion, this style of 
argumentation definitely might have fabricated and reproduced PISA’s ascendancy in 
the teachers’ self-understanding of their national education system. These patterns 
suggest that PISA had been given a political function within the GEW campaign.  The 
chairperson of the GEW, Stange, declared: 
 
Especially according to the results of the PISA study, action is urgently required. 
Germany needs a modern educational system, which produces high performance 
                                                
319 Rettet die Bildung. E&W 5/2002, 5. 
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and is involved in the society, meeting the needs of children, youth and adults.321 
 
Emphasis on achievement or performance orientation (Leistungsfähigkeit) of the system 
coming from Stange was interesting. The fact that the PISA discussion was tied up with 
the concept of ‘achievement’ (Leistung) is understandable since performance and 
efficiency were core concepts of PISA as an institution322 and as we have seen so far, 
achievement defined by PISA was considered a desired goal in the E&W as well. 
Moreover, it might have been politically difficult for the GEW not to highlight the 
importance of achievement. According to Kreft, GEW was not the only labour union to 
state at the time that Germany ought to aim for a Spitzenplatz in international 
achievement tests323.  
 
However, especially the political left and social democrat side in the German education 
debates had been given the connotation of not giving enough value to high achievement 
in contrast to the conservative party CDU/CSU, which demanded for more Leistung.324 
In the E&W, this was visible as well; while some conservative voices uttered that PISA 
indicated that Leistung had not been emphasised enough, several the GEW-minded 
comments asserted the opposite: there had been too much achievement orientation 
which had further increased the selectivity of the system. There were several signs of 
conviction in the magazine that Germany was internationally known for its strict 
discipline system, which even the “Swedish conservatives” had set as their model, as 
Heinemann reported.325 The judgements of what the German reality in fact was like 
created an interestingly contradictory pattern.  
 
Furthermore, it was acknowledged in the E&W that the conservatives accused the GEW 
of Kuschelpädagogik (“cuddle pedagogy”). The conservative logic was criticised for 
instance by pointing out that teachers’ approachable and considerate attitude to pupils 
                                                
321 “Gerade nach den Erkenntnissen der PISA-Studie ist Handeln dringend erforderlich. 
Deutschland braucht ein leistungsfähiges und in die Gesellschaft eingebundenes modernes 
Bildungssystem, das den Bedürfnissen von Kindern, Jugendlichen und Erwachsenen gerecht 
wird.” Stange, Eva-Maria (2002a) Wir wollen eine andere Bildungspolitik. E&W 4/2002, 4. 
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322 See OECD 2004, 3.  
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did not necessarily preclude them from demanding performance as well.326 Later on, the 
PISA-E results were used to justify that the Länder with a social democrat government 
had been able to produce a “Gymnasium elite” just as well as the ones with CDU/CSU 
governments.327 The GEW’s Demmer described the school political debate of the time 
as follows: 
 
As pedagogical laymen the Saxon culture minister Rößler and the president of 
the employers’ federation Hundt came out and promptly warned of cuddle 
pedagogy and again confounded learning and achieving with competition and 
failure threat.328 
 
The discussion thereby resulted in an already existing German debate of different 
political understandings of what Leistung meant or what it should mean.329 In this light, 
the GEW seemingly had a strategy of responding to the conservative claims by 
highlighting, that the GEW in fact pleaded for “more achievement, not less”330. It 
seemed that in this respect, PISA encouraged to give in to the political accusations.  
 
Although highlighting achievement may have been politically unavoidable at the time, 
the GEW could have, considering its determined political goals and the steadfast tone, 
taken a different stance against the strong achievement emphasis coming from an 
external agency such as the OECD. Apparently PISA and its framing as part of the 
GEW arguments might have had an impact on how statements of the capacity for 
international competition and the “right consequences” finally ended up as part of the 
official GEW argumentation.  
 
PISA seemed to have made the need to give in to the political accusations even more 
necessary, but it was simultaneously utilised to provide arguments against the GEW’s 
perceived political opposition. The outcome was a rather ambiguous attitude towards 
the performance-oriented discourse of the OECD in the E&W. Nevertheless, 
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achievement as defined by PISA was hardly put under question by the E&W readers or 
authors as I have shown in the previous chapters. Rather surprisingly, the only sign of a 
critical take on the OECD and PISA in my research period came from a reader as late as 
in June. The critic questioned the tendency of the E&W to treat PISA-results as an 
incontrovertible truth.331 However, this criticism received no comments from the editors 
or other readers.  
 
The GEW, however, dissociated itself from the KMK’s declarations of encouraging 
competition between the Länder, which had been the political agreement of the KMK’s 
ministers as part of their attempt to improve quality after the PISA results.332 
Nevertheless, at the same time the GEW accepted the importance of international 
competitiveness of the German system as part of their rhetoric:  
 
Everyone knew it – PISA confirmed it: the German education system is not 
internationally competitive.333 
 
Thus, it seemed that competition could attain different connotations in the context of 
international competition than when talking about competition within the German 
borders.334 In other words, international competition was perceived as a given task that 
could not be called in question, whereas the national competition initiated by the KMK 
was treated with suspicion. Other signs of worrying about German backwardness 
(Deutscher Rückstand) in educational and economic terms became visible also outside 
of the mere PISA discussion in the E&W. For instance, the OECD’s Schleicher referred 
in his E&W column to the “proven” link between education and the “future 
competence” (Zukunftsfähigkeit) of countries. Hence, the apprehension about the 
economic future of the country was present in the magazine.335  
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Although some commentators of the E&W rather uncritically referred to global 
urgencies, which the OECD rhetoric often leans on in their argumentation,336 it was 
interesting how globalisation on the other hand caused criticism in the magazine. The 
aforementioned contradiction in the discourses on high performance and competition 
became even more apparent in the simultaneous existence of crisis rhetoric and direct 
protests against globalisation effects on education. The on-going negotiations of the 
GATS treaty in spring 2002 were observed critically in the E&W, discussing the 
possible threats to education as a public good. GATS, the General Agreement of Trade 
in Services, was a process initiated by the World Trade Organisation in 1994 in order to 
achieve a multilateral agreement over the liberalisation of trading in services337. The 
statement to the matter in the E&W was expressed explicitly: Bildung must not become 
a product.338 Elmar Altvater implied that through GATS the social equality aspect – 
inherent in the GEW understanding of Bildung throughout the research material – was 
now threatened by the neoliberal ideology of privatisation. According to Altvater, such 
an ideology prevailed in the attitudes of many regular teachers even outside what he 
called the “neoliberal camp”.339  
 
The GEW was likewise disquieted and feared that the KMK would not understand the 
dangers, which “American test institutes” or “New Zealand education companies” 
urging to open the educational market could cause to the national educational 
policymaking. Their concern was that through GATS, external actors and “monopolists 
of the international education market” could determine learning contents, “define the 
standards” and control results instead of national and local democratic organs. 
Heinemann even stated how unsurprising it was that there were power relations hidden 
under the formal equality of market participants. Consequently, it was seen as the task 
                                                
336 E.g. Nuissl, Ekkehard (2002) Lehren sollte nur wer selbst lernt. E&W 6/2002, 14; regarding 
the “crisis rhetoric” surrounding globalisation discourses, see Auld & Morris.  
337 Robertson, Susan, Bonal, Xavier & Dale, Roger (2002) GATS and the Education Service 
Industry: The Politics of Scale and Global Reterritorialization. Comparative Education Review, 
46(4), 473. 
338 Altvater, Elmar (2002) Freier Handel oder freier Zugang? Die Auswirkungen des GATS auf 
das Bildungswesen. E&W 4/2002, 2; Heinemann, Karl-Heinz (2002b) GATS – Freihandel und 
die Folgen für das Bildungswesen. E&W 4/2002, 6–9; Stange, Eva-Maria (2002b) 
Folgeneinschätzung ist angesagt. E&W 4/2002, 9. 
339 Altvater.  
80 
of the GEW to remind the public and the politicians of the effects of globalisation on 
education.340  
 
However, this critical take to capitalism and globalisation effects on education did not 
lead to a similarly sceptical view of the OECD. The articles treating globalisation did 
not discuss PISA or the OECD: these were completely separate topics in the E&W. For 
instance, the concept of standards was treated in a different context in globalisation 
articles than in the PISA discussions, which had particularly stated the need for 
nationwide educational standards.341 It seemed that GATS had received a threatening 
connotation due to its possible direct power with binding rules over national 
governments342, whereas the OECD’s influence might not have been perceived as 
power because of its soft means to provide recommendations.343  
 
There were, however, several German contemporary educationists who publically 
questioned the interests behind the goals of increasing standardised steering, labour 
market orientation and autonomy in education. In their “Frankfurt Pleas” (Frankfurter 
Einsprüche), published in 2005, the critics perceived these features among others as a 
result of politics that followed the logic of international achievement tests. According to 
the critics, the technocratic “quality management” discourse of educational monitoring 
and efficiency was transforming educational systems into market-oriented enterprises. 
Moreover, the critics alluded to the tendency of treating assessment instruments such as 
PISA as self-evident.344 One of them, Frank-Olaf Radtke argued against the prevailing 
presumption that improving quality in education by orienting to international 
comparisons would actually increase social equality345. An opposing argument came 
from Heinz-Elmar Tenorth, a German historian of education, who questioned these 
claims of the economisation of education. Tenorth stated that the Frankfurt Pleas 
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offered no alternatives, stood on the way of progress and merely glorified the past. 
Whereas the critics had expressed the concern that external agents would determine 
educational goals, Tenorth asserted that the educational science would retain the control 
of the evaluation culture346.  
 
In contrast, my analysis has shown so far that many GEW commentators had been 
convinced by PISA. For them, the results had provided what they had wished to hear: 
PISA had proven that socio-economic equity and excellence were compatible, that is, 
low variance in performance could exist simultaneously with high achievement. 
Therefore, the E&W authors did not question PISA as an institution; instead, they 
spread further the message of the PISA advocates, who asserted that in Germany, too, 
reforms increasing autonomy and standardisation were required. International influence 
in the magazine was seen as something different when talking about PISA than when 
talking about globalisation effects. According to the GEW’s own representation they 
were, unlike the KMK, aware of the threats that global influence crossing national 
borders might cause for public education. It was interesting that the GEW in this light 
did not critically scrutinise the background of the OECD’s educational influence and its 
possible impact on national policymaking.  
 
4.2 Bildung and PISA 
 
In summer and autumn 2002 the battle against the German culture of selectivity was 
continuing in the E&W, but with more defined arguments.347 The articles increasingly 
discussed the prevailing inequalities in the German school system, that is, the high 
correlation of socioeconomic background and achievement, which the international 
PISA tests had indicated. The PISA-E results were said to have confirmed this earlier 
finding. In the repeated arguments against the German school structure it was growingly 
referred to the explanation of Finland’s success, namely the policy of  “not leaving any 
child behind”. This image of the Finnish “success” thus was seen to legitimise the old 
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GEW arguments.348 It seemed that the previous glorifying attention to Sweden had 
gradually evaporated.  
 
The scrutiny of prevailing inequalities in Germany now leaned more pronouncedly on 
research. What the magazine had not earlier covered conceptually was the special 
German “tradition of Bildungsbürgertum” (educated bourgeoisie), to which researchers 
Klaus-Jürgen Tillmann and Micha Brumlik attributed the German reproduction of 
inequality in the magazine349. Tillmann and Frank-Olaf Radtke remarked in E&W’s 
interviews how German teachers made tracking recommendations based on 
socioeconomic background of pupils and not on their performance as the official 
version of tracking argued. The conclusion seemed to be that if the system left teachers 
and schools the possibility of delegating “problems”, they would use it.350 Brumlik 
defined this as the “ideology” of German bourgeoisie, which wanted to keep Bildung as 
social capital within a narrow elite. He claimed that the lack of courage in green and 
social democrat education politics caused the continuation of this old ideology of a 
“natural elite” or inherited intelligence, even though the ideals of these parties were 
contradicting it.351 These argumentation patterns accorded with the earlier GEW 
representations of the selective attitudes in the German society at large. Notable was 
also that Radtke and Tillmann’s statements on the pages of the E&W at that point 
appeared congruent with the GEW’s approach to the educational problems of Germany; 
thus differing from the later critical stances they have had to PISA.  
 
The theoretical understanding of education, or in German understanding, Bildung, 
characterised the German researchers’ debate about PISA also outside the E&W 
discussion. The historical roots of the concept of Bildung trace back to the 18th century 
and the neo-humanist philosophies of Johann Gottfried Herder and Wilhelm von 
Humboldt. Based on the self-liberation ideal of the Enlightenment and the goal of ideal 
humanity, Bildung denoted the need of individuals to interact and cope with the ‘world’ 
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in order to develop and unfold themselves.352 After the release of the PISA 2000, 
critical German educationists started to question the compatibility of Bildung with the 
empirical, functional approach of measurable outcomes that PISA had to education353.  
 
Despite his criticism regarding the German tradition of Bildungsbürgertum, Brumlik 
also claimed in the E&W that the PISA concept of “literacy” represented a renaissance 
of a neo-humanist ideal of Bildung.354 In addition, the traditional German 
conceptualisation of Bildung was embedded in GEW statements concerning early 
education, in which their emphasis on the principle of social equality was explicit. The 
traditional elements were visible for instance in how the GEW emphasised that Bildung 
emerged nowhere else than in children themselves; yet the text remarked that this 
subjectivity should not be misunderstood — adults were the ones to ensure that children 
were allowed this “access to the world” (Zugang zur Welt).355 Here one should note that 
the self-orientation and the emphasis on Bildung as inner processes of an individual 
were an inherent part of the traditional understanding of Bildung.356  
 
It is interesting that while these historical conceptualisations of Bildung were guiding 
the understanding of education within the GEW, the German tradition of interpreting 
Bildung caused suspicion. Apparently it was expected that Bildung existed as an ideal 
and as a natural concept that had merely been misused in German history. If interpreted 
through Koselleck’s theory, one could say that Brumlik’s representation and the overall 
GEW argumentation implicitly created continuity from the Bildung tradition to PISA357. 
The discourses seemed to aim at reducing the tension between experience and 
expectations, between Germany’s own tradition and the international trends.  
 
While within the E&W it was implied that PISA represented similar elements than the 
traditional understanding of Bildung, other commentators in the academic German 
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discussion specifically underlined that PISA could not be compatible with Bildung.358 
Contemporaries such as Rudolf Messner expressed concerns of the public 
misunderstanding, which conceived PISA as an all-encompassing concept of liberal 
education. For Messner, the responses to PISA in Germany entailed the risk of 
narrowing down the meaning and goals of schooling and instruction and neglecting the 
aesthetic aspects of Bildung.359 Altogether, what stirred the academic debate was the 
suspicion on the measurability of Bildung360, as well as the concern that PISA lacked an 
explicit educational theory. Dietrich Benner accused the PISA tests of covering an 
unsatisfactory selection of elements and not being sufficient to judge the quality of 
instruction.361 Daniel Tröhler further critised the German OECD texts for not defining 
Bildung, but merely referring to Wilhelm von Humboldt, which according to Tröhler 
was an attempt to legitimise the concept of competence362.  
 
The German PISA experts such as Eckhard Klieme and other researchers responded to 
the criticism and underlined that PISA’s concept of competence pertained very much 
the same elements aiming at lifelong cultivation as the concept of Bildung.363 
Additionally, in 2002 Klieme together with another empirical educational scientist Petra 
Stanat remarked the still prevailing limitations concerning the explanatory power of 
assessment results.364 Besides these statistically oriented educational researchers, 
advocating comments came from historians of education as well. Achim Leschinsky 
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declared that the critics underestimated the philosophical depth of PISA’s functional 
approach365. Heinz-Elmar Tenorth claimed that within a project such as PISA an 
independent educational theory would be developed by itself, thus suggesting that PISA 
encompassed an in-depth philosophical background.366 It seemed that while the PISA 
advocates defended the actual intentions of PISA and reminded the critics of the early 
stage in the development of methodological limitations, the critics in contrast were 
concerned of the unintended effects of the public and political reception of the PISA 
study.  
 
Rebekka Horlacher has observed the German PISA debate and suggested, that as in the 
German versions of the OECD texts ‘education’ was translated as ‘Bildung’, it was 
made possible to assert the compatibility of PISA to the German tradition.367 To 
understand this translational choice it must be noted that Erziehung has traditionally 
been the term used for education. Yet, in recent decades a shift has occurred in the 
academic field of educational science in German-speaking countries: alongside the 
discipline that had always been called Erziehungswissenschaft an alternative term 
Bildungswissenschaften has become popular to address a broader selection of 
approaches to education. While Erziehung is usually associated with the upbringing of 
children, Bildung has become the term that connotes with larger issues and is seen to be 
more congruent with neuropsychological approaches to education.368 In this light it 
seemed that in the German PISA debate of the early 2000s it was partially expected that 
the PISA project would entail theoretical perspectives to education in similar depth and 
form as in the particular history of German Erziehungswissenschaft.  
 
According to Bellmann, those who were irritated by the aims to combine Bildung with 
the OECD concepts understood PISA as “American pragmatism”, which is why PISA 
for them appeared in such a contrast compared to the German educational 
                                                
365 Leschinsky, 832–833.  
366 Tenorth, Heinz-Elmar (2004) Stichwort: „Grundbildung“ und „Basiskompetenzen“: 
Herkunft, Bedeutung und Probleme im Kontext allgemeiner Bildung. Zeitschrift für 
Erziehungswissenschaft, 7(2), 169–182.  
367 Horlacher, Rebekka (2011) Bildung. Bern: Haupt Verlag, 102.  
368 See Bellmann, Johannes (2014) The changing field of educational studies and the task of 
theorizing education. In Biesta, Gert, Allan, Julie & Edwards, Richard (eds.) Making a 
Difference in Theory: The theory question in education and the education question in theory. 
London: Routledge, 65–81.  
86 
philosophy.369 Such an interpretation of PISA seemed to lead to a critical attitude 
towards it, whereas in the E&W there was no sign of perceiving PISA completely 
separate from the German tradition. Consequently, understanding PISA as a reflection 
of the ideal of Bildung in the E&W, as we saw above, may have had an impact on the 
acceptant attitude towards PISA. This conclusion can be supported by Horlacher’s 
notion of how German translations of the OECD texts using the word Bildung might 
have made the OECD conceptualisation of education appear more compatible to the 
German tradition.370  
 
Towards autumn 2002 the E&W cited researchers saying that PISA could not answer 
the question of causes and correlations, but as previously, such statements were 
immediately followed by requests to politicians to “draw consequences” of certain 
“findings”. In this way the arguments remained as ambiguous as in the earlier reactions. 
On the other hand, Heinemann showed a sign of critical reflection when he admitted 
that autonomy, personality, and critical thinking indeed could not be easily measured. 
These aspects Heinemann mentioned could be found in the humanist Bildung 
conceptualisations, although he did not refer to these as German tradition371. Still, he 
continued to assert that it was an indisputable fact that PISA indicators such as literacy 
and capacity of teamwork were connected to these required aspects of Bildung he had 
mentioned. This is why, according to Heinemann, the GEW’s support of the PISA 
indicators implied progress.372   
 
To some extent, the expectations within the GEW thus equated PISA to Bildung. It may 
indeed have been easier to connect PISA to Germany’s own traditional educational 
thinking than accept the conflict between one’s experience and expectations. This 
explanation seems even more plausible considering that in the 1990s the GEW had still 
been rather critical of international large-scale assessments373.   
 
As it seemed that the GEW defined education as Bildung für alle, they automatically 
expected the concept to include equity aspects. However, according to Horlacher, it was 
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the Frankfurter School academics that re-established the social function of Bildung from 
the late 18th century. Consequently, the interpretations of Bildung have varied in history 
and there has never been a unified understanding of Bildung.374 Thereby, even very 
diverging political opinions could claim rights for the concept by selecting historical 
definitions, which fit their understanding.375   
 
This kind of usage of Bildung in the E&W therefore seemed to include a hint of 
inflation of the concept. Horlacher has noted how the concept of Bildung still exerts 
influence on all sides of the German PISA debate. The concept is used both by those 
who link PISA to competence and those who criticise the measuring approach, but 
Horlacher claims neither side is taking into account the different historical connotations 
and implicit expectations embedded within Bildung.376 Looking at the E&W discussion, 
it also seemed that the concepts that were used were not defined. The E&W’s references 
to Bildung in comparison with the academic discussion at the time demonstrated what 
Horlacher has pointed out — that the concept entails historical legitimising power.  
 
The relation to the German tradition in the E&W seemed on the one hand to be based on 
the interpretation of Bildung as a timeless virtue and a useful slogan towards social 
equality. On the other hand, the understanding of tradition was based on the frustration 
of the national educational politics and the experience of a continuous lack of reform 
since the 1960s. It seemed that this relation and experience of the German tradition 
might have contributed remarkably to the perception of PISA and to the roles that were 
attached to it.  
 
4.3 Economic growth and PISA 
 
Another aspect that seemingly received a gradually more refined tone owing to the 
PISA discussion concerned the relationship between education and economy. From 
summer 2002 onwards it was more pronouncedly argued in the E&W that the economic 
future of Germany required reforms, which would orientate to international “models” 
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and that “school success” would lead to economic growth.377 Kahl for instance stated 
that the Scandinavian, Canadian and even the US school culture would, besides 
increasing cognitive achievement, also lead to economic success378. Kahl’s 
documentary film “Spitze! Schulen am Wendekreis der Pädagogik” about the reasons 
behind Swedish and Finnish innovative knowledge societies was advertised as 
commissioned by the GEW.379  
 
The reliance on the “proven” connection of Bildung and economic growth by the OECD 
appeared also in Haas-Rietschel’s interview of the OECD’s Schleicher. Although the 
interviewer showed signs of caution concerning effects of privatisation on social 
inequality, Schleicher defended entrepreneurial interest in education. He evaded the 
privatisation question by claiming that successful countries such as Finland and Japan 
were in fact models of practically “privatised” schools because of their pedagogical 
autonomy and responsibility over results. Despite the clear resistance to privatisation of 
education within the E&W as seen in the GATS discussion, Schleicher’s arguments did 
not seem to cause further questions or criticism in the magazine. The only aspect that 
seemed to attract attention was the interest economy now showed in education, which 
was seen to promote the goals of the GEW: more societal appreciation for education.380 
Other simultaneous calls for learning from Scandinavian school autonomy indicated 
that the OECD message regarding this issue had convinced many E&W 
commentators381. In other words, it seemed that any other economic interests were 
silenced.  
 
In summer 2002 the E&W announced that the KMK had decided to implement national 
educational standards, which also accorded with the OECD recommendations for an 
efficient school system382. Centralised achievement tests and standards still caused 
concerns for some E&W writers, who feared that in a selective system they would lead 
to school ranking, although politicians and researchers such as Klemm affirmed in the 
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magazine that such assessments would raise achievement and thereby “quality”. It was 
still constantly asserted that systematic achievement tests were a “normal” measure both 
in Sweden and Finland.383 It seemed again that caution was expressed only towards 
what national politicians would implement; international standards were, as we have 
seen so far, taken as given and not further questioned.  
 
The ascendancy of economy in defining education was also visible when the GEW drew 
attention to emergent societal support for its goals within research institutes such as the 
Bertelsmann Stiftung (The Bertelsmann Foundation of Germany) and several 
representatives of the economy. The pleas of the Baden-Württembergischer 
Handwerkstag (Confederation of Skilled Crafts in Baden-Württemberg) for a nine-year 
comprehensive school system were interpreted as a sign of support for the GEW goals: 
even “the economy” was seen to question the school structure. The Handwerkstag plea 
was framed to represent the desired reform capacity in society.384 Demmer framed the 
issue again from the national polemic angle: 
 
And who still believes that the Handwerk is a haven of conservatism and hangs 
on traditional talent theories will [...] be disabused. What can be seen there is for 
Germany almost a sensationally determined education policy position, which is 
based on international standards and processes latest research results.385 
 
Demmer praised the call of the Handwerkstag for combining all resources and ideas to 
reach a “Spitzenplatz” in the next PISA rounds.386 The represented connection between 
the PISA ranking and economic growth was therefore accepted. Similar opinions 
concerning early tracking were reported coming from the consultant company 
McKinsey and Handelskammer of Hessen387. What seemed decisive for Demmer 
though, was her experience that the Handwerkstag broke the national taboo by 
demanding the end of the three-tier school structure. Thus for Demmer, the 
representatives of the economy acted with courage contrasting what she perceived as 
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the “inconsequent” action of the KMK politicians.388 It is interesting how this 
experienced support from the economy seemed to be determined by the perception of 
traditional. This representation highlighted how the economy was not, contrasting the 
expectations, as conservative as it was assumed but instead demanded similar changes 
as the GEW.  
 
It seems that the GEW’s relation to the “economy” at this time was connected to its 
perceptions of the national situation. More precisely, this understanding, according to 
which the educational problems in Germany derived at least partially from the political 
conservatism and traditional attitudes, seemed to affect how PISA was framed and how 
the interests of the economy were interpreted. What received no attention here, or in 
Bacchi’s terms was silenced, was the possibility that there might be other interests 
behind the economic perspective than the social equality principle that the GEW 
followed389.  
 
Educational researchers such as Martens and Wolf and Tröhler have shown how the 
PISA project was initiated by national interests: France and the US initiated the 
collection of comparative data for their particular concerns within the Cold War power 
structure.390 Martens and Wolf have argued that despite the original objective of 
increasing democracy in educational policymaking, the unintended consequences of the 
internationalisation of educational politics have led to a decrease in national control 
over its educational politics391. While one can discuss over such an assertion392, an 
awareness of these background aspects and national interests was seemingly not present 
in the E&W discussions of PISA. Rather, the E&W discourses resembled what has been 
called the “paradigm of problem-solving”393, which dismisses path-dependent 
contextual factors in each national context394.  
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Although the GATS discussion had shown that the GEW was concerned about the 
marketisation of education, at this point the interests of the economy were not 
scrutinised with a similarly critical take. Outside the E&W, several contemporary 
educationists in Frankfurt had expressed concerns that politics following the economic 
interests might unintendedly lead to a market-oriented educational system395. For the 
GEW however, it was convincing enough that the explicit goal of the economy was 
perceived to be a comprehensive school system. This representation depicted the 
economy as standing for positive progress and following actual scientific knowledge, 
contrasting the perception of the national tradition, which was seen to follow archaic 
and obsolete illusions ignoring the latest empirical findings. The role of PISA was 
functionalised in this particular context; in other words, in this pattern it represented the 
change against the perceived problem. The fact how the interest of the economy in 
education served for the GEW goals and was treated accordingly demonstrated how the 
ascendancy of the economy in defining education could increase through PISA.  
 
4.4 The national obstacles towards an education “of the future”  
 
Throughout the E&W material the GEW declared that favourable conditions for 
educational reform had arrived in the German society since PISA. In spring and summer 
2002, however, the statements in the magazine gradually began to express more and 
more frustration of the “hectic standstill and conceptless politicking” that was perceived 
to occur among KMK ministers. This was seen to prevent the required transition in 
educational politics.396  
 
As this analysis has shown so far, the GEW emphasised the principle of pupil 
heterogeneity as a solution to educational problems in particular in the June 2002 issue 
of the E&W, which focused thematically on this very topic. The significance of PISA in 
this argumentation was that the results were continuously stated to have proven, that 
attempts to produce homogeneity through selection had failed, and that a school 
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structure debate should be started again. The problem was seen to be though, that no 
one had the courage to lead this debate.397 Demmer declared in summer:  
 
However, the discussion about the quality of the school system is ultimately a 
political one. PISA provided a good basis for this with its comparative data. 
Because PISA compares school systems and not teaching styles or qualities. It is 
therefore disingenuous when the Ministers of Education unanimously declare 
that one can discuss all sorts of things, just not "system issues".398 
 
Interestingly enough, at this point the earlier assumptions that causes for PISA were 
partially to be found in teaching methods had seemingly been forgotten. On the one 
hand, here Demmer depicted the school system as a result of political choices, 
contrasting the earlier common references to the division between facts and fiction. On 
the other hand, representing PISA as facts still dominated her thinking: the quote above 
demonstrates how PISA was represented as an unbiased authority with no historical or 
political context. In contrast, German traditional and historical context was reduced to a 
political game.  
 
Following Bacchi’s approach to problem representations, it is relevant to acknowledge 
how the comparisons to other countries in the E&W did not pay much attention to the 
contexts of these countries. The PISA-E discussion, however, showed how the 
comparison within the national context was different in the way that it sought 
explanations from contextual and socioeconomic factors, since explaining success with 
the political direction of the “successful” regions was regarded as undesired. There was 
thereby a difference in how international phenomena were observed compared to the 
evaluation of the national phenomena.  
 
The politicians and the KMK ministers were thus seen as hindrance to development and 
progress. It seemed that with its PISA interpretations, the GEW endeavoured to frame 
its own political action as the one actively trying to increase achievement in benefit of 
the whole country. This was contrasted with the representation of the political 
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opposition, which was seen to keep insisting on outmoded and ideological principles 
not only at the cost of equality but also of performance.399 Apparently PISA had 
contributed to the increasing tendency to refer to achievement and performance when 
legitimating arguments.   
 
Some E&W commentators drew parallels between their frustration at the politicians’ 
insufficient reactions to PISA 2000 and the stagnation after the school debate in 1960s 
and 1970s, or what was called the “turf war” (Grabenkämpfe).400 During this previous 
educational debate, topics such as inequality issues and the question of the three-tier 
structure had also been discussed, and the Gesamtschule had been introduced as a 
compromise following the dispute401. Apparently many GEW’s commentators belonged 
to the group of contemporaries who were still unsatisfied with the outcome of the old 
debate. A similar perspective from contemporary researchers at the time can be seen for 
example in Leschinsky’s article, where he diagnosed the German history of educational 
politics and asserted that the German way of politics fundamentally differed from 
countries with higher PISA results. Leschinsky tried to trace the causes behind the 
German “educational misery” and the continuous lack of reform.402 The E&W 
comments and Leschinsky had in common both the tendency of lumping other countries 
together as if they all were following a certain policy direction that Germany was not, 
and the conviction that PISA results indicated this difference.  
 
Leaning on Koselleck’s concepts of the space of experience and the horizon of 
expectations, it seemed that the experiences of the past educational debates reinforced 
what was experienced at present and how expectations concerning the future were 
formulated403. Seemingly PISA had opened up a window of “possibilities” regarding the 
future with its examples of “success”. These expectations of what the school system 
should and could be doing seemed to fuel the frustration concerning past educational 
politics. This contributed to the representation of a continued lack of reform in 
Germany. In the light of Koselleck’s approach, the GEW’s campaign to ”save the 
Bildung” can be seen as an attempt to decrease tension between experience and 
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expectations. Apparently the GEW endeavoured to create a new continuity: the aim was 
to reach the expectations of an educational reality that was presumed to exist at the 
international level.  
 
Demmer called for a “professional dealing with heterogeneity” contrasting it with the 
danger of an “ideological school fight”, as the 1960s debate was presented throughout 
the E&W material.404 As we have seen in chapter three, the way of framing 
heterogeneity as “practical rationality” and references to other countries’ ”intelligent” 
integrated systems attributed PISA the role of reason against the political opposition.405 
This pattern in the GEW arguments resembles what Bellmann has observed in 
Germany’s educational reform debate: the reformers in the 2000s perceived themselves 
to be different from the “ideologists” in the 1960s and 1970s debate.406 The way that 
PISA indicated truth in the E&W demonstrated how PISA as an institution was 
conceived in a non-political way. References to the “PISA drama” or “theatre” as well 
as to the “ideological” German politics indicated the overall disapprobation about the 
perceived political use of PISA.407 In contrast, there were no hints of any E&W 
commentators acknowledging or admitting that their own attitudes to PISA would 
obtain anything “political”.  
 
The problematisations and representations of solutions thus built on the juxtaposition 
between the professional, rational and practical on the one hand, contrasted to the 
ideological and political on the other hand. What is relevant here is to recognise how 
this argumentation pattern caused a tone of absoluteness concerning PISA and implied 
that the situation would require a “reform”. Leaning on Bacchi’s understanding of 
representations of problems, such views created a discursive effect, which limited what 
could be thought and said by assuming that there were no alternatives — following 
PISA was “right”, whereas everything else was “ideological” and therefore false. Such a 
representation made it difficult to question PISA and how it should be applied in 
practice.408 Additionally, throughout the E&W material it seemed that rarely these 
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arguments clarified what acting according to PISA or drawing conclusions from PISA 
would mean in reality.  
 
The lack of self-reflection is interesting especially in the light of the criticism that the 
GEW received from several readers about concentrating too much on “school politics” 
and system performance instead of focusing purely on what the critics stated as the 
main task of the GEW, improving teachers’ working conditions.409 Some clearly 
expressed their disapproval of the GEW politics and PISA argumentation. Common for 
the criticism was to remark that the GEW goals of abolishing the selective elements of 
the system or increasing all-day schooling were not shared objectives among the 
members.410 In the research period of this thesis, the criticism received no comments 
from the GEW officials or the E&W editors, although, publishing it made it clear that 
multiple opinions existed within the organisation. On the other hand, the fact that the 
critics took a stand against the GEW’s school political goals might have exactly 
strengthened the perception of a “turf war” and therefore reinforced the need to remain 
in the insistent position.  
 
However, there was one attempt to respond to the criticism during the GEW campaign 
in June 2002 when the GEW authors Welzel and Rödde presented results of a telephone 
survey of the members’ opinions regarding the goals of the organisation. Although 
mentioning that the survey did not reach a representative sample, the article concluded 
that the GEW had the support of the members’ majority.411 The GEW also declared 
several times to be the “leader of opinions” in education-related discussions.412 These 
responses did not acknowledge the opposing statements, nor did they try to build 
bridges between conflicting opinions. Still, it must be noted that several readers shared 
the GEW’s educational opinions in their comments, although some were less optimistic 
than others with respect to the chances of success in system reform.413  
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What remains significant regarding the regular members’ contributions in the E&W is 
that PISA eventually attracted little attention among them. The few critical comments 
on PISA were absolute exceptions during my research period. The material analysed in 
this thesis showed that while the leading figures of the GEW expressed clear stances 
regarding PISA, most of those members who participated in the debates within the 
E&W did not discuss PISA at a deeper level. Yet, it must be taken into account that the 
readers’ viewpoints only had a limited space in the magazine at the end of each issue. 
Still, the debates in the readers’ section concentrated on other topics, nonetheless 
dealing with political matters, such as the War in Afghanistan, the Holocaust and 
various domestic debates. The scope of the discussed themes gave the impression that 
the GEW’s members were generally very aware of diverse subjects. In this light, it is 
striking that they did not call PISA into question either. The lack of further discussion 
may indicate low interest or awareness to the international effects on education. This 
cannot, however, be confirmed in this analysis. Still, considering that the ordinary 
members seemed to take less interest in PISA than the GEW officials and regular 
commentators only reinforced the fact that the definitional process of PISA was left for 
those who took it for granted and focused on criticising the domestic educational 
politics.  
 
5 Discussion 
 
The objective of this master’s thesis was to examine how the PISA 2000 results were 
perceived by the GEW and its members, and how they evaluated PISA as an institution. 
My analysis has shown that the problem representations in the PISA discussions in the 
GEW’s magazine did not question PISA. The PISA results for Germany were accepted 
as a given indicator of structural, political and social problems in German education. I 
begin the conclusion by depicting the E&W problem representations after the analytic 
tools of Bacchi. Apart from definitions of problems I have considered the assumptions, 
genealogies, silences and effects of the problem representations in my analysis.  
 
Although the E&W contained multiple and sometimes contradictory voices, overall the 
PISA discussion reflected a common understanding that Germany’s low PISA results 
were a national problem, which required rapid solutions and political consequences. The 
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situation was often represented to derive from politicians’ and teachers’ indifference. 
Altogether many commentators believed that German education suffered from a 
continuity of harmful societal values, which had led to an unsuccessful educational 
model.  
 
Behind these representations of problems one could trace three distinguishable lines of 
assumptions. Firstly, it was implied or at least not contested that the PISA results 
signified the truth of the state of education in each participant country. Recurrently such 
presumptions conveyed an impression that positions in the PISA rankings indicated 
how education should be reformed in that country. Secondly, the representations 
seemingly expected that the situation in Germany fundamentally differed from other 
countries’ realities. These inferences gave significant importance to the ranking 
positions. Thirdly, assuming that German school life and politics deviated from 
“international standards” in an exceptional way suggested that other countries had 
undergone a certain course of development that Germany had failed to grasp.  
 
Besides representing other countries as a homogeneous group, Germany was also 
treated as an entity. Especially the initial reactions to PISA gave an impression of a 
single German educational system without giving much attention to the federal structure 
and Länder autonomy regarding schooling. The PISA-E results changed this pattern; 
this shift indicated that variation between the Länder was perceived with a different eye 
than variation in international comparison. The fact that PISA-E compared the Länder 
with each other made inevitably visible that the school politics and background factors 
differed between federal states. Despite this new consideration of contextual 
particularities such as socioeconomic conditions, the earlier convictions of the “truths” 
that international PISA results had revealed were not reappraised in the E&W during 
my research period.  
 
Regarding the genealogy of these problem representations one must consider the recent 
history of German educational politics, namely the school politics debate in the 1960s 
and 1970s. This was an aspect also acknowledged in the E&W by various authors. An 
assertion made by several E&W commentators highlighted that the German political 
discussion suffered from a continuous lack of reform. Seemingly, this experience 
reinforced the frustration with the state of the national education on the one hand and on 
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the other, buttressed the image of PISA as a saviour at last. Behind these problem 
representations there were, however, larger phenomena that may have shaped the 
contemporaries. Internationally the collection and comparison of data in the name of 
evidence-based policymaking was increasingly accepted and nationally, an empirical 
turn could be distinguished in the German educational thinking414. Moreover, the 
OECD’s argumentation was understandably appealing to the GEW, since the OECD’s 
PISA reasoning emphasised that it was possible to decrease socioeconomic differences 
with educational reforms. This was compatible with the GEW’s emphasis on 
comprehensive schooling and social equality.  
 
Although the argument in favour of PISA and against the prevailing educational politics 
was rather determined in the E&W, there were several remaining issues that were not 
considered problematic. The historical background of the PISA study and the OECD as 
an organisation of economic development were not discussed. Another major silence 
concerned the contextual factors behind each country’s PISA results and the historical 
path-dependencies of educational systems. Several E&W commentators seemed 
convinced that the ranking positions indicated the success of certain educational 
reforms, teachers’ methods or societal attitudes. This perception, however, attracted less 
attention towards the end of my research period, which may have occurred because 
causes for the results were not searched as eagerly after the initial reactions. 
Additionally, despite the strong trust in the PISA results, the discussions in the E&W 
demonstrated the contradictory assertions of how the PISA results should actually be 
interpreted. The way in which the E&W made an effort to understand the PISA results 
beyond the rankings only showed how ambiguous the assertions surrounding PISA had 
become. Moreover, the initial taken-for-grantedness of the results seemed to have taken 
more weight in the argumentation despite these attempts. During my research period 
there were no comments on the contradictory issues such as the few readers’ critical 
remarks on the PISA argumentation of the E&W. Among these contradictions were also 
the differences between the OECD’s Schleicher and the German PISA expert Baumert’s 
statements, which were not discussed further. In the later PISA discourses, the support 
for PISA from the representatives of economy was interpreted as further evidence that 
German national politics were on a false track. These representations did not consider 
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other possible interests of the economy in supporting PISA than the GEW’s goal for 
social equality. Apparently the GEW expected that the concepts of equality, support and 
opportunities were understood in the same way by all those referring to these ideas.  
 
The GEW’s understanding of social equality went deeper than merely highlighting 
equal opportunities; this was visible for instance in the attitudes towards the 
Scandinavian welfare model. However, there was variance between authors in this 
matter. While in comparison to England, pushing and achievement orientation were 
highlighted, in other occasions softer methods were represented to produce desired 
educational outcomes. The GEW’s interpretation of social equality was also visible in 
the representation of the German tradition of Bildung: it was presumed that equity was 
an inherent part of the Bildung and that the German bourgeoisie had merely misused the 
concept and created an inequal educational system. Furthermore, the fact that the OECD 
was seen to promote social equality issues may have had a major impact on the GEW’s 
acceptant attitude towards PISA. International comparison served as legitimising force 
proving that both equity and high achievement can work simultaneously, unlike what 
the German political opponents were said to advocate. It thus seemed to be the 
perceived educational battle in Germany that directed the high regard for the OECD.  
 
For some GEW’s commentators the representatives of the economy were eventually 
characterised as political allies because they supported comprehensive schooling and 
therefore took a different stand than the German politicians. It seemed that this 
perceived division between the more conservative German politicians and those who 
supported comprehensive schools was a reason to disregard any other possible conflicts 
with the representatives of the economy. After all, several E&W articles had also 
expressed critical concerns of market orientation and economic principles in education. 
What seemed to matter was whether different stakeholders were seen to “follow PISA” 
or not; further issues were set aside. The threats of globalisation and loss of national 
control over education that many German critics stated in the mid-2000s415 also caused 
concerns in the GEW’s discourses. The only difference was that in the E&W 
discussions, instruments such as PISA and their implementation had nothing to do with 
these threats. In other words, PISA and market economic interests were treated as 
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completely separate topics. While the impact of globalisation was represented as a 
threat to public education – for instance in the form of market orientation and private 
international influence on public national goods – no such threat was perceived in the 
OECD’s educational influence. This became visible for example in the expert role 
attached to the PISA director Schleicher in the E&W, as even his assertions on behalf of 
privatisation were not called into question. Partially the E&W material thus showed 
signs of what Bellmann and Waldow have called “the peculiar alliance” of technocratic 
educational reform and reform pedagogy416. If the lack of GEW’s critical scrutiny to 
PISA is considered in the light of the academic criticism directed at the impact of 
PISA417, it seems even more astonishing because of the leftist and generally critical 
positions within the GEW. While the critics have highlighted the connections of an 
assessment culture to the increased market liberal ideals in education in recent 
decades418, in the E&W discussion the OECD’s discourses were not linked to this threat 
at the time.  
 
In regard to the effects that the problem representations may cause, the discourses in the 
E&W gave a black-and-white impression of PISA and the consequences that should 
follow. This appeared especially in the GEW officials’ and E&W editors’ 
argumentation; the members’ letters made less statements regarding PISA. The GEW’s 
argumentation simplified the issue contrasting the “right” consequences with the 
“wrong” ones. PISA became to denote a “scientific” and “realistic” approach opposed 
to the perceived continuation in German politics and education, that is, acting 
“ideologically” and “politically” instead of proceeding rationally. Such a problem 
representation demonstrated how PISA was represented as the absolute truth and 
created an impression that simplistic solutions were available. This limited the 
possibilities to question the ways PISA could be utilised for various arguments. Besides 
these discursive effects, the problem representations in the E&W also shaped and 
constituted especially politicians and teachers in a certain way: they were represented to 
fundamentally differ from other countries’ politicians and teachers in their willingness 
to contribute to a just and high-quality education.  
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With the help of these analytical questions from Bacchi, one could distinguish a taken-
for-granted attitude towards PISA in the E&W. Nevertheless, the multiplicity of the 
viewpoints in the magazine should not be forgotten. There was no single line of opinion 
and emphasis among the articles and positions expressed in the magazine. Especially 
readers’ letters demonstrated various standpoints and contradictory stances. Clearly the 
magazine did not exclude opposing opinions, even with regard to comprehensive 
schooling. On the other hand, because of this seemingly open line one could infer that if 
there had been differing or questioning opinions to PISA, they would have been 
published in the magazine.  
 
An essential part of the PISA discussion in the E&W concentrated on the past and 
present experiences of the national political situation and the expectations that with 
PISA this perceived continuity could be changed. Especially the GEW officials 
represented the problem deriving from the polemic nature of national politics in 
Germany. Despite the multiplicity of voices in the E&W, this line of argumentation was 
discernible throughout the research material.  
 
It seemed that the OECD’s concepts received such positive connotations partially 
because of the strong resistance to present and past national politics and to the perceived 
cultural atmosphere of selection and exclusion in Germany. In other words, my analysis 
has shown how the context had a decisive role in how the GEW actors framed PISA. 
Consequently, the roles attached to PISA were selective and dismissed other dimensions 
of PISA and its political impact. This was also how the German tradition of Bildung 
was portrayed in some representations. The concepts themselves, PISA and Bildung, 
were comprehended as timeless virtues without historical contexts.  
 
Seemingly there was no space for querying the background of PISA because the 
experienced national context constructed the problem and the framework in which PISA 
was discussed. According to Bacchi, problem representations are contingent, which is 
why it is important to scrutinise them in different cultural contexts in order to 
understand how culturally bound certain problematisations may be.419 My results 
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demonstrate how PISA was functionalised in the E&W through a narrow national lense. 
The way that PISA was utilised as legitimising evidence conforms Tillmann et al.’s 
findings of the German policymakers’ context. Although teachers’ agendas and 
positions differed from those of the politicians, the pattern in which PISA received a 
political function was similar.  
 
While the attention in the E&W was directed at the national political context, there 
seemed to be no need to question PISA or the international influence coming from the 
OECD. PISA as an institution was conceived as neutral. In contrast, German politicians 
were represented to utilise PISA for their own purposes. This, however, did not 
undermine the conviction that PISA could be interpreted in a “right” way.  
 
The lack of scrutiny could also indicate that the institutions were not experienced as 
something that could be questioned. One might consider, to what extent it might have 
been possible for a political actor such as the GEW to question an authoritative agency 
such as the OECD. This analysis has, nevertheless, shown that there were several 
German academics who had a critical attitude towards PISA and its implementation in 
politics. Moreover, as Kreft and Hartong have pointed out, the GEW had expressed 
criticism of international achievement assessments before PISA420. The lack of critical 
scrutiny of the OECD’s interests and background of PISA seems astonishing also 
considering that in my research material the GEW generally did not refrain from 
criticising issues that it considered relevant. The readers’ letters were rather determined 
in their argumentation as well, but hardly discussed PISA as an institution. Moreover, 
considering how critically globalisation effects and political actors were scrutinised in 
the magazine, it seems unlikely that the GEW would have spared any criticism if it had 
had such.  
 
Still, this thesis cannot answer the question to what extent the GEW actually believed 
that the OECD or its assessments were the best indicators to determine what was best 
for German education. My analysis could, however, show that during this particular 
time frame they had accepted PISA into their vocabulary. Examining from the 
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viewpoint of conceptual history,421 these results demonstrate how undisputed the 
symbolic meaning of a concept can become. I argue that it is not insignificant how the 
first connotations and experiences of PISA were drawn into the minds of the GEW’s 
educationists and shaped their self-understanding of their professional field. However, 
PISA as an instrument as well as discourses surrounding it have been developing since 
the beginning of the 2000s. Further enquiry would thus be necessary to discover how 
the GEW’s perception of PISA may have changed along with the increasing 
international criticism of the OECD’s education politics towards the 2010s.  
 
In the end, there was a notable difference in how national was represented in 
comparison to international in the E&W sources. The grass seemed greener outside the 
German borders. Within national dimensions it was focused on political conflict, 
whereas everything regarding ‘international’ appeared in neutral or positive terms. The 
meaning of PISA was equalled to international comparison and thereby presented 
without context.  
 
Admittedly, comparison must occur from one’s own point of view, as it would be 
hardly possible to hold a similar scope of contextual information regarding external 
circumstances. Moreover, cross-national comparison can contribute a great deal to the 
understanding of one’s own context from a new perspective. Nevertheless, as critical 
educational literature on the impact of international assessments remarks422, such 
comparisons entail problematic issues. The point of this analysis has not been to suggest 
that empirical research on education should not be conducted. Nor do I wish to question 
the goals of socioeconomic equality and more effective, high quality learning and 
teaching as a basis of educational politics. What I consider problematic in the PISA 
discussion is, however, something that my analysis has further demonstrated: the 
tendency of attributing legitimacy to empirical results and their “implementation” 
without precision and even in presence of contradictory arguments. This thesis has 
shown how the ascendancy of an instrument such as PISA can work, and that it may 
easily be adapted to an existing national context and harnessed to particular political 
views. Moreover, perceptions of PISA within the GEW followed the “textbook 
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example” use of PISA that Waldow has observed in Germany — the comparative view 
was selective in its references to international success423.  
 
This does not mean that assessments such as PISA could not provide significant results 
for educational research. However, as Bellmann has pointed out, there seems to be no 
consensus even among statisticians on how the PISA results should be interpreted and 
what their impact on politics is and ought to be424. Politicians, OECD experts or 
educational professionals should therefore not overlook the extent to which PISA or 
other achievement assessments may attain a political function.  
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